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ABSTRACT 
This research focuses on anti-Americanism in Europe. Old Europe, including countries 
like France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Belgium, is significantly more anti-
American than New Europe, which includes countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and 
Hungary. In this project, however, I have made a number of observations that go beyond than 
this simple conclusion. I examined factors that could be behind these different levels of anti-
Americanism in Old Europe and New Europe, and one key answer that emerged was ―cultural 
similarity.‖ There are, of course, other factors that impact attitudes towards the United States and 
Americans, such as the frequent travels to and from the U.S., a country‘s trade ties with the 
American government, and people‘s views on U.S. policies in the Middle East and towards the 
environment. But even when we take all these elements into account, cultural similarity still 
plays a significant role in why Old Europe is more anti-American than is New Europe. The 
United States and New Europe resemble each other more culturally than Old Europe and the 
U.S. do, particularly in their levels of religiosity. Secularism never took root in New Europe and 
the United States with the force that it has in Old Europe. As the two case studies have shown, 
Romanians and Americans go to church more often, pray more frequently, and place more 
importance on religion in their lives than do the French.  
The second element of cultural similarity investigated in this dissertation is tolerance. 
There is a significant relationship between levels of anti-Americanism and tolerance towards 
women, immigrants/foreign workers and immigrants in Old Europe versus New Europe. New 
Europe and the United States are, in general, more intolerant than Old Europe.  
The results presented in this dissertation provide a better understanding of European anti-
Americanism than was previously the case in the already extensive literature on this topic. There 
is a clear cultural divide in the European Union between Old Europe and New Europe that 
parallels their respective attitudes towards the United States and the American people. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE WHAT AND THE WHY 
In 2003, with the war in Iraq looming over the United States and its EU allies, then 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made a comment that reverberated in all European 
capitals. Addressing the foreign media in Washington, he was asked: ―Sir, a question about the 
mood among European allies. If you look at, for example, France, Germany, also a lot of people 
in my own country -- I'm from Dutch public TV, by the way -- it seems that a lot of Europeans 
rather give the benefit of the doubt to Saddam Hussein than President George Bush. These are 
U.S. allies. What do you make of that?‖ Rumsfeld‘s answer was: 
Now, you're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe. 
If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east. 
And there are a lot of new members. And if you just take the list of all the members of 
NATO and all of those who have been invited in recently -- what is it? Twenty-six, 
something like that? -- You‘re right. Germany has been a problem, and France has been a 
problem. But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They're not with 
France and Germany on this; they're with the United States. (Rumsfeld 2003)  
The reaction to these comments was swift. Coomarasmy (2003) describes German and 
French leaders as being ―profoundly vexed‖ by Rumsfeld‘s comments. He notices that they were 
also quick to dismiss the distinction made by Secretary Rumsfeld as a mere attempt to pitch 
Eastern and Western European countries against each other in order to maintain American world 
supremacy against the increased influence of the European Union – ―divide et impera‖ 
(Coomarasamy 2003).  
This project tests the validity of Rumsfeld‘s supposition that there are two divided 
―Europes.‖ This is the “what‖ of my dissertation – what I am substantially interested in. There 
are two levels of inquiry employed toward this end. The first level deals with the possibility that 
there are different degrees of anti-Americanism in different parts of Europe. If Rumsfeld is right, 
then I should find that countries within ―New Europe‖ (the Polish or the Romanians) are 
friendlier toward the United States than are those within ―Old Europe‖ (the French or Germans). 
Table 1.1.1 contains the list of all European countries part of this analysis and the Old Europe – 
New Europe division.  
TABLE 1.1.1: OLD EUROPE – NEW EUROPE COUNTRIES 
OLD EUROPE NEW EUROPE 
Austria Bulgaria 
Belgium Cyprus 
Denmark Czech Republic 
Finland Estonia 
France Hungary 
Germany Latvia 
Greece Lithuania 
Ireland Poland 
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Table continued. 
OLD EUROPE NEW EUROPE 
Italy Romania 
Luxembourg Slovakia 
Malta Slovenia 
Netherlands  
Portugal  
Spain  
Sweden  
United Kingdom  
 
Assuming that distinctions in feelings towards the United States do exist in Old versus 
New Europe, the second level of inquiry will investigate the reasons behind these divergent 
degrees of anti-Americanism. I have chosen to focus on two sets of explanatory variables, both 
related to cultural differences between Old Europe, New Europe, and the United States – one set 
of variables is focused on religion and the other is focused on tolerance (see below Chart 1.1.1). I 
have also added to my analysis several alternative, non-cultural, explanatory variables: strength 
of economic ties, as measured by the trade to GPD ratio, numbers of times a person had traveled 
to the U.S., as well as views on American involvement in Iraq, the Palestinian problem and 
environmental protection around the world. 
Chart 1.1.1: Cultural Similarity and Anti-Americanism in Old versus New Europe  
 
OLD EUROPE 
NEW EUROPE 
HIGH  CULTURAL 
SIMILARITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LOW CULTURAL 
SIMILARITY 
 
 
LOW PRO-AMERICANISM                                      HIGH PRO-AMERICANISM                  
EXPECTED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CULTURAL 
SIMILARITY AND PRO-AMERICANISM 
THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CULTURAL
LIKENESS AND PRO-
AMERICANISM
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The reason - the “why‖- of my research is that I am keenly interested in the changes that 
have occurred in Eastern Europe for the last twenty years, and wish to better understand the real 
causes of these changes.  I am originally from Romania (part of Rumsfeld‘s New Europe), and 
grew up during Communism with older people telling me stories about how ―the Americans‖ 
have betrayed us after World War II and ―sold us‖ to the Soviets. However, almost as soon as the 
Ceausescu regime fell in December 1989, the democratic Romania became wholeheartedly pro-
American. At the same time, it remained a profoundly francophone country, the only one in 
Central and Eastern Europe where the majority of the population speaks a Latin-language. Then, 
following the United States withdrawal from the International Criminal Court treaty, Romania 
was the first country to follow the U.S.‘s lead by also withdrawing. Later, when the war in Iraq 
started, Romania again broke from its bigger sibling in France, by clearly and unequivocally 
siding with the Bush Administration. Why did Romania choose the Americans over the French? 
Is it because Romania truly is part of Rumsfeld‘s ―New Europe,‖ and is now more sympathetic 
to the U.S. than to the French from an international political perspective? If that is the case, what 
are the values that make the Romanians prefer the United States more than the France? These are 
the types of questions that contributed to the development of this project. 
1.2 THE HOW 
I describe in the next section the methods and data – the how – I use to examine the 
questions discussed above. Toward this end, I employ two forms of methodological inquiry for 
this purpose: 1) statistical analysis (independent samples t-test, chi-square test and multivariate 
regression) using public opinion data (from the Eurobarometer, the World Values Survey and 
other similar databases) as well as trade/economic data, and 2) qualitative (case study) analysis 
using archival data, mass media information, etc. This empirical analysis component of this 
dissertation begins with a series of quantitative tests of my primary research questions using 
public opinion poll data.  This is followed by a qualitative analysis of the relationships uncovered 
by the earlier, quantitative analysis.  
1.2.1  QUANTITATIVE METHODS 
One of the three quantitative methods used in this research is the independent-samples t-test 
comparing means between populations of respondents from Old Europe, New Europe and the 
United States. This method was used in those cases in which the independent variable was a 
dummy variable (coded 0 and 1) and the dependent variable had more than two values. The 
second quantitative method utilized in this dissertation is the Chi-Square test for independence. I 
used this method in those cases in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable, classifying 
the respondents in two distinct categories (agree/disagree, mentioned/not mentioned). The third 
statistical tool used in this research was a multivariate regression with several independent 
variables and anti-Americanism as the dependent variable. 
1.2.2. QUALITATIVE METHODS 
The qualitative method used in this analysis is the case study. The Merriam-Webster 
Online Dictionary defines a case study as ―an intensive analysis of an individual unit (as a person 
or community) stressing developmental factors in relation to environment‖ (Merriam-Webster 
Online Dictionary n.d.). George and Bennett define a case as an ―instance of a class of events 
such as revolutions, or various categories of governmental regimes, economic systems or 
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personality types that the researcher chooses to study with the goals of discovering the causes of 
similarities or differences among instances of that class of events.‖ (George and Bennett 2005, 
17). In Gerring‘s description, a case is ―a spatially delimited phenomenon (unit) observed at a 
single point in time or over some period of time‖ (Gerring 2007, 19).  For the purpose of this 
project, I draw from each of these definitions in examining the differences in levels of anti-
Americanism in France and Romania by limiting the analysis to two political units, over a ten 
years period and one class of societal elements – anti-American attitudes.   
One aspect of case study methodology often criticized is the case selection process. 
George and Bennett (2005) argued that the problem with case selection bias for case studies is 
different from the case selection bias in statistical research, and this discrepancy stems from their 
distinct epistemologies: ―the goal of statistical analysis is to acquire enough knowledge about as 
many units of interest in the population as possible, to be able to make general claims about the 
group under study. The goal of case studies is to acquire as much knowledge as possible about 
one unit, such as a country, or a specific historical event, and then use this information to devise 
new theoretical questions‖ (George and Bennett 2005, 21) As these epistemological differences 
are reflected in methodological ones, the two authors argue that in a statistical analysis, if the 
researcher does not select his cases randomly (unless you can include the entire population in 
your analysis, which is not feasible in most instances) then the results of a statistical analysis 
could be biased, possibly showing either a relationship between variable when none exists, or no 
relationship when in reality there is one.  A case study subject (country, historical event, 
politician, etc.) cannot be selected randomly. It must be a special case, standing out from the 
crowd in a way that makes the causal connections between independent and dependent variables 
more visible to the researcher.  
The ―most similar case‖ case study methodology, focusing on Romania and France, is 
used in this research. These are ―cases that are comparable in all respects except for the 
independent variable, whose variance may account for the cases having different outcomes on 
the dependent variable‖ (George and Bennett 2005, 81).  George and Bennett also advise the 
researchers to select their cases for theoretical reasons, and not just because the cases are 
interesting, while Yin suggests that it is good to ―use your own, prior expert knowledge in your 
case study‖ (Yin 2003, 137). I believe that my cases meet all these requirements. I have 
theoretical and personal knowledge of those two cases, and they are both relevant to my overall 
research question: Romania is part of ―New Europe,‖ France is ―Old Europe,‖ and these 
countries‘ levels of anti-Americanism appear to be notably different despite the fact that their 
strong cultural, political, and economic ties with each other might have suggested otherwise.  
The case studies in this research project are largely used for descriptive purposes, and are 
attempts at providing a snapshot of the bigger picture of cultural similarity and anti-Americanism 
across Old and New Europe, seeing if there is a relationship between these two phenomena. Two 
European countries, one from Old Europe (France) and one from New Europe (Romania) were 
chosen for this purpose.   
1.2.3. EMPIRICAL DATA 
There are six main sources of data used in the statistical analysis part of my dissertation. 
Five of these are public opinion polls/ surveys: the Eurobarometers, World Values Survey, Pew 
Research Center‘s Global Attitudes Project, Voice of the People and the United States 
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Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy surveys. The sixth database contains economic/trade 
data (trade to GDP ratio) and was created specifically for this project by combining information 
from the U.S. government‘s trade data and EU‘s national budgets data. These databases are 
presented in detail below, starting with the Eurobarometer surveys. 
I. The Eurobarometer Surveys 
The Eurobarometer Surveys are ―the products of a unique program of cross-national and 
cross-temporal social science research‖ (Center 2007). This program moved under the 
management of the Commission of the European Community (CEC) in early 1970, when 
simultaneous surveys were conducted in the member countries of the European Union. Initially, 
the Commission‘s goal was to find out how much the Europeans knew and/or cared about the 
Common Market and other communitarian institutions, as well as what the major national goals 
were for each member state in the eyes of its own citizens. The areas of interest later expanded to 
include not only people‘s attitudes toward the European Union, its institutions, and other 
international actors (such as the United States, UN or NATO), but also their views on other 
topics such as the quality of their lives, happiness, religion or hopes for a better future (European 
Comission n.d.). The official launch of the Eurobarometer surveys took place in 1974, and they 
have been conducted since then every spring and fall. I use two Eurobarometer surveys for my 
dissertation: Eurobarometer 62 (2004) and Eurobarometer 63.4 (2005). 
Eurobarometers 62 (2004) and 63.4 (2005) were conducted in 29 European nations, but 
only information from the following countries has been kept in my databases: Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. The variables from these 
two surveys used in this research measure anti-American feelings in Old and New Europe, as 
well as levels of religiosity. Eurobarometer 62 (2004) database used for this analysis contains 51 
variables and 29,334 respondents. Eurobarometer 63.4 (2005) database contains 61 variables and 
29,328 respondents.  Codebooks for these two databases, containing the wording of the questions 
as well as the coding for each answer, can be found in Appendices 6 and 7. 
II. The World Values Survey  
The World Values Survey (WVS) organization is a ―worldwide network of social 
scientists studying changing values and their impact on social and political life‖ (World Values 
Survey 2008). The WVS in collaboration with EVS (European Values Study) conducted national 
surveys in 97 societies, where they discovered the existence of profound changes that have taken 
place over time in what people believe it is important in their lives. European Values Study is ―a 
large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research program on basic human values […] 
and a unique research project on how Europeans think about life, family, work, religion, politics 
and society‖ (European Values Study 2007). In order to measure these beliefs and values, five 
waves of surveys were carried out, from 1981 to 2007, in 97 nations.  For the purpose of this 
analysis I am using only information collected since the 1998 survey. 
The WVS argues that peoples‘ beliefs and values play a key role in a country‘s economic 
and democratic development. While the WVS network analyzes the causal link between global 
cultural changes and economic development, quality of life, and democracy, my interest is to 
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examine whether the tolerance and religiosity levels measured by WVS can explain different 
levels of anti-Americanism in Old Europe and New Europe. My database contains responses 
from the following countries: Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Spain, Great Britain and the United States (62 variables and 
19,897 respondents). The codebook for this database, containing the wording for each question 
as well as the coding for each answer, can be found in Appendix 1. 
III. Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project  
The Pew Research Center‘s Global Attitudes Project conducts ―public opinion surveys 
around the world on a broad array of subjects ranging from people‘s assessments of their own 
lives to their views about the current state of the world and important issues of the day‖ (Pew 
Research Center 2011). It is directed by Andrew Kohut, president of the Pew Research Center, 
and co-author (along with Bruce Strokes) of America against the World: How We Are Different 
and Why We Are Disliked. The project was initiated in 2001 and for my dissertation I am using 
the surveys conducted in 2002 and 2007, as they not only contain questions/variables pertinent to 
my own research, but they also cover the geographical areas I analyze (New Europe, Old Europe 
and the United States).   
The 2002 Pew Global Attitudes survey (referred to henceforth as Pew 2002) was 
conducted in 44 nations.  I focused on the following countries for the purpose of my research: 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Slovak Republic and 
the United States. The variables from this survey that I use in my analysis are those concerning 
levels of tolerance towards women, homosexuals, and foreigners/immigrants, levels of 
religiosity, and levels of anti-Americanism in Europe. The restricted PEW 2002 database I 
created for this analysis contains 38 variables and 6,031 respondents. The codebook for this 
database, containing the wording for each question as well as the coding for each answer, can be 
found in Appendix 3. 
The 2007 Pew Global Attitudes survey (referred to henceforth as Pew 2007) was 
conducted in 47 nations. The modified database I use for this project contains information from 
the following countries: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Poland, Slovakia and the United States. This data is used in testing hypotheses 
regarding levels of anti-Americanism, religiosity, as well as tolerance towards women and 
foreigners/immigrants. The restricted PEW 2007 database used in this dissertation contains 38 
variables and 9,837 respondents. The codebook for this database, with the wording for each 
question and the coding/value for each answer, can be found in Appendix 5. 
IV. Voice of the People  
Voice of the People Survey is conducted annually under the auspices of Gallup 
International Association. The edition used in my analysis is the ―Millennium Survey‖ conducted 
in over 50 countries between August and October 1999, with the results published in 2000 
(ICPSR n.d.). The countries included of my database are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom and United States. Answers from this survey are used to test my hypotheses 
regarding levels of tolerance towards women, homosexuals and foreigners/immigrants, and 
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levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe as well as the United States. The restricted 
database I use contains 42 variables from 21,736 respondents, and the codebook for it can be 
found in Appendix 4. 
V. United States Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy Survey 
―United States Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy‖ CID Survey Project (U.S. CID) 
was conducted in 2006 for the Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown 
University by International Communications Research (Howard, Gibson and Stolle 2005).  It 
represented a partnership with the European Social Survey (ESS), which has been carried out 
twice a year since 2002. As a result of including several questions from the ESS survey in the 
U.S. CID survey, the United States information was compatible and could be included in a sole 
database (which I use for my dissertation) containing U.S. data alongside data from 11 European 
countries surveyed in 2002: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, France, United 
Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal 
and Sweden. This active database contains 22 variables and 43,360 respondents and its codebook 
(with the wording for each question and the coding/value of each answer) can be found in 
Appendix 4. 
VI. “Trade to GDP Ratio” Database 
I created the ―trade to GDP ratio‖ database by combining information from two 
different sources: United States‘ government trade data and the European Union‘s budget data.  
The steps I took in order to build a database containing ―trade to GPD ratio‖ for individual EU 
countries and the U.S. are described below: 
1. I collected trade data (yearly imports and export) in millions of dollars from the U.S. 
census website: http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html . 
2. I then collected national GDP data in millions of Euros from the EUROSTAT website: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database 
3. I converted the millions of Euros from the EUROSTAT website into the millions of 
dollars from the census website. I converted these currencies by first moving the 
information regarding the U.S. GDP in millions of Euros from the EUROSTAT website 
in separate excel files.  
4. Then, I took the information regarding the U.S. GDP for the same years from the website: 
http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp . Because it was in billions of dollars, I had 
to multiply these numbers by 1000 to get to millions of dollars. 
5. The currency information converted into millions of dollars in the same excel file as the 
information in millions of Euros, and divided the dollars by Euros, which gave me the 
parity for the conversion. 
6. I then went back to step 2 listed above (GDP in millions of Euros from EUROSTAT) and 
using the parity from step 5, I changed the millions of Euros into millions of dollars. 
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7. I then used the trade data from the census website and the final GDP data from step 6 to 
find the ―trade to GPD‖ ratio from 1998 to 2010 for bilateral trade relations between 
individual EU member states and the U.S. 
VII. Case Studies Data 
 The richest sources of data for my dissertation are previous studies done on the topics of 
tolerance, religiosity, and anti-Americanism in France and Romania, as well as empirical data 
from the surveys used in the quantitative analysis chapters. World Values Survey information 
will be used to present the cultural similarities between France, Romania and the United States, 
while the 2005 Eurobarometer data will gauge levels of anti-Americanism.  I will also examine 
data from archival records (i.e. survey data not used in the statistical analysis as well as 
organizational records, such as governmental agencies reports), and relay my personal 
experiences from both countries as they are relevant to my research.  
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS BUILDING 
2.1 ANTI-AMERICANISM IN A DIVIDED EUROPEAN UNION – A CULTURAL 
EXPLANATION 
Anti-Americanism in Europe is not new. It has come and gone in waves, usually 
exacerbated by specific U.S. foreign policies such as the war in Vietnam, the Iran-Contra 
scandal, and more recently, George W. Bush‘s war in Iraq. Even during times of relative ―good 
will‖, such as the period of the Clinton Presidency, the trans-Atlantic relationship has been 
marred by tensions. Clinton, one of the most popular American Presidents as far as the Europe is 
concerned, has been accused by Europeans of trying to undermine their economy during the 
famous beef hormone dispute (EU trying to prevent meat from American cattle injected with 
growth hormones from entering its markets, and the U.S. taking the matter to the World Trade 
Organization) (World Trade Organization 2009).  With George W. Bush‘s ―war on terror‖, anti-
Americanism in some parts of Europe has reached new all-time heights. Younger generations of 
Western Europeans, born after the end of the Cold War, have come to see the United States not 
as their protector against the threat of the Soviet Union (as some of their parents and grandparent 
did) but rather as ―the country . . . in European eyes -- of arrogance‖ (Moisi 2003).  
For this dissertation, when I use the term anti-Americanism in Europe, I am referring to 
the negative attitudes of some Europeans toward the U.S. and the American people. Surely, 
certain policies of the U.S. government (the war in Iraq, support for the state of Israel, etc.), as 
well as a number of politicians such as George W. Bush or Donald Rumsfeld, figure prominently 
among the targets of European anti-Americanism.  But Europe‘s hostility is not limited to these 
narrow targets. Harnden (2009) quotes President Obama as saying that America as a whole is 
blamed at times for ―much of what is bad in the world‖ because of its haughtiness and 
unwillingness to cooperate with others, especially with the European Union:  ―Instead of 
celebrating your dynamic union and seeking to partner with you to meet common challenges, 
there have been times where America has shown arrogance and been dismissive, even derisive.‖  
I use data from the Eurobarometer as well as from the World Values Surveys to measure how 
citizens of the European Union view the United States‘ role in fighting poverty in the world, 
dealing with terrorism, helping the international economy, and promoting world peace; these 
questions tap into a pool of public opinion feelings toward the United States in both Old and 
New Europe. 
2.2 CULTURAL SIMILARITY, TOLERANCE AND RELIGION 
This section covers two of the primary aspects of cultural similarity: tolerance and 
religiosity. The core argument of this research is that there is a relationship between these two 
elements of cultural similarity and anti-Americanism: the more culturally similar a country is to 
the United States, the lower its levels of anti-Americanism. I begin with an overall definition of 
cultural similarity. 
2.2.1. CULTURAL SIMILARITY 
Cultural similarity is the concept used in this dissertation to describe the closeness in 
cultural values between countries/regions. The goal is to show that anti-Americanism levels are 
lower in New Europe than in Old Europe because the newest members of the European Union 
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have more in common, culturally, with their American counterparts than Old Europeans do. The 
central argument of this research is that countries/populations who share similar cultural values 
are inclined to feel closer to each other than countries/populations divided by cultural 
differences. This is a fairly ‗common sense‘ suggestion: we like people who we perceive to be 
similar to us. This promotes balance in an individual‘s values system and prevents cognitive 
dissonance, which has been described as the existence of strong contradictions between a 
person‘s various beliefs and opinions about herself and her environment (Festinger 1957) . When 
we like people who are like us, we indirectly validate our own opinions and behaviors through 
them.  
In the international studies literature, the concept of cultural similarity has typically been 
associated with research pertaining to the either the democratic peace theory, or to Huntington‘s 
famous ―clash of civilizations‖ argument. For example, some studies based on the democratic 
peace theory have looked at how cultural similarity between governments and political structures 
strengthens or weakens the impact of democratic dyads on inter-state wars – the more culturally 
similar two democracies are the less likely they are to fight against each other (Henderson 1998). 
Others have investigated the impact of perceived cultural similarity between two states on their 
respective publics, and in turn, the impact of public opinion on governmental foreign policies – 
the more two nationalities perceive each other as culturally alike, the more they would pressure 
their governments to establish bi-lateral friendly/cooperative relations (Geva and Hanson 1999). 
The research in this dissertation differs from those mentioned above in that it is not 
looking at the impact of public opinion on specific governmental policies. Its focus instead 
reflects Nincic and Russett‘s arguments regarding the origin of levels of American public 
hostility or friendliness towards a given country: ―the American public will strive to achieve a 
measure of congruity between its level of approval for a foreign nation and the extent to which 
the foreign nation is perceived as similar to the United States in terms of certain salient 
attributes‖ (Nincic and Russett 1979, 69). My theory is that the public in New Europe will do the 
same thing. ―New Europeans‖ will look at the United States and see the Americans as having 
cultural values similar to their own, especially when it comes to tolerance and religion; this 
perceived cultural similarity will affect their overall feelings towards the U.S.   
2.2.2. RELIGIOSITY AND TOLERANCE   
Religiosity is here understood as the way an individual interprets the world through the 
perceptual lens of his faith, as well as how strictly he observes its rites/rituals. As it pertains to 
this research, I argue that there is a negative relationship between religiosity and anti-
Americanism in Old Europe and New Europe. I expect to find that New Europe and the United 
States share similar (higher) levels of religiosity, compared to a more secular Old Europe. 
There is a vast literature on how America‘s religious beliefs are seen by the rest of the 
world. Using data from the PEW surveys, Kohut and Stokes argue that ―To Europeans, 
Americans‘ religiosity skews what should be secular policy decisions, such as on teaching 
creationism in schools, and the death penalty, abortion and gay marriage‖ (Kohut and Stokes 
2006, 93).  This negative view of how faith and governmental affairs intermingle in the United 
States was particularly accentuated in the first decade of the 2000s following the election of 
George W. Bush as America‘s 43rd President. 
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Those Europeans already worried about his openly-proclaimed faith and wide support 
among evangelical Christians became even more concerned about the influence of religion in 
George Bush‘s foreign policies when he began framing the war on terrorism as a war against 
―evil.‖ In his 2002 State of Union address, President Bush made several references to the ―good 
vs. evil‖ battles awaiting a post-9/11 United States: ―States like [Iran, Iraq and North Korea], and 
their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world‖; ―Our 
enemies believed America was weak and materialistic, that we would splinter in fear and 
selfishness.  They were as wrong as they are evil‖; ―Those of us who have lived through these 
challenging times have been changed by them.  We've come to know truths that we will never 
question:  evil is real, and it must be opposed‖; and ―This time of adversity offers a unique 
moment of opportunity -- a moment we must seize to change our culture.  Through the gathering 
momentum of millions of acts of service and decency and kindness, I know we can overcome 
evil with greater good‖ (Bush 2002). Much of the world had a negative reaction to this rhetoric. 
The Muslim world saw it as an attack on Islam and non-Christians in general, while Europeans 
were mostly concerned about the blurring of lines separating Church and State, especially after 
Bush‘s successful 2004 reelection campaign: 
―He's convinced he's right, and he's almost got this feeling he has a quasi-divine mission 
to fill as the president of the United States,‖ said the Rev. Michel Kubler, executive 
religion editor for La Croix, a Roman Catholic newspaper in France. ―His reelection will 
only reinforce these convictions, and he'll feel infallible, which of course will only 
increase European disquiet. A transatlantic divide has existed for years between 
increasingly secular Europe and religious America, shaping perceptions on issues ranging 
from abortion and stem cell research to the death penalty, same-sex marriage and 
conflicts in the Middle East. As the results of the U.S. election sink in, the early 
consensus among European religious and political thinkers is that the religion gap is 
likely to widen‖ (Bryant 2004). 
This research aims to uncover and examine a ―religion gap‖ like the one Bryant mentions 
above not only between Europe as a whole and the United States, but inside the European Union 
as well—between Old Europe and New Europe. European political scientists have started to 
notice a weakening of continental religious ties with the integration of newer, more Eastern 
countries into the broader economic and political systems of Europe. Schlesinger and Foret 
(2006), for example, analyzed how the impact of new religious groups in European society 
manifested itself in the debate over the inclusion of references to Christian values and beliefs in 
the European Constitution. They argue that New Europe ―flexing‖ its newly found political 
muscle within the EU made the intensity of the debate over religion and the European Union 
Constitution much more pronounced than the secular Old Europe expected. Grace Davie (2006) 
not only agrees with them, but also suggests that these kinds of clashes will probably intensify in 
the future, with secularism under pressure not only from former communist countries that are 
now members of the EU, but from within Old Europe itself, where growing numbers of 
immigrant populations are using religion to maintain their identities and to create a niche for 
themselves in otherwise homogeneous societies (Davie 2006).   
Tolerance, as discussed in the political science literature, comes in two forms. One 
represents the baseline for being tolerant, which means that even if you object to something, you 
still agree to live with it. The second form reflects a higher standard of tolerance that asks a 
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person not only to agree to live with people, beliefs and behaviors one disapproves of, but to also 
recognize them as having equal rights in society (King 1976). The focus of this analysis in on the 
latter variety of tolerance, and for this purpose I have selected three groups that at various points 
in time have been the target of intolerance in Europe and the United States: 1) homosexuals, 2) 
women, and 3) foreigners/immigrants – people who speak a different language, have a different 
nationality, or who ―look‖ different than the majority of the population. Survey questions 
regarding people‘s views on these three groups are used as measures of tolerance. They cover a 
diverse array of societal beliefs about women as mothers, wives, educated individuals, and 
political leaders, about homosexuals as neighbors (and the acceptance of homosexual life style), 
and about immigrants as neighbors and a positive influence on a society.  
This look at tolerance exclusively focused on attitudes falls in line with distinctions 
between tolerance and toleration made by Andrew Murphy and Philip Brooks. Brooks defines 
tolerance as ―a disposition: toleration is the behavior in which the disposition finds expression‖ 
(Brooks 1887, 6). A century later, Murphy builds on this distinction and suggests that we should 
use the term toleration ―…to refer to social or political practice‖ and tolerance ―… to refer to 
attitudes‖ (Murphy 1997). He argues that although toleration in an intrinsic part of a liberal 
democracy, tolerance is not. A democracy can survive with intolerance, but not without 
toleration, and the danger begins the moment that a negative attitude towards a group (i.e. 
women or homosexuals) changes into actively denying that particular group equal rights in the 
society (i.e., not allowing women to vote, drive or work outside the home, or denying gays and 
lesbian couples same civil rights granted to heterosexual households).  The entire group of 
variables used in this dissertation looks at tolerance - attitudes towards homosexuals, women, 
and foreigners/immigrants. 
In the 1980s, several authors focused their attention on changes in intolerance levels in 
American society during the Cold War. What they found was not that the public was more 
intolerant in the 1982 than thirty years prior, but rather that they had shifted the targets for their 
existing intolerant dispositions.  As Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982) note, ―attitudes 
towards Communists, socialists, and atheists are now more favorable [because] citizens are now 
able to point to other political groups towards whom they feel more hostility‖ (69). 
Homosexuals, immigrants and women are three groups that have figured prominently in the 
minds of 21
st
 century Americans as ―new outlets‖ for their intolerant attitudes.  
As early as July 2011, major U.S. media outlets were discussing the passage of a law in 
New York allowing gay marriage, the end of military‘s policy of ―don‘t ask don‘t tell,‖ and 
Presidential hopeful Michelle Bachman‘s views on homosexuality as ―personal bondage, 
personal despair and personal enslavement‖ (Stolberg 2011).  In 2010, PEW Center survey 
findings demonstrated that nearly half (48%) of the American population were opposed to same-
sex marriage, while 60% of respondents supported gays and lesbians serving openly in the 
military, demonstrating that there were still notable segments of U.S. society holding intolerant 
views toward these groups (Pew Research Center 2010).  
Immigration debates are equally heated in the U.S. as of this writing. Samuel Huntington 
wrote that ―the single most immediate and most serious challenge to America‘s traditional 
identity comes from the immense and continuing immigration from Latin America, especially 
from Mexico, and the fertility rates of these immigrants compared to black and white American 
natives‖ (Huntington 2004, 32). Huntington perceives the Latino immigration as so dangerous to 
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the fabric of America‘s ―melting pot‖ precisely because these new immigrants refused to fully 
assimilate, or ―melt,‖ into the existing U.S. culture. Huntington‘s perspective has been echoed in 
discussions over English as the official language of the United States, but also more recently in 
attempts to reduce or eliminate tax-subsidized medical services for uninsured illegal immigrants, 
and plans by high ranking Republican legislators to end birthright citizenship (Preston 2011). 
These high-profile policy initiatives reflect fairly widespread concern within the 
American citizenry about the impact immigrants have on the American society as a whole 
According to a Pew 2011 survey, 61 percent of Americans approve of  Arizona‘s newest and 
toughest immigration laws (which require, among other things, for foreigners to carry their 
immigration papers with them at all times, and for police officers to ask to see these documents if 
they have any reasons to suspect someone might be an illegal immigrant). Further, 39 percent of 
respondents support a constitutional change that would deny automatic citizenship rights for 
children of illegal immigrants (Pew Research Center 2011). 
Women are the third minority groups analyzed here as a target of intolerant attitudes. 
While gender equality issues such as equal pay for equal work, or equal access to jobs and 
education are met with general societal approval in America and the European Union, there are 
still at least two very controversial issues remaining: abortion, and, to a lesser degree, divorce. In 
the United States, abortion ―has inspired marches and murder, and spawned a set of competing 
interest groups that have mobilized tens of millions of dollars a year to influence public opinion 
and voting behavior‖  (Jelen and Wilcox 2003, 489). And these ―pro-life‖ and ―pro-choice‖ 
campaigns seem to have worked as their proponents hoped.  As of this writing, abortion is one of 
the few issues capable of changing a person‘s long time affiliation with a party.  For example, as 
Abramowitz (1995) observed during the 1990s elections, some very religious Democrats voted 
for the Republican Party because of their own party‘s stance on the abortion issue.  Overall, 
America remains deeply divided over the issues of abortion. A 2011 Pew Survey found that a 
majority of Americans (54 percent) believes that abortion should be legal, which represents an 
increase in support from the 46 percent in 2009. When it comes to the political affiliation of pro-
choice supporters, these divisions are clearer – 34 percent of Republics versus 65 percent of 
Democrats and 58 percent of Independents ( Pew Research Center 2011).  
Homosexuality, immigration, and gender equality/abortion issues are much less 
controversial in the European Union than in the United States. However, with the newest waves 
of EU expansion including a growing number of formerly Communist countries, the general tone 
of public debates on these issues has been slowly changing. There are stronger voices now within 
the European Union from New European countries – like Poland and Romania – speaking out 
against gay rights and against abortion, than was the case in the past.  And this creates tensions 
between Old and New Europe. For example, in June 2011 the Wall Street Journal (2011) covered 
a dispute between EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding and the Hungarian Government 
concerning the use of EU money for an anti-abortion campaign in lieu of gender equality 
projects (such as training women for in-demand jobs in sectors traditionally reserved for men). 
Reding officially requested that the Hungarian government remove all posters printed for this 
anti-abortion campaign paid with EU money, while the Hungarian officials blamed the whole 
incident on a misinterpretation of the EU Progress Program. 
To reiterate, the central argument of this project is that there is a relationship between 
how tolerant a European society is and its levels of anti-Americanism. Similar levels of tolerance 
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create a cultural ―likeness‖ between countries and the United States, while dissimilar levels of 
tolerance create a form of cultural ―enmity.‖ Combined with the arguments presented in the 
previous section, the cultural similarity – anti-Americanism theory can be summarized as 
follows: New Europe and the United States are more similar in terms of their levels of 
tolerance and religiosity than Old Europe and the U.S. are, and this rapport explains much 
of the difference in levels of anti-Americanism in Old Europe and New Europe. 
2.3 TRADE, TRAVEL, THE MIDDLE EAST POLICIES, THE ENVIRONMENT 
AND ANTI-AMERICANISM – ALTERNATIVE THEORIES 
This section presents the relationship between anti-Americanism and four factors not 
explicitly related to cultural similarity: strength of trade ties between a country and the U.S. 
(more trade with the U.S. equals more pro-Americanism), travels to America (more travels to the 
U.S. equal stronger pro-American), position on Middle East policies (the more pro-Israel and 
supporting the war in Iraq, the more pro-American) and the environment (the more you support 
protecting the environment, the more anti-American you are likely to be).  
2.3.1. TRADE AND TRAVEL 
Discovering what lies behind anti and pro-Americanism has been a long time interest of 
American scholars, who were surprised by the speed at which the high level of support and 
sympathy expressed around the world immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
transformed into hostility and opposition to America‘s handling of its ―war on terror.‖  In 2005, 
amid a wave of anti-Americanism studies, Anne Applebaum (2005) set out to identify the pro-
Americans still out there in the world. She found them and they looked something like this: ―the 
British small businessman who […] has been on Florida on holiday. Or the Indian stockbroker, 
the South Korean investment banker, and the Philippines manufacturer, all of whom have 
excellent relations with their American clients and all of whom support a U.S. military presence 
in their parts of the world‖ (40). Pro-American feelings in post 9/11 Europe seem to have been 
damaged not only by unpopular policies such as the invasion of Iraq, but also by America‘s 
economic, cultural and political disengagement from the European Union, while focusing its 
attention on the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, China and Russia.  Gienow-Hecht (2006) 
summed this up the following way: 
Between the late 1940s and the end of the Cold War, political criticism remained 
consistently embedded in the critique of cultural imperialism, and it also became 
increasingly academic. While the 1990s witnessed a temporary retreat of political anti-
Americanism, the events following 9/11 re-created a scenario reminiscent of the 1950s—
but without the European sympathy generated by years of foreign investment, cultural 
exchange, and political goodwill on the part of the United States (1089, emphasis 
added). 
These discussions of sources of pro-Americanism mirror arguments from studies done in 
the tradition of modernization theories, according to which ―the more two societies interact and 
have economic and cultural ties, the more they develop a sense of ―fellow-feeling‖ between 
individuals in those societies‖ (Dore 1984, 412). Applying these theories to the present research, 
we should observe lower levels of anti-Americanism in countries that have strong trade ties with 
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the United States (as measured by a ―trade to GPD ratio‖ variable), where the citizenry support 
free markets/capitalism, and where its citizens have traveled to the U.S. 
In a similar analytical approach, Chiozza (2009) investigates the impact of several, 
related factors such as the number of student visas granted by the United States to the citizens of 
a certain country, trade dependence, and American direct investments on anti-Americanism. He 
finds that ―military, economic, and cultural engagement with the United States is not by itself 
sufficient to create a political context immune to anti-Americanism‖ (Chiozza 2009, 151). While 
he uses the 44 countries surveyed in 2002 by the PEW Research Center, it would be interesting 
to see if his findings are reflected in an exclusively European sample, five years later.  
2.3.2. THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
The reason ―Middle East‖ and ―the Environment‖ are lumped together in this section is 
because they both represent policy issue areas that have attracted the world‘s attention and 
antipathy towards the United States over the years. The war in Iraq, America‘s support for the 
state of Israel, and its perceived biases regarding the Palestinian problem have generated 
widespread condemnation and fueled anti-Americanism from Paris to Riyad and from Berlin to 
Tehran. President Bush‘s failure to promote environmentally-friendly policies has triggered 
criticism from the more ecologically-minded Europeans, as well as from environmentalists 
within the U.S. Goldengerg (2009), for example, quotes Josh Borner, a spokesman for the Sierra 
Club as saying ―[Bush] has undone decades if not a century of progress on the environment.‖  
One of the favorite explanations for anti-Americanism inside the Bush 43 administration 
was ―They hate . . . a democratically elected government. They hate our freedoms: our freedom 
of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each 
other‖ (CNN 2001). However, as many opinion polls conducted all around the world have 
shown, most people actually approve of democratic ideas and believe that democracy is the best 
performing governmental system possible right now (Norris and Inglehart 2002). The 2011 
upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Yemen have also demonstrated that the young Arab men 
and women who might have been burning the American flag a year ago were now willing to 
sacrifice their lives to bring democracy in their countries and oust from power dictators like 
Hosni Mubarak or Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, long-time allies of the United States. 
So, if it is not American ideals of freedom and democracy, then why do others in the 
world ―hate‖ Americans? Part of this answer comes from the polls referenced earlier. When 
asked what upsets them about the United States, Europeans have pointed their finger, among 
other issues, at the 2003 Iraq war, America‘s unwavering and lopsided support for the state of 
Israel, and George W. Bush‘s environmentally-unfriendly policies such as unilaterally 
withdrawing in January 2010 from the Kyoto Treaty (Pew Research Center 2007).  
Chapter 9 of this dissertation presents a test of the relationship between anti-Americanism 
and the views of respondents from Old and New Europe on U.S. foreign policies in the Middle 
East, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as on environmental issues such as 
global warming. I expect to find that high levels of anti-Americanism are positively correlated 
with an individual‘s interest in ecological causes, his/her support for the Palestinians, and his/her 
desire to see  a quick withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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2.4 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The core hypothesis at the basis of this research, as well as an alternative hypothesis and 
list of all the more specific hypotheses to be tested in the following chapters, is presented below. 
 
Overall hypothesis: Citizens of New Europe are more pro-American than are citizens of 
Old Europe because New Europe and the United States are more culturally similar than 
are Old Europe and the U.S. 
 
Alternative hypothesis: Citizens of New Europe are more pro-American than citizens of 
Old Europe because they travel to the U.S. more often, because they approve of American 
foreign policies in the Middle East and on the environment, because their countries have 
stronger economic ties with the U.S. economy, and because they support a market 
economy. 
 
Graph 1 – Tolerance, Religiosity, Trade and Anti-Americanism 
 
 
The following six chapters cover the quantitative analysis used to test the hypothesis at the 
foundation of this research, which examines the relationship between anti-Americanism and 
levels of religiosity and tolerance towards women, homosexuals and immigrants/foreigners. 
These tests are conducted in three distinct geographic regions: Old Europe (Western Europe), 
New Europe (Eastern Europe) and the United States. Alternative explanatory factors (trade 
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levels, frequency of travels to the U.S., attitudes towards America‘s policies in the Middle East 
and the environment) are also examined in Chapter 9. The following annotations were used 
through the rest of the dissertation: p ˂ .05*, p ˂ .01** and p ˂ .001***. A list of sub-hypotheses 
can be seen below. ―No answer‖ responses were deleted from all the databases used in this 
empirical analysis. ―Don‘t know‖ answers were kept in an analysis when a judgment was made 
that they were the equivalent of a ―middle-of-the road‖ or moderate response, especially in the 
case of otherwise dichotomous variables where the respondents had only two options (yes or no). 
―Don‘t know‖ answers were deleted in the cases on questions giving the respondents either a 
large number of choices (for example scales from 0 to 10, 1 to 5, etc.), or the possibility of 
choosing a clear ―moderate‖ answer (for example ―favorable‖, ―neither favorable nor 
unfavorable‖ and ―unfavorable‖).   
The core argument of this research is that Old Europe and the United States are less 
culturally similar than New Europe and the US, which explains why Old Europe experiences 
relatively higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe. In order to test this theory, three 
dummy variables were created for each of the databases presented below in Chapters 4 – 8 that 
measured differences in cultural indicators (tolerance towards women, immigrants and 
homosexuals, and levels of religiosity) for three regional pairings: Old Europe and New Europe, 
New Europe and the United States, and Old Europe and the United States. Unfortunately, due to 
time and space restrictions, only the results of the statistical tests involving the Old Europe/New 
Europe, and New Europe/United States comparisons are presented below in detail. Details of 
statistical analysis involving an independent variable coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for the 
United States are presented in the text only when they contradict the main hypothesis, according 
to which we expect to find statistically significant differences in levels of tolerance and 
religiosity between Old Europe and New Europe (culturally divided Europe), as well as between 
Old Europe and the United States (lower cultural similarity), but no statistically significant 
differences between New Europe and the United States (higher cultural similarity).  
The wording of each dependent variable, as well as its value/coding are presented in 
Chapters 3-7 in tables containing their respective crosstabulation results. In some cases, when 
these variables are coded on a scale from 1 to 10, only the two extreme as well as the middle 
values are presented in the above mentioned tables.  
A list of detailed hypotheses can be seen below: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of anti-
Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe (OE ˃ NE). 
Hypothesis 2: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance 
towards women in Old Europe vs. New Europe (OE ˃ NE), and in Old Europe vs. the United 
States (OE ˃ US). 
Hypothesis 3: There is no statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance 
towards women in New Europe vs. the United States. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance 
towards immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe vs. New Europe (OE ˃ NE) and in Old Europe 
vs. the United States (OE ˃ NE). 
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Hypothesis 5: There is no statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance 
towards immigrants/foreigners in New Europe vs. the United States. 
Hypothesis 6: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance 
towards homosexuals in Old Europe vs. New Europe (OE ˃ NE) and in Old Europe vs. the 
United States (OE ˃ US).  
Hypothesis 7: There is no statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance 
towards homosexuals in New Europe vs. the United States. 
Hypothesis 8: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of religiosity 
in Old Europe and New Europe (OE ˂ NE) and in Old Europe and the United States (OE ˂ 
US). 
Hypothesis 9: There is no statistically significant difference between levels of religiosity 
in New Europe and the United States. 
Hypothesis 10 (alternative theories): High anti-Americanism levels are positively 
correlated with weak trade ties with the U.S., infrequent travels to the America, as well as strong 
support for the Palestinians, the environment and for a quick withdrawal of American troops 
from Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
CHAPTER 3 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: ANTI-AMERICANISM 
IN A DIVIDED EUROPEAN UNION 
My first hypothesis states that there is a statistically significant difference between 
levels of anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe (higher levels in Old Europe 
than in New Europe). To test this hypothesis, mean averages of anti-Americanism were 
compared across respondents from Old and New Europe using independent-samples t-tests and 
chi-square methods. Answers to direct questions about overall feelings towards the United States 
and the American people, as well as responses regarding the perceived role United States plays 
on world stage, are used in this analysis to measure anti-Americanism,. The overall results, 
presented below individually and chronologically (per database used) indicated support for this 
hypothesis. 
3.1 . PEW 2002 
Six variables from this database were used as dependent variables to test the difference in 
means between levels of anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe. The results of the statistical 
analysis are summarized in Table 3.1.7 and they are preceded by a detailed description of each 
test. 
 All six are ordinal variables, and for all six of them the statistical test used was an 
independent-samples t-test. The results of this test, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording 
of the questions in each case, are presented below. The independent variable, Old Europe vs. 
New Europe, was coded 0 for Old Europe, and 1 for New Europe. An alpha level of .05 was used 
in all statistical analyses.  
 Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below, 
starting with the ―U.S. world politics‖ variable.  
i. The crosstabulation results for the dependent variable “U.S. world politics” can be seen 
below in Table 3.1.1. 
TABLE 3.1.1:  In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the 
United States takes into account the interests of countries like our country? 
  
  
In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you 
think the United States takes into account the interests of 
countries like our country? 
Great deal 
1 
Fair amount 
2 
Not too much 
3 
Not at all 
4 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
8.0% 34.6% 40.9% 16.5% 
2.8% 25.1% 47.0% 25.1% 
An independent groups t-test revealed that opinions about the United States in Old 
Europe (M = 2.66, SD =.84) significantly differed from those in New Europe (M = 2.94, SD = 
.78), as predicted, t (4305) = -11.50, p ˂.001***). However, the direction of the hypothesis was 
not confirmed by this test. It appears that while the average citizen from Old Europe believes that 
the United States takes into account the interests of his country ―a fair amount‖ in making 
international policy decision, the average citizen of New Europe sees the interests of his country 
taken into account by the U.S. ―not too much.‖ One possible explanation for these results would 
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be that the public in both regions has realistic expectations of U.S. views of the European Union 
– it would be expected for the American government to be more concerned about the interests of 
their economically strong and militarily powerful, longtime allies like United Kingdom or 
Germany, then they would be of countries, like Bulgaria or Slovenia, which are, relatively 
speaking, less significant in the international arena.  
ii. The results of the crosstabulation for the second dependent variable, “U.S. world 
poverty” can be seen below in Table 3.1.2.  
TABLE 3.1.2: In your opinion, do United States' policies increase the gap between rich and 
poor countries, lessen the gap between rich and poor countries, or do United States policies 
have no effect on the gap between rich and poor countries? 
  In your opinion, do United States' policies increase the gap 
between rich and poor countries, lessen the gap between 
rich and poor countries, or do United States policies have 
no effect on the gap between rich and poor countries? 
Increase gap between 
rich and poor 
1 
No effect 
2 
Lessen the gap 
between rich 
and poor 
3 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
69.5% 20.9% 9.6% 
60.9% 24.6% 14.5% 
An independent groups t-test showed that views of the United States policies regarding 
world poverty in Old Europe (M = 1.40, SD = .65) are significantly different from those in 
New Europe (M = 1.54, SD = .73), as predicted, t(4085) = -6.10, p ˂ .001***). The direction of 
the hypothesis is also confirmed, with Old Europe holding a more negative view of how 
American policies affect the gap between the rich and poor countries. 
iii. The results of the crosstabulation for a third variable, “U.S. world problems,” are 
presented below in Table 3.1.3. 
TABLE 3.1.3: In terms of solving world problems, does the United States do too much, too 
little, or the right amount in helping solve world problems? 
  
  
In terms of solving world problems, does the United States do too 
much, too little, or the right amount in helping solve world problems? 
United States 
does too much 
1 
United States 
does right 
amount 
2 
United States 
does too little 
3 
United States does 
nothing 
4  
Old Europe 
New Europe 
21.7% 36.3% 33.2% 2.9% 
24.7% 43.9% 17.8% 3.4% 
An independent groups t-test showed that views of the United States policies vis-à-vis 
world problems in Old Europe (M = 2.18, SD = .82) are significantly different from those in 
New Europe (M = 2.00, SD = .79), as predicted, t(4174) = 7.37, p ˂ .001***). The direction of 
the hypothesis is also confirmed, with more people in Old Europe believing that the United 
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States should do more to solve world problems, while almost half of the people interviewed in 
New Europe see America as doing its part in helping solve world problems.  
iv. Crosstabulation results for the fourth dependent variable, “U.S. culture,” are presented 
below in Table 3.1.4. ―Don‘t know‖ answers were re-coded to fit the middle of the scale, 
as equivalent to a ―neither, nor‖ classification. 
TABLE 3.1.4:  Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view? It's good that 
American ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it's bad that American ideas and 
customs are spreading here. 
  
  
Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view? It's good 
that American ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it's bad that 
American ideas and customs are spreading here. 
It's good that American 
ideas and customs are 
spreading here 
1 
It’s neither good, nor 
bad that American 
ideas and customs are 
spreading here (Don’t 
know) 
2 
It's bad that American 
ideas and customs are 
spreading here 
3 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
30.0% 6.8% 63.2% 
34.1% 13.5% 52.4% 
An independent groups t-test revealed that opinions on Americanization in Old Europe 
(M = 2.33, SD = .90) are significantly different from those in New Europe (M = 2.18, SD = 
.91), as measured, t (4473) = 5.51, p˂.001***). In both regions, the majority of people in believe 
that it is bad that American ideas and customs are spreading in their countries. However Old 
Europeans are more concerned than their New Europe counterparts about the effects of 
Americanization on their societies and cultures. 63 percent of people interviewed in OE 
answered that it was bad that American ideas and customs were spreading in their countries, 
while almost 53 percent of those interviewed in NE argued the opposite. It is also interesting to 
notice the fairly large number of Europeans (7 percent in Old Europe and 14 percent in New 
Europe) who either do not have enough information or who do not care enough about the topic to 
formulate an opinion about the impact of American ideas and customs might have on their 
societies. 
v. The crosstabulation for my fifth dependent variable, ―opinion on U.S.,” is presented 
below in Table 3.1.5.  
TABLE 3.1.5: What is your opinion of the United States? 
  
  
What is your opinion of the United States? 
 
Very 
favorable 
1 
Somewhat 
favorable 
2 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
3 
Very unfavorable 
4 
 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
14.1% 55.4% 25.1% 5.4% 
15.8% 59.2% 20.6% 4.5% 
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An independent groups t-test showed that opinions regarding the United States in Old 
Europe (M = 2.22, SD = .74) are significantly different from those in New Europe (M = 2.14, 
SD = .72), as predicated, t (4263) = 3.54, p ˂ .001***). Although the majority of Europeans have 
a fairly positive attitude towards the United States, Old Europeans hold more ―somewhat 
unfavorable‖ views of their transatlantic partner.  
vi. Crosstabulation results for the dependent variables measuring European views of 
Americans can be found below in Table 3.1.6. 
TABLE 3.1.6: What is your opinion of Americans?  
  
  
What is your opinion of Americans? 
Very favorable 
1 
Somewhat 
favorable 
2 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
3 
Very unfavorable 
4 
 
 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
15.2% 63.2% 17.8% 3.8% 
13.8% 63.5% 19.2% 3.4% 
An independent t- test of the “opinion on Americans” dependent variable revealed no 
significant differences in opinions on Americans between Old Europe (M = 2.10, SD = .68) and 
New Europe (M = 2.12, SD = .67), as measured, t (4226) = -1.01, p = .31 ns).  
vii. Conclusion 
 The results of above findings are summarized below in Table 3.1.7. 
TABLE 3.1.7:  Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables 
from the PEW 2002 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 3) 
Region U.S. 
world 
politics 
U.S. 
world 
poverty 
U.S. world 
problems 
U.S. 
culture 
Opinion 
on the 
U.S. 
Opinion on 
Americans 
Old Europe 2.66*** 
(0.84) 
1.51*** 
(0.81) 
2.39*** 
(1.05) 
1.68*** 
(.46) 
2.33*** 
(.90) 
2.10 ns 
(.68) 
New Europe 2.94*** 
(0.78) 
1.64*** 
(0.85) 
2.58*** 
(1.21) 
1.61*** 
(.48) 
2.18*** 
(.91) 
2.12 ns 
(.67) 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at p ≤ .05. 
 b) p ≤ .01 *, p ≤ .05**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant 
These results indicate that while in Old Europe, the population makes a clear distinction 
between the American people and the American government, in New Europe pro-Americanism 
manifest itself at both levels. For example, when it comes to OE, 55 percent of the people 
surveyed have a ―somewhat favorable‖ view of the United States. The percentage increases to 63 
percent when asked the same question about Americans. This is matched by the percentages of 
those who see the United States in a ―somewhat unfavorable‖ light (25 percent) versus those who 
see the Americans in the same way (17 percent).  
At the same time, these results also show that people in Old Europe believe more than 
then counterparts in New Europe that the United States takes into account their countries‘ 
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interests when making foreign policy decisions. They are also more inclined to be critical of 
these decisions, and they would like to see the United States playing a more positive and 
proactive role in solving the world‘s biggest problem, such as the increasing gap between rich 
and poor countries. OE is also more concerned with the impact of globalization / 
Americanization on their societies. Overall, these results confirm my initial hypothesis: Old 
Europe is more anti-American than New Europe, with the caveat that this anti-
Americanism seems to be directed more towards the U.S. government and not the 
American people.  
3.2 . EUROBAROMETER 62 – 2004 
Six variables from this database were used as dependent variables to test the difference in 
means between levels of anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe. The results of the statistical 
analysis are summarized in Table 3.2.7 and they are preceded by a detailed description of each 
test. 
 All six are ordinal variables, and for the first one examined, a chi-square test was used, 
while for the other five, an independent-samples t-test was employed. The results of these tests, 
as well as the crosstabulation and wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. 
The independent variable, Old Europe vs. New Europe, was coded 0 for Old Europe, and 1 for 
New Europe. ―Don‘t know‖ and ―neither nor‖ answers were re-coded to represent a middle value 
for all the dependent variables that did not already have such a value. For example, the majority 
of the answers were coded 1 = positive, 2 = negative, and 3 = neither nor. They were re-coded as 
1 = positive, 2 = neither nor and 3 = negative. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical 
analyses. Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below, 
starting with the ―EU foreign policy independent of U.S.‖ variable. 
i. Crosstabulation results for the “EU foreign policy independent of U.S.” dependent 
variable are presented below in Table 3.2.1. 
TABLE 3.2.1:  European Union foreign policy should be independent of United States 
foreign policy 
  
  
European Union foreign policy should be independent of 
United States foreign policy 
Tend to agree 
1 
Tend to disagree 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
89.8% 10.2% 
90.7% 9.3% 
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between the 
country where the interview was conducted (Old Europe vs. New Europe) and the respondents‘ 
views on a European Union foreign policy more independent of the United States. The 
relationship between these variables was fairly weak, X² (1, N = 23014) = 4.72, p ˂ .05*, 
although not in the direction predicted by my hypothesis. Despite the small difference in the 
overall percentages, respondents in Old Europe are less likely than their New Europe 
counterparts to advocate a European Union foreign policy more independent of United States.  
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ii. Crosstabulation results for “U.S. Role in World Peace” dependent variable are presented 
below, in Table 3.2.2.  
TABLE 3.2.2: U.S. Role in World Peace 
  
  
In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a 
positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role 
regarding peace in the world? 
 
Positive 
1 
Neither nor 
2 
Negative 
3 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
21.1% 14.9% 64.0% 
32.2% 21.0% 46.8% 
An independent groups t-test showed that opinions regarding the role U.S. plays in 
promoting world peace in Old Europe (M = 2.43, SD = .81) are significantly different from 
those in New Europe (M = 2.15, SD = .87), as predicated, t (24316) = 25.49, p ˂ .001***). A 
sizably larger percentage of those interviewed in Old Europe (64 percent) than New Europe (46 
percent) believe that the United States policies have a negative impact on peace in the world.  
iii. Crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Fighting Terrorism” dependent variable 
are presented below in Table 3.2.3. 
TABLE 3.2.3: U.S. Role in Fighting Terrorism 
  
  
In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a 
positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role 
regarding fighting terrorism? 
 
Positive 
1 
Neither nor 
2 
Negative 
3 
Old Europe 
  
New Europe 
37.1% 14.4% 48.5% 
52.6% 16.8% 30.7% 
Results from an independent-samples t-test (t (24273) = 28.40, p ˂ .001***) revealed that 
Old Europe (M = 2.11, SD = .91) is significantly more likely than New Europe (M = 1.78, SD = 
.88) to see the United States foreign policies as having a negative impact on trying to eradicate 
terrorism in the world. A year after the Iraqi invasion and the beginning of the war in 
Afghanistan (both policies labeled by the American government as part of the war on terror), 
almost half of those interviewed in Old Europe answered that in their opinion, the U.S. plays a 
negative role in fighting terrorism. At the same time, over 50 percent of respondents in New 
Europe (where several national governments expressed official support for the war in Iraq, 
sending troops there) see the impact of the United States in the struggle to eliminate terrorism as 
a positive one.   
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iv. Crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Economic Growth Worldwide” are 
presented below in Table 3.2.4.  
TABLE 3.2.4: U.S. Role in Economic Growth Worldwide 
  
  
In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a 
positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role 
regarding economic growth worldwide? 
 
Positive 
1 
Neither nor 
2 
Negative 
3 
Old Europe 
  
New Europe 
37.5% 19.9% 42.6% 
50.0% 25.1% 25.0% 
An independent-groups t-test showed that there are statistically significant differences 
between opinions on the America‘s role in promoting economic growth worldwide between 
respondents in Old Europe (M =2.05, SD = .89) and New Europe (M = 1.75, SD = .82), as 
predicted, t (23086) = 26.23, p ˂ .001***). While only one in four respondents in New Europe 
believe that the United States plays a negative role regarding world economic growth, almost 
half of those interviewed in Old Europe agrees with this view. 
v. Crosstabulations for the “U.S. Role in Fighting Poverty Worldwide” dependent 
variable are presented in Table 3.2.5. 
TABLE 3.2.5: U.S. Role in Fighting Poverty Worldwide 
  
  
In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a 
positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role 
regarding fighting poverty worldwide? 
 
Positive 
1 
Neither nor 
2 
Negative 
3 
Old Europe 
  
New Europe 
16.8% 21.3% 62.0% 
33.8% 31.7% 34.5% 
Results from an independent-samples t-test (t (23497) = 41.76, p ˂ .001***) showed that 
Old Europe (M = 2.45, SD = .76) is significantly more likely than New Europe (M = 2.01, SD = 
.82) to view the United States‘ role in fighting world poverty as a negative one. While over 60 
percent of those interviewed in Old Europe believe that the America‘s impact on fighting world 
poverty is a negative one (and only little over 16 percent choosing the ―positive role‖ answer), 
opinions in New Europe are more evenly distributed along the three possible answers (positive, 
negative and neither/nor).   
vi. Crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Protecting the Environment” are shown 
below in Table 3.2.6. 
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TABLE 3.2.6: U.S. Role in Protecting the Environment 
  
  
In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a 
positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role 
regarding environment protection? 
 
Positive 
1 
Neither nor 
2 
Negative 
3 
Old Europe 
  
New Europe 
14.5% 16.1% 69.5% 
36.8% 27.3% 35.9% 
An independent-groups t-test results (t (22977) = 51.48, p ˂ .001***) revealed that there 
are significant differences between opinions on America‘s role in protecting the environment in 
Old Europe (M = 2.55, SD = .73) and New Europe (M = 1.99, SD = .85). While views on the 
impact U.S. has on environmental protection are fairly evenly distributed in New Europe 
between ―positive‖, ―negative‖ and ―neither/nor‖, a significant majority (almost 70 percent) of 
those interviewed in Old Europe see the United States as playing a negative role. 
vii. Conclusions 
The results of the statistical analysis based on variables from the Eurobarometer 62 – 
2004 survey/database are summarized below in Table 3.2.7. 
TABLE 3.2.7:  Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables 
from the Eurobarometer 62 -2004 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 6) 
Region EU foreign 
policy 
independent 
of USA 
U.S. role 
in world 
peace 
U.S. role 
in fighting 
terrorism 
U.S. role 
in 
economic 
growth 
worldwide 
U.S. role 
in fighting 
poverty 
worldwide 
U.S. role in 
protecting 
the 
environment 
Old 
Europe 
1.10* 
(.30) 
2.43*** 
(.81) 
2.11*** 
(.91) 
2.05*** 
(.89) 
2.45*** 
(.76) 
2.55 *** 
(.73) 
New 
Europe 
1.09* 
(.29) 
2.15*** 
(.87) 
1.78*** 
(.88) 
1.75*** 
(.82) 
2.01*** 
(.82) 
1.99 *** 
(.85) 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at p ≤ .05. 
 b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant 
Western Europe, comprising the initial EU members, is more inclined to see the 
American policies as having a negative impact on five major areas of current international 
relations: peace in the world, fighting terrorism, promoting economic growth and trying to 
alleviate poverty worldwide, as well as protecting the environment. New Europe nations – 
formerly Communist countries recently admitted into the European Union – have much more 
positive views of the role played by the United States in world affairs. Considering that the study 
was conducted shortly after the 2003 Iraq invasion, we could safely speculate that this war, 
extremely unpopular at the time in Europe, seems to have fueled a radicalization of anti-
Americanism in Old European countries, where, for example, more than half of the respondents 
believe that the U.S. is actually hurting the chances of eliminating terrorism in the world.  
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It is interesting to note that the ―Old vs. New Europe‖ divide maintains its statistical 
significance when it comes to views not only on America‘s role in the world, but on the EU‘s 
impact on international politics as well. You can see below in Table 3.2.8 the results of 
crosstabulations in which the independent variables stayed the same (Old Europe = 0, New 
Europe = 1), and the dependent variable examines opinions regarding the EU‘s role in the world.  
TABLE 3.2.8:  Views on European Union’s role in world politics in Old Europe vs. New 
Europe, as measured by variables from the Eurobarometer 62 -2004 survey /database 
Variable 
 
Region EU tends to play 
a __role 
regarding X? 
EU tends to play 
a __role 
regarding X? 
 
EU tends to play 
a __ role 
regarding X? 
  Positive 
1 
Neither nor 
2 
Negative 
3 
WORLD 
PEACE 
Old Europe 63.2% 25.3% 11.5% 
New 
Europe 
77.7% 17.4% 4.9% 
     
FIGHTING 
TERRORISM 
Old Europe 61.2% 27.1% 11.8% 
New 
Europe 
75.5% 19.5% 5.0% 
     
ECONOMIC 
GROWTH  
Old Europe 56.2% 29.3% 14.5% 
New 
Europe 
71.6% 22.2% 6.2% 
     
FIGHTING 
POVERTY 
Old Europe 49.3% 32.2% 18.4% 
New 
Europe 
62.2% 30.1% 7.6% 
     
ENVIRONMENT 
PROTECTION 
Old Europe 61.0% 23% 16.0% 
New 
Europe 
77.1% 17.9% 5.0% 
An independent samples t-test was used for comparing the means between Old and New 
Europe in all five cases, and the results were statistically significant (p ˂ .001***).  Those 
interviewed in New Europe countries are not only more pro-American, but they are also more 
pro-EU than their counterparts in Old Europe. They also believe that the EU has a more positive 
impact in world politics than the United States. In almost every instance, three out of four 
respondents see the impact of the European Union on the world as a positive one, percentages 
both higher than in Western Europe, and also higher than in the case of the previous questions, 
regarding America‘s role in the world.  
Overall, the results of the statistical analysis using variables from the 2004 
Eurobarometer  confirmed that two years after the PEW 2002 survey, signs of a “divided” 
anti-Americanism in the European Union appeared again, with Europeans feelings towards 
the United States clearly falling along the lines of “Old” vs. “New” Europe.  
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3.3 . EUROBAROMETER 63.4 – 2005 
Six main variables from this database were used as dependent variables to test the 
difference in means between levels of anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe. These variables 
operationalize answers to questions regarding the America‘s role in world politics, as well as the 
future of European Union‘s foreign and defense policy. The results of the statistical analysis are 
summarized in Table 3.3.14 and they are preceded by a detailed description of each test. 
 All six are ordinal variables, and for the first a statistical tool was used in the form of a 
chi-square test, while for the other five, an independent-samples t-test was employed. The results 
of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and wording of the questions in each case, are 
presented below. The independent variable, Old Europe vs. New Europe, was coded 0 for Old 
Europe and 1 for New Europe. ―Don‘t know‖ and ―neither nor‖ answers were re-coded to 
represent a middle value for all the dependent variables that did not already have such a value. 
For example, the majority of the answers were coded 1 = positive, 2 = negative, and 3 = neither 
nor. They were re-coded as 1 = positive, 2 = neither nor and 3 = negative. An alpha level of .05 
was used as the threshold in all statistical analyses.  
I have added to these initial six dependent variables a battery of 12 variables asking 
Europeans to compare the United States and the European Union on several dimensions, such as 
medical and scientific research, fighting discrimination, innovation technology, etc. Independent-
groups t-tests were used to measure the means between Old and New Europe, and the results are 
presented at the end of this section. Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable 
are presented below, starting with the ―EU foreign policy independent of U.S. – 2005‖ variable. 
i. Crosstabulation results for ―EU foreign policy independent of U.S. – 2005‖ dependent 
variable are presented below in Table 3.3.1. 
TABLE 3.3.1: EU foreign policy should be independent of U.S. foreign policy 
  
  
Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with the following statement? 
EU foreign policy should be independent of U.S. foreign policy 
 
Tend to agree 
1 
Neither nor (don’t 
know) 
2 
Tend to disagree 
3 
Old Europe 
  
New Europe 
82.3% 8.5% 9.2% 
81.9% 10.4% 7.7% 
A t- test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between the region 
where the interview was conducted (Old Europe (M = 1.27, SD = .61) vs. New Europe (M = 
1.26, SD = .58) and the respondents‘ views on a European Union foreign policy more 
independent of the United States. The relationship between these variables was not significant, t 
(25816) = 1.59, p = .11 ns, which does not support the idea of a divided anti-Americanism in the 
European Union, even if respondents in Old Europe are slightly less likely than their New 
Europe counterparts to advocate a European Union foreign policy more independent of United 
States.  
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ii. Table 3.3.2 contains crosstabulation results for the “U.S. role in world peace – 2005” 
dependent variable. 
TABLE 3.3.2: U.S. Role in World Peace - 2005 
  
  
United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither 
a positive nor a negative role regarding peace in the world? 
 
Positive 
1 
Neither nor 
2 
Negative 
3 
Old Europe 
 New Europe 
23.4% 15.9% 60.8% 
36.3% 19.5% 44.2% 
The results of an independent-samples t-test confirmed that the differences in means 
between groups of respondents from Old Europe (M = 2.3, SD = .83) and New Europe (M = 
2.08, SD = .89) are statistically significant (t (24482) = 26.06, p ˂ .001***). Although the 
percentage of those seeing the role of the U.S. in world peace as a negative one has decreased 
compared to the 2004 Eurobarometer responses the difference between Old and New Europe 
remains significant. More than half the respondents from Western Europe are still pessimistic 
about America‘s impact on international peace.  
iii. Crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Fighting Terrorism – 2005” dependent 
variable are presented below in Table 3.3.3. 
TABLE 3.3.3: U.S. Role in Fighting Terrorism - 2005 
 
 
United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a 
positive nor a negative role regarding fighting terrorism? 
 
Positive 
1 
Neither nor 
2 
Negative 
3 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
39.9% 14.6% 45.5% 
55.9% 15.3% 28.8% 
An independent-groups t-test showed that views of the United States policies toward 
fighting terrorism in Old Europe (M = 2.06, SD = .92) are significantly different from those in 
New Europe (M = 1.73, SD = .88), as predicted, t (24350) = 27.95, p ˂ .001***). The direction 
of the hypothesis is also confirmed, with Old Europe holding a more negative view of how 
American policies affect efforts to eradicate world terrorism. 
iv. Table 3.3.4 presents crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Economic Growth – 
2005” dependent variable. 
TABLE 3.3.4: U.S. Role in Economic Growth Worldwide - 2005 
  
  
United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a 
positive nor a negative role regarding economic growth worldwide? 
 
Positive 
1 
Neither nor 
2 
Negative 
3 
Old Europe 
 New Europe 
39.3% 19.7% 41.0% 
56.0% 23.8% 20.2% 
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Results of an independent-samples t-test showed that opinions on the United States‘ role 
in economic growth worldwide in Old Europe (M = 2.02, SD = .89) and New Europe (M = 1.64, 
SD = .79) are significantly different (t (23234) = 33.46, p ˂ .001***). Twice as many 
respondents in Old Europe as in New Europe believe that America has a negative impact on 
economic growth worldwide. 
v. Crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Fighting Poverty Worldwide – 2005” 
dependent variable are shown below in Table 3.3.5. 
TABLE 3.3.5: U.S. Role in Fighting Poverty Worldwide - 2005 
  
  
In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a 
positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role 
regarding fighting poverty worldwide? 
 
Positive 
1 
Neither nor 
2 
Negative 
3 
Old Europe 
  
New Europe 
18.2% 20.9% 60.9% 
37.9% 30.9% 31.2% 
An independent-groups t-test revealed that the role played by the United States in 
fighting poverty worldwide is seen as being significantly more negative (t (23732) = 46.78, p ˂ 
.001***) in Old Europe (M = 2.43, SD = .78) than in New Europe (M = 1.93, SD = .82). More 
than half of respondents in Old Europe believe that America‘s impact on the fight to alleviate 
world poverty is a negative one, while opinions in New Europe are divided between the positive, 
the negative and the ―no impact‖ views.  
vi. Table 3.3.6 presents crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Environment 
Protection – 2005” dependent variable. 
TABLE 3.3.6: U.S. Role in Environment Protection 
  
  
United States role regarding environment protection 
 
Positive 
1 
Neither nor 
2 
Negative 
3 
Old Europe 
  
New Europe 
13.5% 15.4% 71.0% 
39.2% 25.1% 35.7% 
Results of an independent-samples t-test confirmed that the differences in means between 
groups of respondents from Old Europe (M = 2.57, SD = .71) and New Europe (M = 1.96, SD = 
.86) are statistically significant (t (23391) = 56.74, p ˂ .001***). The percentage of those seeing 
the role of the U.S. in environmental protection as a negative one has slightly increased in Old 
Europe compared to the 2004 Eurobarometer responses, which widens the gap between the two 
regions even further. In 2005, over 70 percent of the respondents from Western Europe were 
pessimistic about America‘s impact on the environment, while only one in three of those 
interviewed in countries from New Europe agreed with them.  
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vii. The next 12 dependent variables are helpful in understanding how Europeans see 
themselves compared to the United States. As pertaining to my analysis, I argue that 
levels of anti-Americanism can be estimated from feelings of superiority towards the 
United States. Old Europe respondents will perceive that the EU is ahead of the U.S. 
in several or most of the societal dimensions measured by the 2005 Eurobarometer, 
while New Europe will see the EU behind or at the same level as the U.S.   
Tables 3.3.7 and 3.3.8 present crosstabulation results for two dependent variables 
measuring views on how United States and the European Union compare to each other when it 
comes to overall economic performance and life quality. 
 TABLE 3.3.7: European Economy Compared to U.S. 
  
  
Would you say that the European economy is performing better, 
performing worse or performing as well as the American economy? 
 
Performing better 
1 
Performing as well as 
2 
Performing worse 
3 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
31.0% 31.2% 37.8% 
20.0% 33.0% 46.9% 
 
TABLE 3.3.8: European Quality of Life Compared to U.S. 
  
  
In general, would you say that the standard of the quality of life in Europe 
at the moment is better or less good than in the United States? 
 
Much better 
1 
Somewhat better 
2 
Somewhat less 
good 
3 
Definitely less 
good 
4 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
13.5% 44.0% 18.4% 3.8% 
5.7% 23.3% 35.2% 9.4% 
T-test results for these two dependent variables, presented below in Table 3.3.9, confirm 
the initial argument, that Old Europe will perceive the EU as being ahead of the U.S., while 
New Europe will see the EU behind or at the same level as the U.S. on overall economic 
performance as well as general quality of life.  Twice as many respondents in Old Europe as new 
Europe believe that the quality of life in the European Union is either ―much better‖ or 
―somewhat better‖ than in the United States. The relationship holds in the case of the perceived 
economic performance comparison, although the difference in raw numbers between Old and 
New Europe is smaller than in the previous case.  
TABLE 3.3.9: T-Test Results for Variables Measuring Perceived Differences between EU 
and U.S. Economy and Life Quality 
Variable T-Test  df Region Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Overall Economic 
Performance 
-18.36*** 21749 Old Europe 2.07 .82 
New Europe 2.27 .77 
Overall Standard of the 
Quality of Life 
-30.90*** 25816 Old Europe 2.84 1.53 
New Europe 3.44 1.49 
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Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .05 
*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant. 
Crosstabulation results for 10 dependent variables comparing perceived differences 
between EU and U.S. are presented below in Table 3.3.10.  
TABLE 3.3.10: Crosstabulation Results for Variables Measuring Perceived Differences 
between EU and U.S. 
For each of the following, please tell me 
whether in your opinion the EU is 
ahead, behind or at the same level as the 
U.S. 
 
Region 
 
Answer 
(%) 
Ahead 
1 
Answer 
(%) 
At the 
same 
level 
2 
Answer 
(%) 
Behind 
3 
Scientific Research Old Europe 14.5 26.8 58.7 
New Europe 16.1 34.1 49.8 
Medical Research Old Europe 18.4 28.3 53.3 
New Europe 18.6 35.2 46.2 
Protection of the Environment Old Europe 68.8 17.2 14.0 
New Europe 46.5 32.4 21.1 
Innovation Technology Old Europe 19.8 28.5 51.7 
New Europe 16.9 31.4 48.9 
The Healthcare System Old Europe 62.9 15.9 21.2 
New Europe 30.9 33.6 35.6 
Education Old Europe 48.2 28.3 23.5 
New Europe 43.5 32.2 24.3 
Fighting Social Disparities Old Europe 67.6 18.2 14.2 
New Europe 39.5 35.0 25.4 
Fighting Unemployment Old Europe 47.6 27.6 24.8 
New Europe 29.6 39.1 32.3 
Fighting Discrimination Old Europe 57.1 25.0 17.8 
New Europe 37.1 36.3 26.6 
Creation of Companies Old Europe 19.9 26.6 53.3 
New Europe 19.1 36.0 44.9 
Independent-samples T-test results (presented below in Table 3.3.11) comparing means 
between respondents in Old Europe and New Europe reveal that there are statistically 
significant differences between these two groups when it comes to the way they perceive the 
differences between the European Union and the United States. The picture we get is a more 
nuanced one than my initial hypothesis suggested. Old Europe‘s levels of self-satisfaction with 
the state of the European Union when compared to the United States in general – but not in every 
case – are higher than in New Europe. Exceptions are questions related to the field of scientific 
and technological development (levels of scientific and medical research, as well as innovation 
and technology). Old Europe more than New Europe sees the United States as being ahead of the 
European Union when it comes to these areas, and in the case of innovation/technology, the 
differences between the two regions are statistically insignificant. At the same time, more than 
half of the respondents from Western Europe perceive the EU as being ahead of the U.S. in 
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fighting against discrimination, promoting environmental protection measures, developing a 
better healthcare system and trying to alleviate social disparities. Twice as many of those 
interviewed in Old Europe as in New Europe see America lagging behind Europe in fighting 
unemployment, but better at creating private companies (which might represent a reflection of a 
more social-democratic outlook on the labor-government-private section relationship).   
TABLE 3.3.11: T-Test Results for Variables Measuring Perceived Differences between EU 
and U.S. 
For each of the following, please 
tell me whether in your opinion 
the EU is ahead, behind or at the 
same level as the U.S. 
 
T-Test Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
Region 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Scientific Research 10.47*** 22514 Old 
Europe 
2.44 .73 
New 
Europe 
 
2.34 .73 
Medical Research 7.71*** 22630 Old 
Europe 
2.35 .77 
New 
Europe 
 
2.28 .75 
Protection of the Environment -28.22*** 22419 Old 
Europe 
1.45 .72 
New 
Europe 
 
1.75 .78 
Innovation Technology -.10 ns 21550 Old 
Europe 
2.32 .78 
New 
Europe 
 
2.32 .74 
The Healthcare System -41.37** 22232 Old 
Europe 
1.58 .81 
New 
Europe 
 
2.05 .81 
Education -4.93*** 22070 Old 
Europe 
1.75 .81 
New 
Europe 
 
 
1.81 .80 
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Table continued. 
For each of the following, please 
tell me whether in your opinion 
the EU is ahead, behind or at the 
same level as the U.S. 
 
T-Test Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
Region 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Fighting Social Disparities -36.69*** 21643 Old 
Europe 
1.47 .73 
New 
Europe 
1.86 .79 
Fighting Unemployment -23.88*** 21402 Old 
Europe 
1.77 .82 
New 
Europe 
2.04 .78 
Fighting Discrimination -26.40*** 21633 Old 
Europe 
1.61 .77 
New 
Europe 
1.89 .79 
Creation of Companies 6.99*** 20251 Old 
Europe 
2.34 .78 
New 
Europe 
2.26 .75 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .05 
*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant 
Staying in the realm of perceived differences between Europe and America, it is 
interesting to see how the role of the European Union in world politics is seen in comparison to 
the United States. Independent-samples t-tests were conducted for five dependent variables 
looking at the role the EU plays on the international stage and the results show that there are 
significant differences between Old Europe and New Europe not only when it comes to anti-
Americanism, but also pro-European Union feelings (results in Table 3.3.12). Crosstabulation 
results are presented below in Table 3.3.13 alongside results for the main 5 dependent variables 
used at the beginning of this section to measure anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe. 
TABLE 3.3.12: T-Test Results for Variables Measuring Perceptions of EU’s Role in World 
Politics 
In your opinion, does the 
European Union tend to play a 
positive role, a negative role or 
neither positive nor negative role 
regarding…? 
 
T-Test Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
Region 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Peace in the world 24.95*** 24423 Old Europe 1.43 .65 
New 
Europe 
 
1.25 .51 
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Table continued. 
In your opinion, does the 
European Union tend to play a 
positive role, a negative role or 
neither positive nor negative role 
regarding…? 
 
T-Test Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
Region 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
The fight against terrorism 25.82*** 24156 Old Europe 1.48 .68 
New 
Europe 
1.28 .53 
The growth of world economy 29.78*** 23390 Old Europe 1.59 .72 
New 
Europe 
1.33 .57 
The fight against poverty in the 
world 
22.93** 23787 Old Europe 1.66 .76 
New 
Europe 
1.45 .64 
The Protection of the environment 32.32** 23979 Old Europe 1.51 .73 
New 
Europe 
1.25 .52 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at p ≤ .05. 
 b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant 
 
TABLE 3.3.13: How Europeans Perceive the International Role Played by the European 
Union and the United States – crosstabulation results 
The EU / US 
tend to play a 
__ role 
regarding __? 
 
Region 
 
Answer 
EU 
(%) 
Positive 
 
Answer 
U.S. 
(%) 
Positive 
Answer 
EU 
(%) 
Neither 
positive 
nor 
negative 
Answer 
U.S. 
(%) 
Neither 
positive 
nor 
negative 
Answer 
EU 
(%) 
Negative 
Answer 
U.S. 
(%) 
Negative 
Peace in the 
world 
Old 
Europe 
65.9 23.4 24.7 15.9 9.4 60.8 
New 
Europe 
79.0 36.3 17.3 19.5 3.8 44.2 
The fight 
against 
terrorism 
Old 
Europe 
62.2 39.9 27.0 14.6 10.7 45.5 
New 
Europe 
 
76.1 55.9 19.7 15.3 4.3 28.8 
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Table continued. 
The EU / US 
tend to play a 
__ role 
regarding __? 
 
Region 
 
Answer 
EU 
(%) 
Positive 
 
Answer 
U.S. 
(%) 
Positive 
Answer 
EU 
(%) 
Neither 
positive 
nor 
negative 
Answer 
U.S. 
(%) 
Neither 
positive 
nor 
negative 
Answer 
EU 
(%) 
Negative 
Answer 
U.S. 
(%) 
Negative 
The growth of 
world economy 
Old 
Europe 
55.4 39.3 30.4 19.7 14.2 41.0 
New 
Europe 
72.2 56.0 22.3 23.8 5.6 20.2 
The fight 
against poverty 
in the world 
Old 
Europe 
52.2 18.2 29.7 20.9 18.1 60.9 
New 
Europe 
63.5 37.9 28.2 30.9 8.3 32.1 
The Protection 
of the 
environment 
Old 
Europe 
63.7 13.5 21.6 15.4 14.8 71.0 
New 
Europe 
79.8 39.2 15.7 25.1 4.5 35.7 
The picture emerging from these results is one of a European Union that perceives its role 
on the international stage as more positive than the one played by the United States. At the same 
time, it is interesting to notice that significantly more respondents from New Europe than Old 
Europe share this point of view.  
viii. Conclusions 
T-test results for five main dependent variables are summarized below in Table 3.3.14. 
TABLE 3.3.14:  Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by 
variables from the Eurobarometer 63 -2005 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 7) 
Region EU foreign 
policy 
independent 
of USA 
U.S. role 
in world 
peace 
U.S. role 
in fighting 
terrorism 
U.S. role 
in 
economic 
growth 
worldwide 
U.S. role 
in fighting 
poverty 
worldwide 
U.S. role in 
protecting 
the 
environment 
Old 
Europe 
1.27 ns 
(.61) 
2.37*** 
(.83) 
2.06*** 
(.92) 
1.80*** 
(.89) 
2.02*** 
(.78) 
2.43 *** 
(.71) 
New 
Europe 
1.26 ns 
(.58) 
2.08*** 
(.89) 
1.73*** 
(.88) 
1.68*** 
(.79) 
1.64*** 
(.82) 
1.93*** 
(.86) 
Measures of anti-Americanism from the 2005 Eurobarometer show a divided European 
Union, along the Old Europe – New Europe line. Respondents from Western Europe are 
significantly more likely to see the United States as playing a negative role in promoting 
international peace and economic growth, fighting terrorism, trying to eradicate world poverty 
and protecting the environment. In the last two cases, twice as many of those interviewed in Old 
Europe as in New Europe perceive America as having a negative impact on efforts to alleviate 
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poverty worldwide and protecting the environment. Thanks to the battery of questions presented 
in the previous section, we can also get a more nuanced picture of European anti-Americanism, 
directed mostly at areas of social and economic equality, as well as foreign policies. While 
America is still admired for its technological prowess, it is also criticized for its conduct on the 
international stage, as well as for its domestic policies regarding the healthcare system, the 
environment and unemployment. Directly related to the focus of this dissertation on tolerance, it 
is worth pointing out that Old Europe is especially critical of the way United States deal with 
discrimination at home and abroad (only 17 percent of respondents believe that the U.S. is ahead 
of the EU on this dimension).  
Overall, the results of the statistical analysis using variables from the 2005 
Eurobarometer confirmed the findings from both the 2002 PEW and 2004 Eurobarometer 
surveys: a “divided” anti-Americanism in the European Union, with Europeans feelings 
towards the United States falling along the lines of “Old” vs. “New” Europe. Old Europe is 
significantly more anti-American than in New Europe. 
3.4 . PEW 2007 
Seven variables from this database were used as dependent variables to test the difference 
in means between levels of anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe. These variables provide 
answers to questions regarding feelings towards the United States, President George W. Bush, 
and the American people and culture broadly defined. The results of the statistical analysis are 
summarized in Table 3.4.10 and are preceded by a detailed description of each test. 
 All nine are ordinal variables, and the statistical tool used for four of them was a chi-
square test, while for the other five, I used an independent-samples t-test. The results of these 
tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented 
below. The independent variable, Old Europe vs. New Europe, was coded 0 for Old Europe, and 
1 for New Europe. ―No answer‖ and ―don‘t know‖ answers were eliminated when they did not 
provide any relevant information. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. 
Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below, starting with 
the ―Opinion of United States - 2007‖ variable. 
i. Crosstabulation results for the “Opinion of United States - 2007” are presented below in 
Table 3.4.1. 
TABLE 3.4.1: Opinion of the United States - 2007 
  
  
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, 
somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United 
States? 
Very favorable 
1 
Somewhat 
favorable 
2 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
3 
Very unfavorable 
4 
Old Europe 
  
New Europe 
6.1% 38.0% 39.3% 16.7% 
7.7% 43.2% 35.5% 13.6% 
Results from an independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant 
differences (t (7393) = 5.82, p ˂ .001***) between opinions of the United States in Old Europe 
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(M = 2.67, SD = .82) and New Europe (M = 3.55, SD = .82). Western European respondents are 
more likely have ―somewhat unfavorable‖ and ―very unfavorable‖ views of the United States 
than those interviewed in New Europe.  
ii. Table 3.4.2 contains crosstabulation results for the “Opinion of Americans – 2007” 
dependent variable.  
TABLE 3.4.2: Opinion of Americans - 2007 
  
  
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, 
somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Americans? 
 
Very favorable 
1 
Somewhat 
favorable 
2 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
3 
Very unfavorable 
4 
Old Europe 
  
New Europe 
12.7% 56.1% 24.0% 7.2% 
8.2% 54.8% 28.7% 8.3% 
An independent-groups t-test confirmed that there are significant differences (t (7181) 
= -6.12, p ˂ .001***) between opinions of the United States in Old Europe (M = 2.26, SD = .76) 
and New Europe (M = 2.37, SD = .75), although not in the direction predicted by my hypothesis. 
Although they have a mostly negative view of the United States, over half of the respondents 
from Old Europe (more than New Europe, which goes against my hypothesis about higher levels 
of anti-Americanism in OE compared to NE) perceive the American people in a positive light. 
Europeans seem to be able to differentiate between the U.S. government and the U.S. citizens 
when it comes to the target of their antipathy.   
iii. Crosstabulation results for the “U.S. World Politics – 2007” dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 3.4.3. 
 TABLE 3.4.3: U.S. World Politics - 2007 
  
  
In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think 
the United States takes into account the interests of countries like our 
country – a great deal, a fair amount, not too much, or not at all? 
Great deal 
1 
Fair amount 
2 
Not too much 
3 
Not at all 
4 
Old Europe 
  
New Europe 
3.0% 18.1% 46.2% 32.7% 
2.1% 18.9% 46.8% 32.2% 
Results from an independent-samples t-test showed that there are no significant 
differences (t (4664) = -.19, p = .84 ns) between Old Europe and New Europe when it comes to 
the beliefs about the amount of attention paid by the United States to other countries when it 
makes its foreign policy decision. One in five of the respondents in both regions believe that the 
U.S. doesn‘t take into account the interests of their countries ―at all‖, or if it does, it is ―not too 
much.‖ 
iv. Table 3.4.4 presents crosstabulation results for the “U.S. World Poverty – 2007” 
dependent variable.  
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 TABLE 3.4.4: U.S. World Poverty - 2007 
  
  
Do United States policies increase or lessen the gap between rich and 
poor countries, or do United States policies have no effect on the gap 
between rich and poor countries? 
 
Increase gap between 
rich and poor 
1 
No effect 
2 
Lessen gap between 
rich and poor 
3 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
71.7% 16.8% 11.5% 
57.1% 28.6% 14.4% 
An independent-samples t-test revealed that there are significant differences (t (4417) = 
-7.64, p ˂ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 1.40, SD = .68) and New Europe (M = 1.57, SD = 
.73) regarding the role played by the United States on the gap between rich and poor countries. 
Over 70 percent of respondents in Western Europe and 57 percent in New Europe believe that 
the impact America has on alleviating world poverty is a negative one. 
v. Crosstabulation results and question wording for the “U.S. Culture – 2007” dependent 
variable are presented below in Table 3.4.5. 
 TABLE 3.4.5: U.S. Culture - 2007 
  
  
Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view?   
It's good that American ideas and 
customs are spreading here 
1 
It's bad that American ideas and 
customs are spreading here 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
23.0% 77.0% 
25.6% 74.4% 
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between the 
country where the interview was conducted (Old Europe vs. New Europe) and the respondents‘ 
views on the Americanization of their national culture. The relationship between these variables 
was significant, but weak, X² (1, N = 5440) = 3.82, p ˂ .01**. Despite the small difference in 
the overall percentages (77 vs. 74 percent), respondents in Old Europe are more likely than their 
New Europe counterparts to argue that it is bad that American ideas and customs are spreading in 
their countries. 
vi. Table 3.4.6 contains crosstabulation results for the “Trust in President George W. 
Bush” dependent variable. 
 TABLE 3.4.6: Trust in President George W. Bush 
  
  
How much confidence you have in U.S. President George W. to do 
the right thing regarding world affairs? 
A lot of 
confidence 
1 
Some 
confidence 
2 
Not too much 
confidence 
3 
No confidence at 
all 
4 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
2.4% 17.9% 30.5% 49.2% 
4.6% 26.0% 36.8% 32.6% 
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Results from an independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant 
differences (t (4617) = 11.14, p ˂ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 3.27, SD = .83) and New 
Europe (M = 2.97, SD = .87) when it comes to their feelings towards American leader George 
W. Bush. Almost 80 percent of respondents in Old Europe have little or no confidence at all in 
President Bush‘s involvement in international politics. It seems that President Bush is more 
distrusted and dislike by the Europeans than the American government or the American people 
as a whole.  
vii. Crosstabulation results for the ―U.S. Promotes Democracy” dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 3.4.7. 
 TABLE 3.4.7: U.S. Promotes Democracy 
  
  
Which statement comes closer to describing your view?   
The United States promotes 
democracy wherever it can 
1 
The United States promotes 
democracy mostly where it serves its 
interests 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
7.7% 92.3% 
13.2% 86.8% 
A chi-square test of independence showed that there are significant differences - X² (1, 
N = 5330) = 35.66, p ˂ .001*** - between Old and New Europe‘s views on America‘s 
democratization efforts. Most Europeans believe that the U.S. promotes democracy only when it 
serves its interests, but more respondents from Old Europe than New Europe share this point of 
view. 
viii. Conclusions 
Table 3.4.8 summarizes the results of the analysis comparing anti-Americanism in Old 
vs. New Europe using variables from the PEW 2007 database/survey.  
TABLE 3.4.8:  Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables 
from the PEW 2007 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 5) 
Region U.S. 
world 
politics 
U.S. 
world 
poverty 
Trust in 
Pres 
Bush 
U.S. 
culture 
U.S. and 
democracy 
Opinio
n of 
U.S. 
Opinion of 
Americans 
Old 
Europe 
3.09 ns 
(.78) 
1.40*** 
(.68) 
3.27*** 
(.83) 
X²=3.82** 
 
X²=35.66**
* 
2.67**
* 
(.82) 
2.26 *** 
(.76) 
New 
Europe 
3.09 ns 
(.76) 
1.57*** 
(.73) 
2.58*** 
(.87) 
X²=3.82** 
 
X²=35.66**
* 
2.55**
* 
(.82) 
2.37 *** 
(.75) 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .01 *, p ≤ 
.05**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant 
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Data from the PEW 2007 survey confirms the existence of a divided anti-
Americanism in the European Union, along the Old Europe – New Europe lines. Old 
Europe is more anti-American than New Europe. Respondents from Western Europe (more than 
their New Europe counterparts) hold unfavorable views of the United States government and 
President George W. Bush, believe that the U.S. has a negative impact on efforts to alleviate 
world poverty and that the spread of American culture is bad for their own countries. They deem 
America‘s efforts to spread democracy in the world as self-serving, but they also make a clear 
distinction between the American people (70 percent positive responses) and the American 
government (40 percent positive responses).    
3.5 . CONCLUSIONS – DIVIDED ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The results of the statistical analyses presented above are summarized in Tables 3.5.1 to 
3.5.4 and they confirm the initial theory: there is a relationship between the Old Europe – 
New Europe divide and levels of anti-Americanism.  
TABLE 3.5.1:  Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables 
from the PEW 2002 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 3) 
Region U.S. 
world 
politics 
U.S. 
world 
poverty 
U.S. world 
problems 
U.S. 
culture 
Opinion 
on the 
U.S. 
Opinion on 
Americans 
Old Europe 2.66*** 
(0.84) 
1.51*** 
(0.81) 
2.39*** 
(1.05) 
1.68*** 
(.46) 
2.33*** 
(.90) 
2.10 ns 
(.68) 
New Europe 2.94*** 
(0.78) 
1.64*** 
(0.85) 
2.58*** 
(1.21) 
1.61*** 
(.48) 
2.18*** 
(.91) 
2.12 ns 
(.67) 
 
TABLE 3.5.2:  Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables 
from the Eurobarometer 62 -2004 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 6) 
Region EU foreign 
policy 
independent 
of USA 
U.S. role 
in world 
peace 
U.S. role 
in fighting 
terrorism 
U.S. role 
in 
economic 
growth 
worldwide 
U.S. role 
in fighting 
poverty 
worldwide 
U.S. role in 
protecting 
the 
environment 
Old 
Europe 
1.10* 
(.30) 
2.43*** 
(.81) 
2.11*** 
(.91) 
2.05*** 
(.89) 
2.45*** 
(.76) 
2.55 *** 
(.73) 
New 
Europe 
1.09* 
(.29) 
2.15*** 
(.87) 
1.78*** 
(.88) 
1.75*** 
(.82) 
2.01*** 
(.82) 
1.99 *** 
(.85) 
 
TABLE 3.5.3:  Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables 
from the Eurobarometer 63 -2005 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 7) 
Region EU foreign 
policy 
independent 
of USA 
U.S. role 
in world 
peace 
U.S. role 
in fighting 
terrorism 
U.S. role 
in 
economic 
growth 
worldwide 
U.S. role 
in fighting 
poverty 
worldwide 
U.S. role in 
protecting 
the 
environment 
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Table continued. 
Region EU foreign 
policy 
independent 
of USA 
U.S. role 
in world 
peace 
U.S. role 
in fighting 
terrorism 
U.S. role 
in 
economic 
growth 
worldwide 
U.S. role 
in fighting 
poverty 
worldwide 
U.S. role in 
protecting 
the 
environment 
Old 
Europe 
1.27 ns 
(.61) 
2.37*** 
(.83) 
2.06*** 
(.92) 
1.80*** 
(.89) 
2.02*** 
(.78) 
2.43 *** 
(.71) 
New 
Europe 
1.26 ns 
(.58) 
2.08*** 
(.89) 
1.73*** 
(.88) 
1.68*** 
(.79) 
1.64*** 
(.82) 
1.93*** 
(.86) 
 
TABLE 3.5.4:  Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables 
from the PEW 2007 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 5) 
Region U.S. 
world 
politics 
U.S. 
world 
poverty 
Trust in 
Pres 
Bush 
U.S. 
culture 
U.S. and 
democracy 
Opinio
n of 
U.S. 
Opinion of 
Americans 
Old 
Europe 
3.09 ns 
(.78) 
1.40*** 
(.68) 
3.27*** 
(.83) 
X²=3.82** 
 
X²=35.66**
* 
2.67**
* 
(.82) 
2.26 *** 
(.76) 
New 
Europe 
3.09 ns 
(.76) 
1.57*** 
(.73) 
2.58*** 
(.87) 
X²=3.82** 
 
X²=35.66**
* 
2.55**
* 
(.82) 
2.37 *** 
(.75) 
Old Europe is more anti-American than New Europe, more inclined to see the American 
government, President Bush and the overall international politics involvement of the United 
States in a negative light. Respondents from Western Europe are more likely than those in New 
Europe to disapprove of America‘s social and environmental policies, admiring at the same time 
its technological and scientific prowess. They are also more critical of the Americanization of 
their societies and of the war on terrorism. It is interesting to notice that Europeans in general 
make a distinction between the U.S. government and the American people, the former being the 
actual target of more virulent anti-American feelings, while the latter seems to be merely 
disliked.  
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CHAPTER 4 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: TOLERANCE 
TOWARDS WOMEN IN OLD EUROPE, NEW EUROPE AND 
THE UNITED STATES 
My second and third theories predict levels of tolerance towards women in Old Europe, 
New Europe and the United States. The core argument of this research is that Old Europe and the 
United States are less culturally similar than New Europe and the US, which explains why Old 
Europe experiences relatively higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe. In order to 
test this theory, three dummy variables were created for each of the databases presented below in 
Chapter 4, measuring differences in cultural indicators (tolerance towards women, immigrants 
and homosexuals, and levels of religiosity) for three regional pairings: Old Europe and New 
Europe, New Europe and the United States, and Old Europe and the United States. 
Unfortunately, due to time and space restrictions, only the results of the statistical tests involving 
the Old Europe/New Europe, and New Europe/United States comparisons are presented below in 
detail. Details of statistical analysis involving an independent variable coded 0 for Old Europe 
and 1 for the United States are presented in the text only when they show no significant 
differences between the two regions, as such contradicting the main hypothesis of this research, 
according to which we expect to find statistically significant differences in levels of tolerance 
towards women between Old Europe and New Europe, as well as between Old Europe and the 
United States (reflecting their comparably lower cultural similarity), but no such differences 
between New Europe and the United States due to their higher cultural similarity.  
Hypothesis 2: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance 
towards women in Old Europe vs. New Europe (OE ˃ NE) and in Old Europe vs. the United 
States. 
Hypothesis 3: There is no statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance 
towards women in New Europe vs. the United States. 
To test these two hypotheses, mean averages of attitudes towards women rights, as well 
as the overall status of women in a society, were compared across nations from Old Europe, New 
Europe and the United States, using independent-samples t-tests and chi-square tests of 
independence. The results of this analysis are presented below individually per database used. 
4.1 . WORLD VALUES SURVEY 
Eight dependent variables from the World Values Survey database were used to measure 
levels of tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These 
variables were based on answers to questions regarding views on the role and position of women 
in the society (women as political leaders, women without children), as well as certain 
social/economic issues (marriage, abortion, divorce). The overall results of the statistical analysis 
are summarized in Table 4.1.7 which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. 
 All eight are ordinal variables, and the statistical tool used for one of them was a chi-
square test, while for the other seven, I used an independent-samples t-test. The results of these 
tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented 
below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. 
New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New 
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Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States). 
Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old 
Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States.  Two t-tests were conducted for each 
independent variable, measuring the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and 
New Europe and United States. ―No answer‖ and ―don‘t know‖ answers were eliminated when 
they did not provide any relevant information. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical 
analyses.  
Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below, 
beginning with the ―Women Right to a Job‖ variable. 
i. Crosstabulation results for “Women Right to a Job” dependent variable are presented 
below in Table 4.1.1. 
 TABLE 4.1.1:  Women’s equal right to a job even when jobs are scarce 
  
  
Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women 
Agree 
1 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
13.8% 9.8% 76.5% 
27.1% 20.2% 52.7% 
8.2% 17.1% 74.6% 
The first independent-samples t-test conducted for this dependent variable revealed that 
for respondents in Old Europe (M = 2.63, SD = .71) and New Europe (M = 2.26, SD = .85) there 
was a strong relationship (t (17084) = 26.32, p ˂ .01**) between the region where the interview 
was conducted and the answers regarding the equal rights for women to a job, even when jobs 
are scarce.  
The second t-test showed significant differences (t (7051) = -22.89, p ˂ .001***) 
between New Europe (M = 2.26, SD = .62) and United States (M = 2.66, SD = .62) regarding the 
equal right of women to have a job even when jobs are scarce. A third t-test showed weaker 
dissimilarities (t (14881) = -2.59, p ≤ .01**) in gender equality opinions between Old Europe and 
the United States. 
 To summarize, hypothesis 2 was confirmed: levels of tolerance in Old Europe are 
significantly higher than those in New Europe. They are however much closer than expected to 
those in the United States, which does not support the assumption behind hypothesis #3. Levels 
of tolerance towards women are significantly higher in the United States than in New Europe. 
Overall, America and Old Europe are more culturally similar in this respect than New Europe 
and the U.S. 76 percent of respondents from Old Europe and 74 percent from the United States 
disagreed with the statement that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are 
scarce, while only 52 percent of those interviewed in New Europe agreed with this point of view.  
ii. Crosstabulation results for the “Marriage out-dated” dependent variable are presented 
in Table 4.1.2.  
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TABLE 4.1.2:  Marriage out-dated 
  
  
Marriage is an out-dated institution 
 
Disagree 
1 
Agree 
2 
 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
77.7% 22.3% 
82.2% 17.8% 
88.9% 11.1% 
Two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant differences 
between views on marriage as an out-dated institution in Old Europe compared to New Europe 
(X² (1, N = 13564) = 36.24, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X² 
(1, N = 6887) = 54.37, p ˂ .001***).  Hypothesis 2 is confirmed by these results, while 
hypothesis 3 is not. However, because Old Europe has a larger percentage of respondents who 
believe that marriage is an out-dated institution (22 percent) than New Europe (17 percent) and 
United States (11 percent), a valid argument can be made that in the case of the institution of 
marriage, there is a higher degree of cultural similarity between U.S. and NE than between U.S. 
and Old Europe (see Chart 4.1.1).  
Chart 4.1.1 – Is Marriage an Out-Dated Institution? Cultural Similarity 
between Old Europe, New Europe and the United States 
 
 Crosstabulation results for the “Woman as single parent” dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 4.2.3. 
  
77.70% 
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TABLE 4.2.3:  Woman as single parent 
  
  
Woman as a single parent 
 
Disapprove 
0 
Depends 
1 
Approve 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
30.0% 20.2% 49.8% 
33.5% 23.8% 42.7% 
46.9% 6.7% 46.4% 
A first independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant differences (t 
(16791) = 7.00, p ≤ .001***) between views on women as single parents in Old Europe (M = 
1.20, SD = .87) and New Europe (M = 1.09, SD = .86). Results from a second t-test revealed that 
there is a strong relationship (t (6972) = 4.11, p ˂ .001***) between where the interview was 
conducted - New Europe (M = 1.09, SD = .86) vs. the United States (M = 1.00, SD = .96) - and 
what the respondent‘s opinion was on single mothers. These results show that there is actually 
more cultural similarity between Old and New Europe, than between New Europe and the 
United States when it comes to the issue of women as single parents. As shown above in 
Table 3, over 46 percent of Americans disapprove of single mothers, compared to the 30 percent 
in Old Europe and 33 percent in New Europe. It is interesting also to notice the much larger 
percentages of Europeans who answer ―depends‖ to this question, which suggest a willingness to 
evaluate individual situations that is not shared by the American respondents.    
iii. Crosstabulation results for the ―Men better leaders than women” dependent variable 
are presented in Table 4.1.4.  
 TABLE 4.1.4:  Men better political leaders than women 
  
  
Men make better political leaders than women do 
 
Agree strongly 
1 
Agree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Strongly disagree 
4 
 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
3.7% 14.5% 43.3% 38.6% 
12.2% 33.6% 38.4% 15.8% 
4.7% 19.9% 56.3% 19.0% 
Results from two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are significant 
differences (t (16413) = 38.22, p ˂ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 3.17, SD = .80) and New 
Europe (M = 2.58, SD = .89), and between New Europe (M = 2.58, SD = .89) and United States 
(M = 2.90, SD = .75) when it comes to views on women as political leaders (t (6757) = -15.26, p 
˂ .001***). Three times more respondents from New Europe than Old Europe and the United 
States agree or strongly agree that men make better political leaders than women. There is no 
cultural similarity between New Europe and the United States that might explain in future 
analyses the former‘s lower levels of anti-Americanism as compared to Old Europe (see below 
Chart 4.1.2). 
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CHART 4.1.2: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement – men 
make better political leaders than women do 
 
Crosstabulation results for the “University more important for boys than girls‖ 
dependent variable are presented below in Table 4.1.5. 
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43.30% 
38.60% 
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33.60% 
38.40% 
15.80% 
4.70% 
19.90% 
56.30% 
19.00% 
Agree Strongly
Agree
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Strongly disagree
DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: MEN MAKE BETTER 
POLITICAL LEADERS THAN WOMEN DO 
United States
New Europe
Old Europe
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TABLE 4.1.5:  University more important for boys than girls 
  
  
University is more important for a boy than for a girl 
 
Agree strongly 
1 
Agree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Strongly disagree 
4 
 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
2.2% 6.5% 38.3% 53.0% 
4.0% 11.0% 45.3% 39.7% 
1.9% 6.0% 55.1% 37.0% 
Two independent-samples t-tests showed that there is a strong relationship – t1 (16799) 
= 15.93, p ˂ .001***) and t2 (6883) = -3.60, p ˂ .001*** - between the region where the 
interview was conducted – Old Europe (M = 3.42, SD = .71), New Europe (M = 3.21, SD = .79) 
and the United States (M = 3.27, SD = .65) - and the respondents‘ views on higher education for 
boys and girls. While the majority of Europeans and Americans disagree or strongly disagree 
with the idea that university education is more important for boys than girls, the percentages are 
higher in Old Europe and United States than in New Europe. These results show there is more 
cultural similarity on this issue between the United States and Western Europe than between the 
U.S. and New Europe (see Chart 4.1.3).  
CHART 4.1.3: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement – 
university education is more important for boys than girls 
 
iv. This section starts with crosstabulation results for the last three dependent variables from 
the WVS database (―Prostitution justifiable‖, ―Abortion Justifiable‖ and ―Divorce 
Justifiable‖). The question wording for all three dependent variables was: ―Please tell me 
for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never is 
justified, or something in between, using this card.‖ These dependent variables are coded 
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DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: UNIVERSITY 
EDUCATION IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR BOYS THAN GIRLS 
United States
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on a scale from 1 (Never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable); the two extreme values are 
presented below in Table 4.1.6. 
TABLE 4.1.6:  Prostitution, Abortion and Divorce: Justifiable or Not? 
 Justifiable: prostitution Justifiable: abortion Justifiable: divorce 
 
Never 
justifiable 
1 
Always 
justifiable 
10 
Never 
justifiable 
1 
Always 
justifiable 
10 
Never 
justifiable 
1 
Always 
justifiable 
10 
 
Old Europe 31.2% 6.2% 16.4% 15.8% 7.1% 24.1% 
New Europe 53.9% 3.3% 35.3% 10.5% 22.0% 15.9% 
United States 46.1% 3.0% 28.0% 7.5% 6.6% 12.1% 
Results of four independent-samples t-tests revealed that there is a strong relationship 
between the regions where the interview was conducted – Old Europe, New Europe and the 
United States – and the respondents‘ opinions on the justifiability of prostitution (t1 (15630) = 
23.86, p ˂ .001*** and t2 (6833) = -3.75, p ˂ .001***)  and divorce (t1 (16826) = 26.47, p ˂ 
.001*** and t2 (6882) = -7.09, p ˂ .001***). A larger percentage of those interviewed in New 
Europe (M = 2.86, SD = 2.59) and United States (M = 3.10, SD = 2.51) than Old Europe (M = 
3.98, SD = 2.80) believe that prostitution is never justifiable. 
 Results of the analysis on divorce are more mixed. At one of the extremes, New Europe 
(M = 5.37, SD = 3.19) has a significantly larger percentage of respondents who argue that 
divorce is never justifiable than Old Europe (M = 6.79, SD = 2.73) and the United States (M = 
5.87, SD = 2.48). At the other end of the spectrum, ―divorce is always justifiable‖, New Europe 
(20 percent) is positioned between Old Europe (24 percent) and the United States (12 percent).  
An independent-samples t-test comparing means between groups of respondents in Old 
Europe (M = 5.68, SD = 3.04) and New Europe (M = 4.35, SD = 3.21) confirmed the existence 
of significant differences (t (16707) = 24.00, p ˂ .001***) in their views on the justifiability of 
abortion. When New Europe is compared to the United States (M = 4.41, SD = .2.91), these 
differences become insignificant (t (6847) = -.81, p = .41 ns).  Overall, opinions on abortion 
confirm both hypothesis 2 (OE has more tolerant views than NE) and hypothesis 3 (there are no 
significant differences in levels of tolerance between NE and the U.S.). 
v. Conclusions 
Results of the statistical analysis of variables from the World Values Survey database are 
summarized below in Table 4.1.7. 
TABLE 4.1.7:  Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the World Values 
Survey database (codebook in Appendix 1) 
 Women 
right to 
job 
Marriage 
out-dated 
Single 
mothers 
Women 
political 
leaders 
University 
education 
for girls 
Prostitution 
justifiable 
Abortion 
justifiable 
Divorce 
justifiable 
Old 
Europe 
1.96** 
(.48) 
X²=36.24*
** 
(OE – NE) 
1.20*** 
(.87) 
3.17*** 
(.80) 
3.42*** 
(.71) 
3.98*** 
(2.80) 
5.68*** 
(3.04) 
6.79*** 
(2.73) 
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Table continued. 
 Women 
right to 
job 
Marriage 
out-dated 
Single 
mothers 
Women 
political 
leaders 
University 
education 
for girls 
Prostitution 
justifiable 
Abortion 
justifiable 
Divorce 
justifiable 
New 
Europe 
1.93**/**
* 
(.68) 
X²=54.37*
** 
(NE – US) 
1.09*** 
(.86) 
2.58*** 
(.89) 
3.21*** 
(.79) 
2.86*** 
(2.59) 
4.35***/ns 
(3.21) 
5.37*** 
(3.19) 
United 
States 
2.09*** 
(.49) 
X²=54.37*
** 
(NE – US) 
1.00*** 
(.96) 
2.90*** 
(.75) 
3.27*** 
(.65) 
3.10*** 
(2.51) 
4.41 ns 
(2.91) 
5.87*** 
(2.48) 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE 
relationship, second one to NE-U.S, for the cases in which they are different. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ 
.01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant 
Analysis based on data from the World Values Survey has produced a nuanced picture of 
tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. In general, there is 
a relationship between the region where the interview was conducted and the answers given by 
the respondents. Old Europe and the United States share similar views on:  1) the right of women 
to have a job even when jobs are scarce, 2) importance of higher education for girls, 3) women as 
political leaders and 4) divorce. There is a stronger cultural similarity between New Europe and 
the U.S. when the respondents were asked to express their views on marriage as an out-dated 
institution, prostitution and abortion, and between Old Europe and New Europe on single 
motherhood. To summarize, although there are certain areas in which more intolerant views on 
women and their role in the society are matched by lower levels of anti-Americanism (in New 
Europe), data from the World Values Survey does not support the argument that there is an 
overall stronger cultural similarity between New Europe and the United States than between 
Old Europe and the United States   
4.2 . VOICE OF THE PEOPLE – MILLENIUM EDITION 
Six dependent variables from the Voice of the People – Millennium Edition database 
were used to measure levels of tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New Europe and the 
United States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding views on the role 
and position of women in the society (women as political leaders, women without children), as 
well as certain social/economic issues (household income, education for girls, marriage, rape, 
etc.). The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 4.2.7 which is 
preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core argument at the basis of this section 
states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. 
are more culturally similar when it comes to their views on women than Old Europe and the U.S.  
 All six are ordinal variables, and the statistical tool used for all of them was a chi-square 
test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in 
each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first 
one, “Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while 
the second one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the 
United States). Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “Region” and 
coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States.  ―No answer‖ and ―don‘t 
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know‖ answers were eliminated when they did not provide any relevant information. An alpha 
level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Results of the statistical analysis for each 
dependent variable are presented below, starting with the ―Education for girls‖ variable. 
i. Crosstabulation results for the “Education for girls” dependent variable are presented 
below in Table 4.2.1. 
 TABLE 4.2.1:  Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the World 
Values Survey database 
  
  
Do you agree or disagree with the statement: Education is more 
important for boys than for girls? 
 
Agree 
1 
Disagree 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
7.3% 92.7% 
19.0% 81.0% 
6.8% 93.2% 
Two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant differences 
between views the importance of education for boys and girls in Old Europe compared to New 
Europe (X² (1, N = 19629) = 605.21, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United 
States (X² (1, N = 8544) = 91.33, p ˂ .001***). A third chi-square also revealed that there are no 
statistically significant differences in gender equality opinions between Old Europe and the 
United States, regarding the importance of education for both genders (X² (1, N = 13091) = .439, 
p = .566 ns). These results confirmed the existence of a divide between Old Europe and New 
Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Moreover, more respondents from 
New Europe than Old Europe and United States combined believe that education is more 
important for boys than girls, which shows that gender equality issues related to education are 
viewed more positively in Old Europe and the United States than in New Europe.  Overall, there 
is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the United States than between United States 
and New Europe regarding this particular aspect of tolerance towards women.   
ii. Crosstabulation results for the “Equal contributions to household income” dependent 
variable are presented below in Table 4.2.2. 
 TABLE 4.2.2:  Equal contributions to household income 
  
  
Do you agree or disagree with the statement: Both the husband 
and the wife should contribute to the household income? 
Agree 
1 
Disagree 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
85.9% 14.1% 
89.6% 10.4% 
76.9% 23.1% 
Results from two chi-square tests of independence revealed that there are significant 
differences between opinions on equal contributions to household income by both spouses in 
Old Europe compared to New Europe (X² (1, N = 19375) = 57.53, p ˂ .001***) and in New 
Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, N = 8616) = 133.40, p ˂ .001***).   These results 
confirmed the existence of a split between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New 
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Europe and the United States. Almost 90 percent of respondents from New Europe agree that 
both the husband and the wife should contribute to the household income, compared to lower 
percentages in Old Europe (86 percent) and United States (77 percent).  In conclusion, for this 
second variable, there is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the New Europe than 
between United States and New Europe regarding this economic/social aspect of tolerance 
towards women. 
iii. Table 4.2.3 presents crosstabulation results for the ―Men better political leaders” 
dependent variable.  
 TABLE 4.2.3:  Men better political leaders 
  
  
Do you agree or disagree with the statement:  On the whole, 
men make better political leaders than women do? 
 
Agree 
1 
Disagree 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
 U.S. 
17.0% 83.0% 
52.8% 47.2% 
21.6% 78.4% 
Two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant distinctions 
between views the women as political leaders in Old Europe compared to New Europe (X² (1, N 
= 18609) = 2647.30, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, N = 
8028) = 332.80, p ˂ .001***). These results confirmed the existence of a schism between Old 
Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Moreover, a 
significantly larger percentage of respondents from New Europe than from Old Europe and 
United States combined believe that men make better political leaders than women.  Overall, 
there is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the United States than between United 
States and New Europe regarding women‘s involvement in politics and their role as political 
leaders.   
iv. Crosstabulation results for “Women right to a job when jobs scarce” dependent 
variable are presented below in Table 4.2.4. 
 TABLE 4.2.4:  Women right to a job when jobs scarce 
  
  
Do you agree or disagree with the statement: When jobs are 
scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women?  
 
Agree 
1 
Disagree 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
 U.S. 
22.8% 77.2% 
40.0% 60.0% 
16.2% 83.8% 
Results from two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant 
differences between views the women as political leaders in Old Europe compared to New 
Europe (X² (1, N = 19100) = 644.93, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United 
States (X² (1, N = 8293) = 209.84, p ˂ .001***).   These results confirmed the existence of a 
division between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United 
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States. Moreover, a larger percentage of respondents from New Europe than from Old Europe 
and United States combined believe that when jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a 
job than women.  There is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the United States 
than between United States and New Europe on the issue of women‘s right to a job even when 
jobs are scarce.   
v. Table 4.2.5 contains crosstabulation results for the “Women without children” variable. 
 TABLE 4.2.5:  Women without children 
  
  
Do you agree or disagree with the statement:  A woman needs to 
have children in order to be really fulfilled? 
 
Agree 
1 
Disagree 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
29.2% 70.8% 
73.2% 26.8% 
15.0% 85.0% 
Two chi-square tests of independence revealed that there are significant distinctions 
between opinions on women as mothers in Old Europe compared to New Europe (X² (1, N = 
18230) = 3389.96, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, N = 
8178) = 1273.20, p ˂ .001***).   These results confirmed the existence of a rift between Old 
Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Moreover, a 
significantly larger percentage of respondents from New Europe (73 percent) than from Old 
Europe (29 percent) and United States (15 percent) consider a woman without children to be 
unfulfilled.  There is much more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the United States 
than between United States and New Europe regarding motherhood and what that means in a 
woman‘s life. 
vi. Crosstabulation results for the “Woman says no to sex” dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 4.2.6. 
 TABLE 4.2.6:  Woman says no to sex 
  
  
Do you agree or disagree with the statement: Sometimes when a 
woman says no to sex, she doesn't always mean it? 
 
Agree 
1 
Disagree 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
38.0% 62.0% 
63.1% 36.9% 
30.2% 69.8% 
Results from two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant 
differences between views women saying no to sex in Old Europe compared to New Europe (X² 
(1, N = 15902) = 933.45, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, 
N = 6700) = 361.25, p ˂ .001***).   The analysis confirmed the existence of a tolerance divide 
between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. 
Moreover, a larger percentage of respondents from New Europe (63 percent) than from Old 
Europe (38 percent) and United States (30 percent) believe that sometimes when a woman says 
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no to sex, she doesn't always mean it.  There is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and 
the United States than between United States and New Europe regarding a woman‘s right to say 
no to sex. On a personal note, I believe that all these numbers are extremely high and very 
disturbing. 
vii. Conclusions 
Table 4.2.7 summarizes the results of the statistical analyses measuring levels of 
tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States based on variables 
from the Voice of the People survey – Millennium Edition database.  
TABLE 4.2.7:  Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the Voice of the 
People – Millennium Edition survey database (codebook in Appendix 2) 
 University 
education for 
girls 
Women and 
household 
income 
Women 
political 
leaders 
Women right 
to a job when 
jobs scarce 
Women 
without 
children -
fulfilled? 
Women say 
no to sex 
Old 
Europe 
X²=605.21*** 
OE - NE 
X²=57.33*** 
OE-NE 
X²=2647*** 
OE-NE 
X²=644.93*** 
OE-NE 
X²=3389*** 
OE-NE 
X²=933.4*** 
OE-NE 
New 
Europe 
X²=91.33*** 
NE-US 
X²=133.40*** 
NE-US 
X²=332*** 
NE-US 
X²=209.84*** 
NE-US 
X²=1273*** 
NE-US 
X²=361.2*** 
NE-US 
United 
States 
X²=.439 ns 
US-OE 
X²=133.40*** 
NE-US 
X²=332*** 
NE-US 
X²=209.84*** 
NE-US 
X²=1273*** 
NE-US 
X²=361.2*** 
NE-US 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant. 
Results of the chi-square tests on variables from the Voice of the People – 
Millennium Edition measuring levels of tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New 
Europe and the United States have shown that levels of tolerance towards women are much 
more similar in Old Europe and United States than in United States and the pro-American 
and apparently quite intolerant New Europe.  
In every instance, a significantly higher percentage of respondents from New Europe than 
from Old Europe and the U.S. think that women need children to be fulfilled and that they don‘t 
always mean it when they say no to sex, education is more important for boys than girls, men 
make better political leaders than women and they also should be given preference over women 
in hiring when jobs are scarce. Data from the Voice of the People – Millennium Edition did not 
support the existence of a connection between cultural similarity and levels of tolerance. 
4.3 . PEW 2007 
Two dependent variables from the PEW 2007 Survey database were used to measure views 
on women in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were based on 
answers to questions regarding the importance of education for boys and girls, and women as 
political leaders.  The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 4.3.3 
which is preceded by a detailed description of each test.  
The core theory at the basis of this section states that New Europe is less anti-American than 
Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar when it comes to their 
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views on women than Old Europe and the U.S. These two variables are ordinal, and the 
statistical tool used in both cases was an independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as 
well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. 
This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. New 
Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New 
Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States.  
Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old 
Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States.  Two t-tests were conducted for each 
independent variable, measuring the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and 
New Europe and United States. ―No answer‖ and ―don‘t know‖ answers were eliminated when 
they did not provide any relevant information. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical 
analyses. Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below, 
beginning with the “Education for boys and girls” variable. 
i. Crosstabulation results for the “Education for boys and girls” dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 4.3.1. 
 TABLE 4.3.1:  Education for boys and girls 
  
  
Which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion 
about educating children? 
 
It is more important for 
boys than for girls 
1 
 
It is equally important 
for girls and for boys 
2 
It is more important for 
girls than for boys 
3 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
1.4% 98.0% .6% 
2.5% 96.7% .8% 
.7% 98.7% .6% 
A first t-test revealed the existence of only slightly significant differences in views on the 
importance of education for boys and girls (t (7778) = 2.34, p ≤ .05*) between respondents in 
Old Europe (M = 1.99, SD = .14) and New Europe (M = 1.98, SD = .18). A second t-test showed 
more significant distinctions (t (4812) = -4.06, p ≤ .001***) regarding gender equality and 
education between New Europe and the United States (M = 2.00, SD = .11).  
While the majority of Europeans and Americans believe that education is equally 
important for boys and girls, the percentages are slightly higher in Old Europe and United States 
than in New Europe. As such, these results do not support the core theory of this research: 
there is more cultural similarity (and more tolerant attitudes) on this gender-equality issue 
(education for men and women) between the United States and Western Europe than between the 
U.S. and New Europe.  
ii. Table 4.3.2 contains crosstabulation results for the “Women political leaders” variable. 
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TABLE 4.3.2:  Women political leaders 
  
  
Which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion 
about men and women as political leaders? 
Men generally make 
better political leaders 
than women 
1 
In general, women and 
men make equally good 
political leaders 
2 
Women generally make 
better political leaders 
than men 
3 
Old Europe 
 New Europe 
United States 
9.3% 83.8% 6.9% 
19.2% 70.8% 10.0% 
16.2% 77.9% 6.0% 
Results from a first t-test showed that there are significant differences (t (7652) = 5.75, p 
≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 1.98, SD = .40) and New Europe (M = 1.91, SD = .53) 
regarding views on women as political leaders. A second t-test revealed no statistically 
significant distinctions (t (4683) = .70, p = .48 ns) between New Europe and the United States 
(M = 1.90, SD = .46). While over 70 percent of Europeans and Americans believe that in 
general, women and men make equally good political leaders, percentages of respondents who 
consider men as better political leaders than women are higher in the United States and New 
Europe than Old Europe. As such, these results do support my theory: there is more cultural 
similarity on this issue between the United States and New Europe than between the U.S. and 
Old Europe. 
iii. Conclusions 
Results of the statistical analysis of views on women based on variables from the PEW 
2007 survey database are summarized below in Table 4.3.3. 
TABLE 4.3.3:  Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the 
PEW 2007 Survey database (codebook in Appendix 5) 
 Education for boys and girls 
 
Women political leaders 
Old Europe 2.97*** 
(.24) 
1.98*** 
(.40) 
New Europe 2.94*** 
(.32) 
1.91***/ ns 
(..53) 
United States 2.98*** 
(.180 
1.90 ns 
(.46) 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. When the levels of significance for two t-tests conducted using the same 
dependent variable are different, the first one presented in the table refers to the Old Europe – 
New Europe comparison, while the second one to the differences between New Europe and the 
United States. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant 
The existence of a relationship between cultural similarity and anti-Americanism was 
confirmed by the second dependent variable from the PEW 2007 survey database used in this 
section, measuring views on women as political leaders –New Europe and the United States 
share similar opinions about men as better political leaders than women. The first dependent 
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variable, looking at the importance of education for boys and girls, did not confirm my theory: 
Old Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar than New Europe and the United States. 
4.4 . CONCLUSIONS 
The overall results comparing differences between tolerance towards women in Old 
Europe, New Europe and the United States are summarized below in Tables 4.4.1 to 4.4.3. 
They have offered moderate support for the cultural similarity – anti-Americanism 
connection theory.  
TABLE 4.4.1:  Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the World Values 
Survey database (codebook in Appendix 1) 
 Women 
right to 
job 
Marriage 
out-dated 
Single 
mothers 
Women 
political 
leaders 
University 
education 
for girls 
Prostitution 
justifiable 
Abortion 
justifiable 
Divorce 
justifiable 
Old 
Europe 
1.96** 
(.48) 
N=9095**
* 
.90 ns 
(.70) 
3.17*** 
(.80) 
3.42*** 
(.71) 
3.98*** 
(2.80) 
5.68*** 
(3.04) 
6.79*** 
(2.73) 
New 
Europe 
1.93**/**
* 
(.68) 
N=4469**
* 
.90 
ns/*** 
(.75) 
2.58*** 
(.89) 
3.21*** 
(.79) 
2.86*** 
(2.59) 
4.35***/n
s 
(3.21) 
5.37*** 
(3.19) 
United 
States 
2.09*** 
(.49) 
N=2418**
* 
.60*** 
(.61) 
2.90*** 
(.75) 
3.27*** 
(.65) 
3.10*** 
(2.51) 
4.41 ns 
(2.91) 
5.87*** 
(2.48) 
 
TABLE 4.4.2:  Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the Voice of the 
People – Millennium Edition survey database (codebook in Appendix 2) 
 University 
education for 
girls 
Women and 
household 
income 
Women 
political 
leaders 
Women right 
to a job when 
jobs scarce 
Women 
without 
children -
fulfilled? 
Women say 
no to sex 
Old 
Europe 
X²=605.21*** 
OE - NE 
X²=57.33*** 
OE-NE 
X²=2647*** 
OE-NE 
X²=644.93*** 
OE-NE 
X²=3389*** 
OE-NE 
X²=933.4*** 
OE-NE 
New 
Europe 
X²=91.33*** 
NE-US 
X²=133.40*** 
NE-US 
X²=332*** 
NE-US 
X²=209.84*** 
NE-US 
X²=1273*** 
NE-US 
X²=361.2*** 
NE-US 
United 
States 
X²=.439 ns 
US-OE 
X²=133.40*** 
NE-US 
X²=332*** 
NE-US 
X²=209.84*** 
NE-US 
X²=1273*** 
NE-US 
X²=361.2*** 
NE-US 
 
TABLE 4.4.3:  Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the 
PEW 2007 Survey database (codebook in Appendix 5) 
 Education for boys and 
girls 
 
Women political leaders 
Old Europe 2.97*** 
(.24) 
1.98*** 
(.40) 
New Europe 2.94*** 
(.32) 
1.91***/ ns 
(..53) 
United States 2.98*** 
(.180 
1.90 ns 
(.46) 
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Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant 
Old Europe and the United States have shown higher levels of tolerance towards women 
on issues such as the right of women to jobs even when jobs are scarce, the importance of 
education for boys and girls, the equal potential of men and women to become good political 
leaders. They also share similar views on a woman‘s right to say no to sex and to have a fully 
fulfilled life even without children. Europeans in general approve of single mothers and believe 
that both the wife and the husband should contribute to the household income. The topics where 
there was a clear connection between similar levels of tolerance towards women – cultural 
similarity – and anti-Americanism were marriage as an out-dated institution, prostitution, divorce 
and abortion. United States and New Europe judged abortion, prostitution and abortion to 
never be justifiable and the institution of marriage as not out-dated. What is interesting 
about these results is that cultural similarity between New Europe and the U.S. is strongest when 
it comes to topics heavily influenced by religious views, while in the cases of secular issues, such 
as education or jobs, there are more similarities between Old Europe and the Americans than 
between New Europe and the United States.  
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CHAPTER 5 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: TOLERANCE 
TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS AND FOREIGN WORKERS IN OLD 
EUROPE, NEW EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 
My fourth and fifth hypotheses predict levels of tolerance towards foreigners/immigrants 
in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. The core argument of this research is that Old 
Europe and the United States are less culturally similar than New Europe and the US, which 
explains why Old Europe experiences relatively higher levels of anti-Americanism than New 
Europe. In order to test this theory, three dummy variables were created for each of the databases 
presented below in Chapter 5, measuring differences in cultural indicators for three regional 
pairings: Old Europe and New Europe, New Europe and the United States, and Old Europe and 
the United States. Unfortunately, due to time and space restrictions, only the results of the 
statistical tests involving the Old Europe/New Europe, and New Europe/United States 
comparisons are presented below in detail. Details of statistical analysis involving an 
independent variable coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for the United States are presented in the text 
only when they show no significant differences between the two regions, as such contradicting 
the main hypothesis of this research, according to which we expect to find statistically significant 
differences in levels of tolerance towards immigrants/foreign workers between Old Europe and 
New Europe, as well as between Old Europe and the United States (reflecting their comparably 
lower cultural similarity), but no such differences between New Europe and the United States 
due to their higher cultural similarity. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance 
towards immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe vs. New Europe (OE ˃ NE), and in Old Europe vs. 
the United States (OE ˃ US). 
Hypothesis 5: There is no statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance 
towards immigrants/foreigners in New Europe vs. the United States.  
To test these two hypotheses, mean averages of attitudes towards foreigners/ immigrants 
were compared across nations from Old Europe, New Europe and the United States, using 
independent-samples t-tests and chi-square tests of independence. The results of this analysis, 
presented below individually per database used, have offered moderate support for the 
cultural similarity – anti-Americanism theory. 
5.1 . WORLD VALUES SURVEY 
Three dependent variables from the World Values Survey database were used to measure 
views on immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These 
variables were based on answers to questions regarding people‘s views on having 
immigrants/foreign workers in their neighborhoods, how a good immigration policy should look 
like and the right of immigrants/foreign workers to a job when jobs are scarce.  The overall 
results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 5.1.4 which is preceded by a detailed 
description of each test. The core theory at the basis of this section states that New Europe is less 
anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar 
when it comes to their views on immigrants/foreign workers (more intolerant) than Old Europe 
and the U.S..  
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 These three variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for the first one was a chi-
square test of independence, while for the other two, I used an independent-samples t-test. The 
results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, 
are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old 
Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second 
one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. 
Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old 
Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States.  Two t-tests or two chi-square tests were 
conducted for each independent variable, measuring the difference in means between Old and 
New Europe, and New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical 
analyses. 
Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below, 
beginning with the “Neighbors immigrants” variable. 
i. Crosstabulation results for the “Neighbors immigrants” dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 5.1.1. 
 TABLE 5.1.1:  Neighbors immigrants 
  
  
On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort 
out any that you would not like to have as neighbors? 
Immigrants/foreign workers 
 
Not mentioned 
1 
Mentioned 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
87.7% 12.3% 
83.5% 16.5% 
88.0% 12.0% 
Results from two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant 
differences between views on having immigrants/foreign workers as neighbors in Old Europe 
compared to New Europe (X² (1, N = 17177) = 53.15, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe 
compared to the United States (X² (1, N = 7190) = 26.08, p ˂ .001***).   The analysis confirmed 
the existence of a divide in attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers between Old Europe 
and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States.  
A third chi-square test comparing views on immigrants as neighbors in Old Europe and 
the United States showed that there are no significant differences between these two regions 
regarding this particular aspect of tolerance towards immigrants/foreign workers (X² (1, N = 
14867) = .16, p = .708 ns). A slightly higher percentage of respondents from New Europe (17 
percent) than from Old Europe and United States (both at 12 percent) mentioned immigrants 
among those groups unwelcome in their neighborhoods.  There is more cultural similarity 
between Old Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are comparatively higher than in New 
Europe) and the United States than between United States and New Europe regarding tolerance 
towards immigrants/foreign workers. 
ii. Crosstabulation results for the “Jobs for immigrants” dependent variable are presented 
below in Table 5.1.2. 
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 TABLE 5.1.2:  Jobs for immigrants when jobs are scarce 
  
  
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: When jobs 
are scarce, employers should give priority to (nation) people than 
immigrants 
 
Agree 
1 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
45.3% 12.3% 42.3% 
72.8% 13.8% 13.5% 
54.1% 16.8% 29.1% 
Results from two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are significant 
dissimilarities – t1 (16937) = 41.82, p ˂ .001***) and t2 (7043) = -16.57, p ˂ .001*** - between 
Old Europe (M = 1.97, SD = .93), New Europe (M = 1.41, SD = .71) and the United States (M = 
1.75, SD = .87) regarding hiring immigrants/foreign workers when jobs are scarce. While over 
70 percent of respondents from New Europe believe that when jobs are scarce, employers should 
give priority to their nation‘s citizens instead of immigrants, only 54 percent of Americans and 
45 percent of respondents from Old Europe agree with this view. As such, these results do not 
support my theory: there is more cultural similarity on this issue between the United States and 
Old Europe than between the U.S. and New Europe. 
iii. Table 5.1.3 contains crosstabulation results for the “Immigration policy” dependent 
variable.  
 TABLE 5.1.3: Immigration policy 
  
  
How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which 
one of the following do you think the government should do? 
 
Let anyone 
come 
1 
As long as jobs 
available 
2 
Strict limits 
3 
Prohibit people 
from coming 
4 
 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
10.3% 49.3% 37.2% 3.2% 
15.5% 46.5% 29.5% 8.6% 
9.4% 39.9% 45.6% 5.1% 
Results from two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are no significant 
differences – t1 (13663) = 1.48, p = .13 ns) – between Old Europe (M = 2.33, SD = .70) and 
New Europe (M = 2.31, SD = .83) regarding the nature of a good immigration policy in their 
respective regions. There are however important distinctions (t (6840) = -7.81, p ≤ .001***) 
between New Europe and the United States (M = 2.49, SD = .73) on the same issue. Larger 
percentages of respondents from United States (47 percent) than from Old Europe (37 percent) 
and New Europe (29 percent) would like to see a stricter immigration policy. There is more 
cultural similarity between Old Europe and New Europe, than between New Europe (where 
levels of anti-Americanism are comparatively higher than those in Old Europe) and the United 
States regarding the influx of foreign workers on their domestic job markets.  
 
62 
 
iv. Conclusions 
Results of the statistical analysis of attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based 
on variables from the World Values Survey database are summarized below in Table 5.1.4. 
TABLE 5.1.3: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on 
variables from the World Values Survey database (codebook in Appendix 1) 
 Immigrants neighbors 
 
Jobs for immigrants Immigration policy 
Old Europe X²=53.15*** 
OE - NE 
1.61*** 
(.68) 
2.33 ns 
(.70) 
New Europe X²=26.08*** 
NE - US 
1.41*** 
(.71) 
2.31 ns / *** 
(.83) 
United States X²=.16 ns 
US - OE 
1.63*** 
(.75) 
2.46*** 
(.73) 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, when we have two different significance levels 
for an analysis using the same dependent variable, the first significance level refers to OE-NE 
relationships while the second one to NE-U.S comparison. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, 
ns = not significant 
Overall, these results do not support a cultural explanation for anti-Americanism 
based on levels of tolerance towards immigrants/foreign workers. United States and Old 
Europe (where anti-Americanism is relatively stronger than in New Europe) share similar, more 
tolerant, views on having immigrants as neighbors and on the hiring of foreign vis-à-vis 
domestic workers when jobs are scarce. In the case of stricter immigration policies, there are 
strong cultural similarities between Old and New Europe, while the United States stands alone in 
its desire to place stricter limits on who is allowed to enter its territory.   
5.2 . PEW 2002 
Four dependent variables from the PEW 2002 database were used to measure levels of 
tolerance towards immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. 
These variables were based on answers to questions regarding people‘s views on the overall 
influence of immigrants in a society, their impact on the domestic way of life and culture, and on 
stricter immigration policies.  The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in 
Table 5.2.5, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core theory at the basis 
of this section argues that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New 
Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it comes to their attitudes 
towards immigrants/foreign workers (more intolerant) than to Old Europe and the United States 
are.  
 These four variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for all four was 
independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the 
wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main 
independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old 
Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was 
coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based 
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on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United 
States. Two t-tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference 
in means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. ―No 
answer‖ responses were eliminated because they did not provide any information.‖ Don‘t know‖ 
answers were kept in the database, but they were re-coded to fit the middle of the answer scale. 
An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Results of the statistical analysis for 
each dependent variable are presented below, beginning with the “Immigrants influence” 
variable. 
i. Crosstabulation results for the “Immigrants influence” dependent variable are presented 
below in Table 5.2.1. 
TABLE 5.2.1:  Immigrants influence 
  
  
Is the influence of immigrants very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or 
very bad in our country? 
 
Very good 
1 
Somewhat good 
2 
Don't know 
3 
Somewhat bad 
4 
Very bad 
5 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
3.1% 33.1% 5.6% 43.8% 14.4% 
1.4% 25.7% 18.5% 45.2% 9.1% 
7.9% 41.7% 6.7% 31.4% 12.3% 
Results from a first independent-samples t-test revealed that there are no significant 
differences (t (480) = -.53, p = .59 ns) between Old Europe (M = 3.33, SD = 1.16) and New 
Europe (M = 3.35, SD = 1.00) regarding views on the influence of immigrants on the way things 
are going in their countries. A second t-test showed that there are important distinctions on the 
same topic (t (3490) = 9.30, p ≤ .001***) between New Europe and the United States (M = 
2.98, SD = 1.24). Lower percentages of respondents from the United States (31 percent) see the 
influence of immigrants as somewhat bad, compared to the Europeans (45 percent in New 
Europe and 44 percent in Old Europe). It is also interesting to notice the fairly large percentage 
of respondents from New Europe, 18.5%, answering ―don‘t know‖ to this question, suggesting 
both lack of knowledge and lack of interest in the issue of immigrant influence in their societies. 
New Europe (where anti-Americanism is relatively stronger than in Old Europe) shows stronger 
cultural parallels with Old Europe than with the United States.  
ii. Crosstabulation results for the “Superior national culture” dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 5.2.2. 
TABLE 5.2.2:  Superior national culture 
  
  
Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others. 
Completely 
agree 
1 
Mostly agree 
2 
Don't know 
3 
Mostly 
disagree 
4 
Completely 
disagree 
5 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
10.0% 31.3% 2.2% 30.9% 25.6% 
19.1% 39.8% 6.1% 26.5% 8.5% 
22.7% 37.5% 2.9% 23.5% 13.4% 
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An independent-samples t-test measuring views on a country‘s national culture in Old 
Europe (M = 3.31, SD = 1.39) and New Europe (M = 2.65, SD = 1.28) reveled the existence of 
significant differences (t (4492) = 16.32, p ≤ .001***). A second t-test on the same issue in 
New Europe and the United States (M = 2.67, SD = 1.39) showed that there are no important 
distinctions (t (3489) = -.40, p = .68 ns) when respondents from these two areas were asked if 
their national cultures were superior to others.  
Almost 60 percent of those interviewed in New Europe and the U.S. (compared to only 
40 percent in Old Europe) ―agree‖ or ―mostly agree‖ with the fact that their cultures are superior 
to others. United States and the New Europe (where anti-Americanism is relatively weaker 
compared to Old Europe) share the same nationalistic views of their own national cultures 
compared to Old Europe, where most people tend to see all world cultures as equal.  
iii. Table 5.2.3 contains crosstabulation results for the “Protecting domestic way of life 
against foreign influences” dependent variable. 
 TABLE 5.2.3:  Protecting domestic way of life against foreign influences 
  
  
Here is a list of statements. For each one, please tell me whether you 
completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree. 
Our way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence. 
 
Completely 
agree 
1 
 
Mostly 
agree 
2 
Don't know 
3 
Mostly 
disagree 
4 
Completely 
disagree 
5 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
21.0% 33.5% 1.8% 26.7% 16.9% 
25.8% 40.0% 4.2% 23.1% 6.8% 
29.7% 34.5% 2.9% 24.6% 8.4% 
An initial independent-samples t-test measuring attitudes towards foreign influences on 
domestic way of life in Old Europe (M = 2.85, SD = 1.44) and New Europe (M = 2.45, SD = 
1.27) reveled the existence of significant dissimilarities (t (4509) = 9.81, p ≤ .001***). A 
second t-test using the same dependent variable compared New Europe and the United States (M 
= 2.47, SD = 1.35) showed that there are no important distinctions (t (3491) = -.52, p = .60 ns) 
when respondents from these two areas were asked about the need to protect their domestic way 
of life against foreign influences. 
 Almost 70 percent of those interviewed in New Europe and the U.S. (compared to a little 
over 50 percent in Old Europe) ―agree‖ or ―mostly agree‖ with the fact that their national way of 
life must be protected against external influences. United States and New Europe (where levels 
of anti-Americanism are comparatively lower than those in Old Europe) share the same 
nationalistic views of domestic way of life compared to Old Europe, where more people tend to 
perceive the outside influences as innocuous for their national customs and traditions. 
iv. Crosstabulation results for the “Stricter immigration laws” dependent variable are listed 
below in Table 5.2.4. 
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TABLE 5.2.4:  Stricter immigration laws 
  
  
Here is a list of statements. For each one, please tell me whether you 
completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree. We 
should restrict and control entry of people into our country more than we 
do now. 
 
Completely 
agree 
1 
Mostly agree 
2 
Don't know 
3 
Mostly 
disagree 
4 
Completely 
disagree 
5 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
38.6% 35.3% 1.8% 15.4% 8.9% 
28.8% 37.0% 7.7% 19.3% 7.1% 
46.1% 34.8% 2.3% 12.5% 4.3% 
Two independent-samples t-test revealed that there are significant differences (t (4512) 
= -4.59, p ≤ .001***) regarding stricter immigration laws between Old Europe (M = 2.21, SD = 
1.33) and New Europe (M = 2.39, SD = 1.27) as well as between United States (M = 1.94, SD = 
1.17) and New Europe (t (3504) = 10.76, p ≤ .001***). A smaller percentage of respondents 
from New Europe (29 percent) than from Old Europe (39 percent) and the United States (46 
percent) completely agree with the idea that their governments should control and restrict the 
entry of people in their countries more than they currently do.  United States shares more cultural 
parallels with Old Europe than with New Europe (where anti-Americanism is comparatively 
weaker than in OE).  
v. Conclusions 
Results of the statistical analysis of attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based 
on variables from the PEW 2002 survey database are summarized below in Table 5.2.5. 
TABLE 5.2.5: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on 
variables from the PEW 2002 survey database (codebook in Appendix 3) 
 Immigrants 
influence 
National 
culture 
superior 
Foreign influences on 
domestic way of life 
Stricter 
immigration 
laws 
Old Europe 3.33 ns 
(1.16) 
3.31*** 
(1.39) 
2.85*** 
(1.44) 
2.21*** 
(1.33) 
New Europe 3.35 ns / *** 
(1.00) 
2.65***/ns 
(1.28) 
2.45***/ns 
(1.27) 
2.39*** 
(1.27) 
United States 2.98*** 
(1.24) 
2.67 ns 
(1.39) 
2.47 ns 
(1.35) 
1.94*** 
(1.17) 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE 
relationship, second one to NE-U.S, when they are different. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, 
ns = not significant 
Overall, these results offered mixed support a cultural explanation for anti-
Americanism based on levels of tolerance towards immigrants/foreign workers. United 
States and Old Europe share similar, more intolerant, views on restricting the access of 
immigrants/ foreign workers to their economies. In the case of the immigrants who are already 
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here and their influence on their host countries, there are stronger cultural similarities between 
Old and New Europe (more positive views on this issue), then between New Europe and the U.S. 
When the questions turn to nationalistic beliefs (national culture is superior to others) and 
xenophobic attitudes (domestic way of life is threatened by foreign influences), results of 
statistical analyses based on dependent variables from the PEW 2002 survey database showed 
that there are strong cultural similarities between New Europe and the United States, while 
Old Europe displays lower levels of nationalism and xenophobia.      
5.3 . U.S. 2006 CITIZENSHIP, INVOLVEMENT AND DEMOCRACY SURVEY  
Nine dependent variables from the U.S. 2006 Citizenship, Involvement and 
Democracy/2002 ESS surveys were used to determine levels of tolerance towards 
immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were 
based on answers to questions regarding people‘s opinions on qualifications for immigration, the 
impact immigrants have on a country‘s cultural life, crime problems and tax system, as well as 
the pros and cons of cultural homogeneity. The overall results of the statistical analysis are 
summarized in Table 5.3.10, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core 
argument at the foundation of this section states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old 
Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it 
comes to their attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers (more intolerant) than Old Europe 
and the United States are.  
 These nine variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for all of them was 
independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the 
wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main 
independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old 
Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was 
coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based 
on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United 
States.  Two t-tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference 
in means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An 
alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. 
Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test results for all nine dependent variables are 
presented below, staring with the “Education – qualification for immigration” variable. 
i. Crosstabulation results for the “Education – qualification for immigration” dependent 
variable are presented in Table 5.3.1.  
 TABLE 5.3.1:  Education – qualification for immigration 
  
  
Qualification for immigration: good educational qualifications 
 
Extremely unimportant 
1 
Neither nor 
5 
 
Extremely important 
10 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
5.2% 16.0% 11.9% 
5.7% 16.4% 16.3% 
1.7% 13.2% 18.3% 
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Two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are significant differences (t 
(41352) = -6.64, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 6.22, SD = 2.75) and New Europe (M = 
6.47, SD = 2.78), and between United States (M = 6.92, SD = 2.44) and the New Europe (t 
(7417) = -5.22, p ≤ .001***) regarding the importance of good education as a qualification for 
immigration. New Europe is more culturally similar to United States than Old Europe is (the 
mean response from NE is positioned between the means of OE – the lowest value - and U.S. – 
the highest and more intolerant value). 
ii. Crosstabulation results for the “Family living in host country – qualification for 
immigration” dependent variable are presented in Table 5.3.2. 
 TABLE 5.3.2:  Close family living in host country – qualification for immigration 
  
  
Qualification for immigration: close family living here 
 
Extremely unimportant 
1 
Neither nor 
5 
Extremely important 
10 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
9.2% 15.5% 6.7% 
8.6% 14.7% 13.0% 
2.4% 15.1% 11.3% 
A first independent-samples t-test measuring differences between Old Europe (M = 5.35, 
SD = 2.94) and New Europe (M = 5.91, SD = 3.03) regarding views on close family living in the 
host country as a qualification for immigration has produced statistically significant results (t 
(41274) = -13.67, p ≤ .001***). A second t-test showed that there are no important distinctions 
(t (7424) = -1.69, p=.09 ns) between New Europe and the United States (M = 6.06, SD = 2.58). 
Respondents from the more pro-American New Europe and the United States view the presence 
of close family living in the host country as a more important qualification for immigration than 
Old Europe.  
iii. Crosstabulation results for the “Speak national language – qualification for 
immigration” dependent variable are presented in Table 5.3.2. 
 TABLE 5.3.3:  Speak national language – qualification for immigration 
  
  
Qualification for immigration: speak country's official language 
 
Extremely unimportant 
1 
Neither nor 
5 
Extremely important 
10 
 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
5.6% 9.6% 21.7% 
4.1% 12.3% 26.9% 
1.5% 8.8% 34.2% 
Two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are significant differences (t 
(41666) = -10.59, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 6.67, SD = 3.02) and New Europe (M 
= 7.08, SD = 2.81), and between United States (M = 7.69, SD = 2.45) and the New Europe (t 
(7505) = -7.15, p ≤ .001***) regarding the importance of speaking the official language of the 
host country as a qualification for immigration. New Europe is more culturally similar to United 
States than Old Europe is (the mean response from NE is positioned between the means of OE – 
the lowest value - and U.S. – the highest and more intolerant value). For example, 22 percent of 
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respondents from Old Europe, 27 percent from New Europe and 34 percent from United States 
believe that it is extremely important for an individual to speak the official language of his/her 
host country before he/she is granted the right to immigrate to that country.  
iv. Crosstabulation results for the “Christian – qualification for immigration” dependent 
variable are presented in Table 5.3.4. 
TABLE 5.3.4:  Christian – immigrant qualification 
  
  
Qualification for immigration: Christian background 
 
Extremely unimportant 
1 
Neither nor 
5 
Extremely important 
10 
 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
30.1% 13.5% 4.2% 
22.1% 15.8% 9.2% 
13.5% 20.2% 6.4% 
A first independent-samples t-test measuring differences between Old Europe (M = 3.60, 
SD = 3.28) and New Europe (M = 4.25, SD = 3.36) regarding views on having a Christian 
background as a qualification for immigration has produced statistically significant results (t 
(41320) = -14.17, p ≤ .001***). A second t-test showed that there are no important distinctions 
(t (7398) = 1.08, p=.27 ns) between New Europe and the United States (M = 4.14, SD = 2.93). 
Respondents from New Europe and the United States view a religious element – having a 
Christian background - as a more important qualification for immigration than Old Europe. 
v. Crosstabulation results for the “Race – qualification for immigration” dependent 
variable are presented in Table 5.3.5. 
 TABLE 5.3.5:  Race – qualification for immigration 
  
  
Qualification for immigration: be white 
 
Extremely unimportant 
1 
Neither nor 
5 
Extremely important 
10 
 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
46.1% 10.2% 2.1% 
34.4% 14.0% 7.4% 
29.8% 12.0% 1.7% 
Two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are significant differences (t 
(41447) = -26.31, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 2.17, SD = 2.76) and New Europe (M 
= 3.34, SD = 3.36), and between United States (M = 2.45, SD = 2.48) and the New Europe (t 
(7409) = 9.99, p ≤ .001***) regarding the importance of being white as a qualification for 
immigration. Overall, the anti-American Old Europe is slightly more culturally similar to United 
States than New Europe is (the mean response from U.S. is positioned closer to the means of OE 
– the lowest value - than NE – the highest and more intolerant value). At the same time, for one 
particular answer, a higher percentage of respondents from Old Europe (46 percent) than New 
Europe (34 percent) and United States (30 percent) stated that being white was extremely 
unimportant as a qualification for immigration, which would suggest a closer cultural similarity 
on this particular issue between NE and U.S. than between OE and U.S.  
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vi. Crosstabulation results for the “Immigrants and taxes” dependent variable are presented 
in Table 5.3.6. 
 TABLE 5.3.6:  Immigrants and taxes 
  
  
Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less 
 
Generally take out 
more 
1 
Generally they take out just 
as much as they put in 
5 
Generally put in more 
10 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
7.0% 29.3% 1.6% 
7.0% 34.6% .8% 
5.3% 19.6% 2.0% 
Results from the two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are significant 
differences (t (39549) = 10.78, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 4.23, SD = 2.28) and 
New Europe (M = 3.91, SD = 2.05), and between United States (M = 4.36, SD = 2.50) and New 
Europe (t (6866) = -5.24, p ≤ .001***) regarding the relationship between immigrants and the 
taxation system in their host countries. A third t-test revealed that there are no statistically 
significant differences between Old Europe and the United States regarding the economic 
impact of immigrants on a country‘s tax system (t (32283) = -1.71, p = .087 ns). Old Europe is 
more culturally similar to United States than New Europe. Respondents from Old Europe and the 
United States are more inclined than those from New Europe are to see immigrants as putting 
more into the taxes and services system than they take out.  
vii. Crosstabulation results for the “National cultural life and immigrants” -dependent 
variable are presented in Table 5.3.7. 
TABLE 5.3.7:  National cultural life and immigrants 
  
  
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants 
 
Cultural life undermined 
1 
Neither nor 
5 
Cultural life enriched 
10 
 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
3.5% 20.7% 6.4% 
3.3% 30.7% 4.3% 
1.7% 18.0% 8.7% 
Two independent-samples t-tests revealed that there are significant differences (t 
(39967) = 13.73, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 5.83, SD = 2.49) and New Europe (M 
= 5.38, SD = 2.29), and between United States (M = 6.16, SD = 2.41) and New Europe (t (6980) 
= -9.35, p ≤ .001***) regarding the relationship between immigrants and the cultural life in the 
countries where they currently reside. Overall, the anti-American Old Europe is more culturally 
similar to United States than New Europe is (the mean response from OE is located between the 
means of NE – the lowest value - and U.S. – the highest and more tolerant value). Respondents 
from Old Europe and the United States are more inclined is to believe that their national cultural 
lives are enriched by the presence of immigrants in their societies, while those interviewed in 
New Europe are more worried that their countries‘ cultural lives are undermined by immigrants.   
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viii. Table 5.3.8 contains crosstabulation results for the “Immigrants and crime problems” 
dependent variable. 
 TABLE 5.3.8:  Immigrants and crime problems 
  
  
Immigrants make country's crime problems worse or better 
 
Crime problems made 
worse 
1 
Neither worse, nor 
better 
5 
Crime problems made 
better 
10 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
13.2% 19.9% .4% 
12.8% 18.4% .4% 
4.1% 32.4% 1.6% 
Results from two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are significant 
differences (t (40714) = 2.91, p ≤ .01**) between Old Europe (M = 3.11, SD = 2.05) and New 
Europe (M = 3.02, SD = 2.04), and between United States (M = 4.26, SD = 2.07) and New 
Europe (t (7251) = -17.33, p ≤ .001***) regarding the impact immigrants have on crime 
problems in their host countries. Overall, the anti-American Old Europe is more culturally 
similar to United States than New Europe is (the mean response from OE is located between the 
means of NE – the lowest value - and U.S. – the highest and more tolerant value). At the same 
time, Europeans from both sides of the ―anti-Americanism divide‖ are more inclined than the 
Americans to see immigrants as contributing to the worsening of crime problems in their new 
countries.  It is also interesting to notice the extremely low percentage of respondents (less than 
.5 percent in Ole Europe and New Europe and only 1.6 percent in the U.S.) who believe that 
immigrants have a positive impact on crime levels in the countries where they currently reside.  
ix. Table 5.3.9 contains crosstabulation results for the “Immigrants and cultural 
homogeneity” dependent variable.  
 TABLE 5.3.9:  Immigrants and cultural homogeneity 
  
  
Better for a country if almost everyone share customs and traditions 
 
Agree strongly 
1 
Agree 
2 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
3 
Disagree 
4 
Disagree 
strongly 
5 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
14.5% 34.8% 21.0% 25.4% 4.2% 
20.7% 45.9% 19.0% 13.0% 1.4% 
3.7% 26.9% 8.1% 53.2% 8.1% 
Two independent-samples t-tests revealed that there are significant distinctions (t 
(41636) = 29.62, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 2.69, SD = 1.12) and New Europe (M 
= 2.29, SD = .98), and between United States (M = 3.35, SD = 1.07) and New Europe (t (7520) = 
-29.48, p ≤ .001***) regarding the benefits for a country of having everyone sharing same 
customs and traditions.  
Overall, the anti-American Old Europe is more culturally similar to United States than 
New Europe is (the mean response from OE is located between the means of NE – the lowest 
value - and U.S. – the highest and more tolerant value). Data also shows Old Europe and New 
Europe sharing similar high levels of cultural nationalism. While over half of the respondents 
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from United States – the original ―melting pot‖ - disagree with the statement that it is better for a 
country if everyone shared the same customs and traditions, the opposite is true for Europe, 
where cultural homogeneity is seen as more beneficial for a society than a diversity of customs 
and traditions.  
x. Conclusions 
Results for the statistical analysis of attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based 
on variables from the U.S. Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy survey database are 
summarized below in Tables 5.3.10 (Qualifications for immigration batch of questions) and 
5.3.11 (the rest of the dependent variables). 
TABLE 5.3.10: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the 
U.S. 2006 CID survey database – Qualifications for immigration dependent variables batch 
 Qualification 
for 
immigration  
Education 
Qualification 
for 
immigration 
Family ties 
Qualification 
for 
immigration 
Language 
Qualification 
for 
immigration 
Christian 
Qualification 
for 
immigration 
Race 
Old Europe 6.22*** 
(2.75) 
5.35*** 
(2.94) 
6.67*** 
(3.02) 
3.60*** 
(3.28) 
2.17*** 
(2.76) 
New Europe 6.47*** 
(2.78 
5.91*** / ns 
(3.03) 
7.08*** 
(2.81) 
4.25*** /ns 
(3.36) 
3.34*** 
(3.36) 
United States 6.92*** 
(2.44) 
6.06 ns 
(2.58) 
7.69*** 
(2.45) 
4.14 ns 
(2.93) 
2.45*** 
(2.48) 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE 
relationship, second one to NE-U.S. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant 
Statistical analysis results presented above confirmed that New Europe (where 
levels of anti-Americanism are in general lower than those in Old Europe) and the United 
States are more culturally similar than Old Europe and the U.S. are, on matters of 
tolerance towards immigrants. As a side note, none of the survey data I use in this research 
makes a distinction between legal and illegal immigration. It would be interesting, for future 
research, to investigate if there are any significant differences in attitudes towards these two 
categories of immigrants.  
In 2006 U.S. Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy Survey (as well as the 2002 – 
2006 European Social Survey data incorporated in this database), people were asked about 
certain characteristics that they would consider important in potential immigrants, from race, 
religion to the knowledge of the national language in the country where they intent to relocate 
and work. On average, New Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are lower compared to 
Old Europe) and United States respondents showed to have more similar opinions on the issue of 
qualification for immigration than Old Europe and the U.S.  They are more likely than Western 
Europeans to argue in favor of an immigrant‘s need to learn the official language of their host 
countries, to have a good education and close family already living in the country where they 
intend to immigrate. When it comes to race, 46 percent of those interviewed in Old Europe, 
compared to 30 percent in the U.S. and 34 percent in New Europe believe that being white is 
extremely unimportant as a qualification for immigration, which does suggest that NE and U.S. 
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tend to share a comparable cultural – and preferential - outlook on white vs. non-white 
immigrants. The results of the t-test for the last four of the dependent variables from the U.S. 
2006 CID database used to measure attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers are presented 
below in Table 5.3.11. 
TABLE 5.3.11: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the 
U.S. 2006 CID survey database – Taxes, cultural life, crime problem and immigration 
 Immigration and 
taxes 
Immigrants and 
domestic cultural 
life 
Immigrants and 
crime problems 
Immigrants and 
cultural 
homogeneity 
Old Europe 4.23*** 
(2.28) 
5.83*** 
(2.49) 
3.11*** 
(2.05) 
2.69*** 
(2.76) 
New Europe 3.91***  
(2.05) 
5.38*** 
(2.29) 
3.02** /*** 
(2.04) 
2.29*** 
(.98) 
United States 4.36*** 
(2.50) 
6.16*** 
(2.41) 
4.26 *** 
(2.07) 
3.35*** 
(1.07) 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant 
The core theory of this research states that there is a relationship between cultural 
similarity – as manifested in tolerance and attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers – and 
levels of anti-Americanism. Results of the statistical analysis presented above in Table 5.3.11 
do not support this theory. There is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and United 
States, than between New Europe and the U.S. Respondents from Western Europe and the 
United States are more likely than those from New Europe to argue that in general, immigrants 
take out just about as much or little less than they put in a country‘s tax and services system, that 
the presence of immigrants does not undermine a country‘s cultural life nor does it negatively 
impact its crime problems. Americans more than Europeans also disagree with the idea that 
cultural homogeneity is a positive thing (53 percent compared to Old Europe‘s 25 percent and 
New Europe‘s 13 percent). 
Overall, data from U.S. CID database offers indirect support for the existence of a 
connection between cultural similarity and levels of anti-Americanism in Europe. United 
States and New Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are comparatively lower than in 
Old Europe) share similar views on what qualifications are important for a potential 
immigrant, while Old Europe and the U.S. have comparable opinions on the impact of 
immigrants on the countries they now call “home.”  
5.4 . PEW 2007 
Two dependent variables from PEW 2007 survey database were used to determine levels of 
tolerance towards immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. 
These variables were based on answers to questions regarding people‘s opinions on the influence 
of immigrants on their receiving countries. The core theory at the basis of this section argues that 
New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more 
culturally similar to each other when it comes to their attitudes towards immigrants/foreign 
workers (more intolerant) than to Old Europe and the United States are.  These two variables are 
ordinal, and the statistical tool used for both was independent-samples t-test. The results of these 
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tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented 
below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. 
New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New 
Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. 
Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old 
Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States.  Two t-tests were conducted for each 
independent variable, measuring first the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and 
then between New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical 
analyses. Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test results for both dependent variables are 
presented below, staring with the “Immigration problem” variable. 
i. Crosstabulation results for the “Immigration problem” dependent variable are presented 
below in Table 5.4.1. 
 TABLE 5.4.1:  Immigration problem 
  
  
Please tell me if you think it is a very big problem, a moderately big 
problem, a small problem or not a problem at all. Immigration. 
 
Very big problem 
1 
Moderately big 
problem 
2 
Small 
problem 
3 
Not a problem 
at all 
4 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
37.0% 32.8% 20.7% 9.6% 
13.2% 28.9% 38.1% 19.8% 
40.2% 33.8% 19.1% 6.9% 
Two independent-samples t-tests revealed that there are significant distinctions (t 
(4753) = -21.39, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 2.03, SD = .97) and New Europe (M = 
2.65, SD = .94), and between United States (M = 1.93, SD = .93) and New Europe (t (2777) = 
19.35, p ≤ .001***) regarding the magnitude of the immigration problem in their countries. 
Overall, the anti-American Old Europe is more culturally similar to United States than New 
Europe is (the mean response from OE is located between the means of U.S. – the lowest value - 
and NE – the highest and more tolerant value).  While two out of three respondents in Old 
Europe and United States view immigration as a very big or moderately big problem, less than 
half of those interviewed in New Europe agree with this assessment.  
ii. Crosstabulation results for the “Immigrants influence – 2007” dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 5.4.2. 
TABLE 5.4.2:  Immigrants influence - 2007 
  
  
Is the influence of immigrants very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad 
or very bad in our country? 
 
Very good 
1 
Somewhat 
good 
2 
Don't know 
3 
Somewhat 
bad 
4 
Very bad 
5 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
5.4% 40.5% 5.0% 35.2% 14.0% 
1.9% 27.9% 17.4% 42.0% 10.8% 
6.7% 44.2% 7.0% 25.5% 16.7% 
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Two independent-samples t-tests revealed that there are significant differences (t 
(4836) = -5.97, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 3.12, SD = 1.23) and New Europe (M = 
3.32, SD = 1.05), and between United States (M = 3.01, SD = 1.27) and New Europe (t (2882) = 
6.46, p ≤ .001***) regarding the influence of immigrants on their countries. Old Europe is more 
culturally similar to United States than New Europe is (the mean response from OE is located 
between the means of U.S. – the lowest value - and NE – the highest and more intolerant value).  
Almost half of the respondents from Old Europe and the United States tend to see the influence 
of immigrants on their countries as ―very good‖ or ―somewhat good‖, compared to less than 30 
percent in New Europe. Again, it is interesting to notice the relatively large percentage of those 
interviewed in New Europe – 17 percent – who ―don‘t know‖ if immigrants have a positive or a 
negative impact on their societies.  
iii. Conclusions 
The PEW 2007 survey data showed that Old Europe and the U.S. are more culturally 
similar (they believe that even with immigration being a serious problem, the influence of 
immigrants in their societies is actually a positive one) than New Europe and the United States. 
Respondents from New Europe seems also less informed and/or less interested in the problem of 
immigration than their European and American counterparts, as shown by the large percentage of 
―don‘t know‖ answers.  
5.5 . CONCLUSIONS 
Information from the World Values Survey, Pew 2002 and 2007 surveys, as well as 
2006 U.S. CID databases, is summarized below in Table 5.5.1 to 5.5.4.  
TABLE 5.5.1: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the 
World Values Survey database (codebook in Appendix 1) 
 Immigrants neighbors Jobs for immigrants Immigration policy 
Old Europe X²=53.15*** 
OE - NE 
1.61*** 
(.68) 
2.33 ns 
(.70) 
New Europe X²=26.08*** 
NE - US 
1.41*** 
(.71) 
2.31 ns / *** 
(.83) 
United States X²=.16 ns 
US - OE 
1.63*** 
(.75) 
2.46*** 
(.73) 
 
TABLE 5.5.2: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the 
PEW 2002 survey database (codebook in Appendix 3) 
 Immigrants 
influence 
National culture 
superior 
Foreign influences on 
domestic way of life 
Stricter 
immigration laws 
Old Europe 3.33 ns 
(1.16) 
3.31*** 
(1.39) 
2.85*** 
(1.44) 
2.21*** 
(1.33) 
New Europe 3.35 ns / *** 
(1.00) 
2.65***/ns 
(1.28) 
2.45***/ns 
(1.27) 
2.39*** 
(1.27) 
United States 2.98*** 
(1.24) 
2.67 ns 
(1.39) 
2.47 ns 
(1.35) 
1.94*** 
(1.17) 
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TABLE 5.5.3: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the 
U.S. 2006 CID survey database – Qualifications for immigration dependent variables batch 
 Qualification 
for 
immigration  
Education 
Qualification 
for 
immigration 
Family ties 
Qualification 
for 
immigration 
Language 
Qualification 
for 
immigration 
Christian 
Qualification 
for 
immigration 
Race 
Old Europe 6.22*** 
(2.75) 
5.35*** 
(2.94) 
6.67*** 
(3.02) 
3.60*** 
(3.28) 
2.17*** 
(2.76) 
New Europe 6.47*** 
(2.78 
5.91*** / ns 
(3.03) 
7.08*** 
(2.81) 
4.25*** /ns 
(3.36) 
3.34*** 
(3.36) 
United States 6.92*** 
(2.44) 
6.06 ns 
(2.58) 
7.69*** 
(2.45) 
4.14 ns 
(2.93) 
2.45*** 
(2.48) 
 
TABLE 5.5.4: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the 
U.S. 2006 CID survey database – Taxes, cultural life, crime problem and immigration 
(codebook in Appendix 4) 
 Immigration and 
taxes 
Immigrants and 
domestic cultural 
life 
Immigrants and 
crime problems 
Immigrants and 
cultural 
homogeneity 
Old Europe 4.23*** 
(2.28) 
5.83*** 
(2.49) 
3.11*** 
(2.05) 
2.69*** 
(2.76) 
New Europe 3.91***  
(2.05) 
5.38*** 
(2.29) 
3.02** /*** 
(2.04) 
2.29*** 
(.98) 
United States 4.36*** 
(2.50) 
6.16*** 
(2.41) 
4.26 *** 
(2.07) 
3.35*** 
(1.07) 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant 
Old Europe (where anti-American feelings are stronger than in New Europe) and the 
United States share similar views on several (but not all) issues regarding immigration. Those 
interviewed in OE and the U.S. are more likely than those in New Europe to see the influence of 
immigrants as positive even if immigration is believed to be a relatively big problem in their 
societies. They also advocate equal rights for immigrants and domestic workers to have a job 
even when jobs are scarce, but they would also like stricter immigration policies than those 
currently in place.  
Strong cultural similarities between New Europe and the United States appear in the 
analysis of nationalistic (i.e. ―our culture is superior to others‖) and slightly xenophobic (i.e. ―our 
national way of life is under attack by foreign influences‖) negative attitudes towards 
immigrants/foreign workers. Data regarding beliefs on what characteristics of potential 
immigrants are important and which ones are not showed that respondents from New Europe 
(compared to Old Europe) and the U.S. are more likely to see race, religion and the knowledge of 
the national language as important issues when evaluating prospective immigrants.  Two 
interesting aspects of this analysis that could be explored in the future are: 1) the relatively large 
number of those interviewed in New Europe not knowing if the influence of immigrants in their 
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societies was a positive or a negative thing, and 2) the fact that no distinction was made between 
legal and illegal immigration.  
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CHAPTER 6 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: TOLERANCE 
TOWARDS HOMOSEXUALS IN OLD EUROPE, NEW EUROPE 
AND THE UNITED STATES 
My sixth and seventh hypotheses predict levels of tolerance towards homosexuals in Old 
Europe, New Europe and the United States. The core argument of this research is that Old 
Europe and the United States are less culturally similar than New Europe and the US, which 
explains why Old Europe experiences relatively higher levels of anti-Americanism than New 
Europe. In order to test this theory, three dummy variables were created for each of the databases 
presented below in Chapter 6, measuring differences in cultural indicators for three regional 
pairings: Old Europe and New Europe, New Europe and the United States, and Old Europe and 
the United States. Unfortunately, due to time and space restrictions, only the results of the 
statistical tests involving the Old Europe/New Europe, and New Europe/United States 
comparisons are presented below in detail. Details of statistical analysis involving an 
independent variable coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for the United States are presented in the text 
only when they show no significant differences between the two regions, as such contradicting 
the main hypothesis of this research, according to which we expect to find statistically significant 
differences in levels of tolerance towards homosexuals between Old Europe and New Europe, as 
well as between Old Europe and the United States (reflecting their comparably lower cultural 
similarity), but no such differences between New Europe and the United States due to their 
higher cultural similarity. 
Hypothesis 6: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance 
towards homosexuals in Old Europe vs. New Europe (OE ˃ NE) and in Old Europe vs. the 
United States (OE ˃ US).  
Hypothesis 7: There is no statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance 
towards homosexuals in New Europe vs. the United States. 
To test these two hypotheses, mean averages of attitudes towards homosexuals were 
compared across nations from Old Europe, New Europe and the United States, using t-test and 
chi-square tests. The results of this analysis, presented below individually per database used, 
have offered a nuanced support for the theory on cultural similarity and anti-
Americanism.  
6.1 . WORLD VALUES SURVEY 
Three dependent variables from the World Values Survey database were used to measure 
views on homosexuals in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were 
based on answers to questions regarding the overall importance of teaching children tolerance 
and respect for others, the justifiability of homosexuality and people‘s views on having 
homosexuals as neighbors.  The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 
6.1.4 which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core theory at the basis of this 
section states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and 
the U.S. are more culturally similar when it comes to their views on homosexuals (more 
intolerant) than Old Europe and the U.S. These three variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool 
used for the first two cases was a chi-square test of independence, while for the third one, I used 
an independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the 
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wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main 
independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old 
Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was 
coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based 
on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United 
States.  Two t-tests or two chi-square tests were conducted for each independent variable, 
measuring the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and New Europe and United 
States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. 
i. Crosstabulation results for the “Tolerance in children” variable are presented below in 
Table 6.1.1. 
TABLE 6.1.1:  Tolerance and respect for other people in children 
  
  
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people 
 
Not mentioned 
1 
Important 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
17.7% 82.3% 
33.7% 66.3% 
20.6% 79.4% 
Results from two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant 
differences between views on teaching children tolerance in Old Europe compared to New 
Europe (X² (1, N = 17448) = 514.18, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United 
States (X² (1, N = 7263) = 133.95, p ˂ .001***).   The analysis confirmed the existence of a 
tolerance divide between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the 
United States. Moreover, a smaller percentage of respondents from New Europe (66 percent) 
than from Old Europe (82 percent) and United States (79 percent) mentioned tolerance and 
respect for others as an important quality in a child.  There is more cultural similarity between 
Old Europe and the United States than between United States and New Europe regarding 
tolerance in children. 
ii. Crosstabulation results for the “Homosexuals as neighbors” dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 6.1.2. 
TABLE 6.1.2:  Homosexuals as neighbors 
  
  
On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out 
any that you would not like to have as neighbors? 
Homosexuals. 
Not mentioned 
1 
Mentioned 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
86.3% 13.7% 
49.0% 51.0% 
75.4% 24.6% 
Two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant distinctions 
between attitudes towards homosexuals in Old Europe compared to New Europe (X² (1, N = 
17190) = 2620.04, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, N = 
7195) = 460.06, p ˂ .001***). The analysis confirmed the existence of a tolerance divide 
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between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. 
Crosstabulation results show that larger percentage of respondents from New Europe (51 
percent) and United States (25 percent) than from Old Europe (14) percent) named homosexuals 
as one of the groups they would not like to have as neighbors.  There is slightly more cultural 
similarity between New Europe and the United States than between United States and Old 
Europe regarding attitudes towards homosexuals. 
iii. Crosstabulation results for the “Homosexuality justifiable” dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 6.1.3. 
TABLE 6.1.3:  Homosexuality justifiable 
  
  
Homosexuality can always be justified, never be justified, or 
something in between? 
 
Never justifiable 
1 
Something in between 
5 
Always justifiable 
10 
 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
15.5% 13.5% 31.8% 
50.4% 9.4% 8.9% 
32.4% 19.8% 14.2% 
A first independent-samples t-test revealed that there are significant differences (t 
(16356) = 54.15, p ˂ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 6.49, SD = 3.30) and New Europe (M 
= 3.45, SD = 3.11) in opinions on the justifiability of homosexuality. A second t-test showed that 
there are also significant distinctions (t (6661) = -14.53, p ˂ .001***) between New Europe 
(M = 3.45, SD = 3.11) and United States (M = 4.64, SD = 3.24). The analysis confirmed the 
existence of a tolerance divide between Old Europe and New Europe, and also between New 
Europe and the United States. Crosstabulation results show that larger percentage of respondents 
from New Europe (50 percent) and United States (32 percent) than from Old Europe (115) 
percent) believe that homosexuality is never justifiable.  There is more cultural similarity 
between New Europe and the United States than between United States and Old Europe when 
tolerance towards homosexuality is taken into account. 
iv. Conclusions 
Table 6.1.4 summarizes the results of the statistical analysis of tolerance towards 
homosexuals as measured by variables from the World Values Survey database. 
TABLE 6.1.4:  Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by variables from the World 
Values Survey database (codebook in Appendix 1) 
 Teaching children 
tolerance 
Homosexuals as 
neighbors 
Homosexuality 
justifiable 
Old Europe X²=514.18*** 
OE-NE 
X²=2620.04*** 
OE-NE 
6.49*** 
(3.30) 
New Europe X²=133.95*** 
NE-US 
X²=460.06*** 
NE-US 
3.45*** 
(3.11) 
United States X²=133.95*** 
NE-US 
X²=460.06*** 
NE-US 
4.64*** 
(3.24) 
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Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant 
United States and New Europe share similar – fairly intolerant – views on homosexuality 
compared to Old Europe, especially in the case of the justifiability of homosexuality (a lot of the 
opposition to homosexuality comes from viewing it as a choice individuals make). 
6.2 . PEW 2002 
One dependent variable from the PEW 2002 survey database was used to measure views 
on homosexual life style in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. The core theory at 
the basis of this section states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because 
New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar when it comes to their views on 
homosexuals (more intolerant) than Old Europe and the U.S..  
This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. 
New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New 
Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. 
Crosstabulation results are presented below in Table 1 and they are based on variable labeled 
“Region” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States.  Two chi-
square tests of independence were also conducted for each independent variable, measuring the 
difference in means between Old and New Europe, and New Europe and United States. An alpha 
level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Crosstabulation results for the “Homosexuality 
way of life” dependent variable can be seen below in Table 6.2.1, followed by a description of 
the chi-square test results.  
TABLE 6.2.1:  Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Homosexuality way of 
life” from the PEW 2002 database 
  
  
Which one of these statements about homosexuality comes 
closer to your opinion? 
Homosexuality-way of life 
society should accept 
1 
Homosexuality-way of life society 
should not accept 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
81.0% 19.0% 
63.6% 36.4% 
54.4% 45.6% 
Two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant differences between 
attitudes towards homosexuals in Old Europe compared to New Europe (X² (1, N = 4224) = 
160.38, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, N = 3196) = 
27.59, p ˂ .001***).   The analysis confirmed the existence of a tolerance divide between Old 
Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Crosstabulation 
results show that significantly smaller percentages of respondents from New Europe (63 percent) 
and United States (54 percent) than from Old Europe (81 percent) believe homosexuality is a 
way of life society should accept.  There is significantly more cultural similarity between the 
pro-American New Europe and the United States than between United States and anti-American 
Old Europe regarding attitudes towards homosexuals. 
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6.3 . U.S. 2006 CITIZENSHIP, INVOLVEMENT AND DEMOCRACY SURVEY 
One dependent variable from the U.S. 2006 Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy 
Survey database was used to measure views on homosexuality in Old Europe, New Europe and 
the United States. The core theory at the basis of this section states that New Europe is less anti-
American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar when it 
comes to their views on homosexuals (more intolerant) than Old Europe and the U.S..  
This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. 
New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New 
Europe vs. United States‖, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. 
Crosstabulation results are presented below in Table 1 and they are based on variable labeled 
“Region” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States.  Two 
independent-samples t-test were also conducted for each independent variable, measuring the 
difference in means between Old and New Europe, and New Europe and United States. An alpha 
level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. 
Crosstabulation results for the “Homosexuals free to live as they wish” dependent 
variable are presented below in Table 6.3.1, followed by a description of the t- test results. 
TABLE 6.3.1:  Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Gays and lesbians free 
to live as they wish” from the U.S. 2006 CID database 
  
  
Gays and lesbians free to live life as they whish 
 
Agree strongly 
1 
Agree 
2 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
3 
Disagree 
4 
Disagree 
strongly 
5 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
31.6% 43.9% 12.7% 7.3% 4.5% 
15.2% 35.2% 23.2% 15.6% 10.8% 
18.4% 47.5% 6.5% 18.4% 9.2% 
A first independent-samples t-test revealed that there are significant differences (t (40688) 
= -36.27, p ˂ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 2.12, SD = 1.08) and New Europe (M = 2.72, 
SD = 1.21) in opinions on the justifiability of homosexuality. A second t-test showed that there 
are also significant distinctions (t (7116) = 4.53, p ˂ .001***) between New Europe (M = 2.72, 
SD = 1.21) and United States (M = 2.52, SD = 1.24). The analysis confirmed the existence of a 
tolerance divide between Old Europe and New Europe, and also between New Europe and the 
United States. Crosstabulation results show that larger percentages of respondents from New 
Europe (28 percent) and United States (27 percent) than from Old Europe (11 percent) do not 
think that gays and lesbians should be free to live their lives as they wish.  There is more cultural 
similarity between the pro-American (and more intolerant) New Europe and the United States 
than between United States and anti-American Old Europe regarding tolerance towards 
homosexuals. 
6.4 . PEW 2007 
One dependent variable from the PEW 2007 survey database was used to measure views 
on homosexual life style in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. The core theory at 
the basis of this section states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because 
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New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar when it comes to their views on 
homosexuals (more intolerant) than Old Europe and the U.S..  
This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. 
New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New 
Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. 
Crosstabulation results are presented below in Table 1 and they are based on variable labeled 
“Region” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States.  Two chi-
square tests of independence were also conducted for each independent variable, measuring the 
difference in means between Old and New Europe, and New Europe and United States. ―No 
answer‖ and ―don‘t know‖ answers were eliminated when they did not provide any relevant 
information. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. 
Crosstabulation results for the “Homosexuality way of life – 2007” dependent variable 
are presented below in Table 6.4.1, followed by a description of the chi-square test results. 
TABLE 6.4.1:  Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Homosexuality way of 
life - 2007” from the PEW 2007 database 
  
  
And which one of these comes closer to your opinion, number 1 or 
number 2? 
Number 1 – Homosexuality is a 
way of life that should be 
accepted by society 
1 
Number 2 – Homosexuality is a way 
of life that should not be accepted by 
society 
2 
 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
82.9% 17.1% 
64.5% 35.5% 
54.2% 45.8% 
Two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant differences between 
attitudes towards homosexual way of life in Old Europe compared to New Europe (X² (1, N = 
4523) = 196.61, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, N = 
2615) = 26.75, p ˂ .001***).   The analysis confirmed the existence of a tolerance divide 
between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. 
Crosstabulation results show that significantly larger percentages of respondents from New 
Europe (36 percent) and United States (46 percent) than from Old Europe (17 percent) do not 
believe homosexuality is a way of life society should accept.  There is significantly more cultural 
similarity between the pro-American (and more intolerant) New Europe and the United States 
than between United States and anti-American Old Europe regarding attitudes towards 
homosexuals. 
6.5 . CONCLUSIONS 
Statistical results of analyses (independent-samples t-tests as well as chi-square tests 
of independence) using dependent variables measuring levels of tolerance towards 
homosexuals in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States are presented below in 
Tables 6.5.1 to 6.5.4.  
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TABLE 6.5.1:  Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by variables from the World 
Values Survey database 
 Teaching children 
tolerance 
 
Homosexuals as 
neighbors 
Homosexuality 
justifiable 
Old Europe X²=160.38*** 
OE-NE 
 
X²=196.61*** 
OE-NE 
6.49*** 
(3.30) 
New Europe X²=27.59*** 
NE-US 
 
X²=26.75*** 
NE-US 
3.45*** 
(3.11) 
United States X²=27.59*** 
NE-US 
X²=26.75*** 
NE-US 
4.64*** 
(3.24) 
 
TABLE 6.5.2:  Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Homosexuality way of 
life” variable from the PEW 2002 database 
  
  
Which one of these statements about homosexuality comes 
closer to your opinion? 
 
Homosexuality-way of life 
society should accept 
1 
 
Homosexuality-way of life society 
should not accept 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
81.0% 19.0% 
63.6% 36.4% 
54.4% 45.6% 
 
TABLE 6.5.3:  Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Gays and lesbians free 
to live as they wish” variable from the U.S. 2006 CID database 
  
  
Gays and lesbians free to live life as they whish 
 
Agree strongly 
1 
Agree 
2 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
3 
 
Disagree 
4 
Disagree 
strongly 
5 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
31.6% 43.9% 12.7% 7.3% 4.5% 
15.2% 35.2% 23.2% 15.6% 10.8% 
18.4% 47.5% 6.5% 18.4% 9.2% 
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TABLE 6.5.4:  Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Homosexuality way of 
life - 2007” variable from the PEW 2007 database 
  
  
And which one of these comes closer to your opinion, number 1 or 
number 2? 
Number 1 – Homosexuality is a 
way of life that should be 
accepted by society 
1 
Number 2 – Homosexuality is a way 
of life that should not be accepted by 
society 
2 
 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
82.9% 17.1% 
64.5% 35.5% 
54.2% 45.8% 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant 
New Europe and the United States share similar negative and quite intolerant attitudes 
towards homosexual way of life, while on all measurements Old Europe appears fairly tolerant 
and open-minded on the matter of homosexuality. 
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CHAPTER 7 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: LEVELS OF RELIGIOSITY IN 
OLD EUROPE, NEW EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 
My eighth and ninth hypotheses predict levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe 
and the United States. The core argument of this research is that Old Europe and the United 
States are less culturally similar than New Europe and the US, which explains why Old Europe 
experiences relatively higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe. In order to test this 
theory, three dummy variables were created for each of the databases presented below in Chapter 
7, measuring differences in cultural indicators for three regional pairings: Old Europe and New 
Europe, New Europe and the United States, and Old Europe and the United States. Due to time 
and space restrictions, only the results of the statistical tests involving the Old Europe/New 
Europe, and New Europe/United States comparisons are presented below in detail. Details of 
statistical analysis involving an independent variable coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for the 
United States are presented in the text only when they show no significant differences between 
the two regions, as such contradicting the main hypothesis of this research, according to which 
we expect to find statistically significant differences in levels of religiosity between a more 
secular Old Europe and a more religious New Europe, as well as between Old Europe and the 
United States (reflecting their comparably lower cultural similarity), but no such differences 
between New Europe and the United States due to their higher cultural similarity. 
Hypothesis 8: There is a statistically significant difference between levels of religiosity in 
Old Europe and New Europe (OE ˂ NE) and in Old Europe and the United States (OE ˂ US). 
Hypothesis 9: There is no statistically significant difference between levels of religiosity in 
New Europe and the United States. 
To test these two hypotheses, mean averages of attitudes towards faith, as well as the role 
of religion in a society, were compared across nations from Old Europe, New Europe and the 
United States, using independent-samples t-tests and chi-square tests of independence. 
7.1 . WORLD VALUES SURVEY 
Seven dependent variables from the World Values Survey database were used to 
determine levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables 
were based on answers to questions regarding people‘s views on church and social problems, the 
importance of teaching children about religion, separation of church and state, as well as 
personal religious rituals (such as the frequency of attending religious services). The overall 
results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 7.1.8, which is preceded by a detailed 
description of each test. The core theory at the basis of this section argues that New Europe is 
less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally 
similar to each other when it comes to their faith (more religious) than to the secular Old Europe.  
 These seven variables are ordinal, and the statistical tools used were independent-
samples t-tests (for five of them) and chi-square tests of independence (for two of them).The 
results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, 
are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old 
Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second 
one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. 
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Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old 
Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States.  Two t-tests or chi-square tests were 
conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference in means between Old 
and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was 
used in all statistical analyses. Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test results for all eight 
dependent variables are presented below, staring with the “Confidence in churches” variable. 
i. Crosstabulation results for the “Confidence in churches” dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 7.1.1. 
TABLE 7.1.1:  Confidence in churches 
  
  
I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell 
me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, 
quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? 
The churches 
 
A great deal 
1 
 
Quite a lot 
2 
Not very much 
3 
None at all 
4 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
11.6% 35.2% 35.4% 17.9% 
35.2% 32.4% 22.4% 9.9% 
31.7% 39.4% 22.4% 6.4% 
A first independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant differences (t 
(16929) = 32.82, p ≤ .001**) in levels of confidence in churches between Old Europe (M = 2.60, 
SD = .91) and New Europe (M = 2.07, SD = .98). A second t-test revealed that there are no 
statistically significant distinctions (t (7126) = 1.51, p = .13 ns) on this topic between New 
Europe and the United States (M = 2.04, SD = .89). New Europe (where anti-Americanism is 
weaker than in Old Europe) and the United States share similar high levels of religiosity. 
Almost 70 percent of respondents from New Europe and the United States (compared to less 
than half of those interviewed in Old Europe) trust their churches ―a great deal‖ or ―quite a lot.‖ 
ii. Crosstabulation results for the “Religious services attendance” dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 7.1.2. 
TABLE 7.1.2:  Religious services attendance 
  
  
How often do you attend religious services? 
More than 
once a 
week 
1 
Once 
a week 
2 
Once a 
month 
3 
Only on special 
holy 
days/Christmas/
Easter days 
4 
Once a 
year 
5 
Less 
often 
6 
Never 
practically 
never 
7 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
2.9% 9.3% 8.6% 15.3% 9.9% 12.4% 41.6% 
4.2% 23.2% 14.6% 28.7% 4.8% 10.4% 14.1% 
14.5% 27.0% 12.9% 9.7% 5.6% 9.8% 20.5% 
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Results from an independent-samples t-test, comparing religious services attendance in 
Old Europe (M = 5.88, SD = 2.31) and New Europe (M = 4.24, SD = 2.18) revealed that these 
two groups are rather dissimilar in their church-going habits (t (17205) = 43.30, p ≤ .001***). A 
second t-test showed that on the same issue, there were no significant differences (t (7148) = 
1.81, p = .07 ns) between New Europe and the United States (M = 4.12, SD = 2.62). New 
Europe (where antipathy towards Americans is comparatively weak) and the United States are 
more culturally similar on the issue on church attendance than the United States and the secular 
and anti-American Old Europe. For example, over 40 percent of respondents from Old Europe 
never go to church, compared to 14 percent of those interviewed in New Europe and 20 percent 
in the U.S.  
iii. Crosstabulation results for the “Religious person” dependent variable are presented 
below in Table 7.1.3. 
TABLE 7.1.3:  Religious person 
  
  
Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say 
you are… 
 
A religious person 
1 
Not a religious person 
2 
A convinced atheist 
3 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
51.0% 39.0% 10.0% 
83.4% 13.0% 3.6% 
78.9% 19.0% 2.1% 
An independent-samples t-test revealed that there are significant differences (t (16670) 
= 41.33, p ≤ .001***) in the way people qualify themselves as religious or not in Old Europe (M 
= 1.59, SD = .66) and New Europe (M = 1.20, SD = .48). A second t-test, comparing New 
Europe and the United States (M = 1.23, SD = .46) on the same dimension showed a weaker 
relationship (t (6901) = -2.48, p ≤ .05*) between the region where the interview was conducted 
and the respondent‘s religiosity levels. Overall, these results confirm the existence of a 
connection between cultural similarity and anti-Americanism. The more anti-American and 
secular Old Europe and the United States are less culturally similar on the issue of religiosity 
than New Europe and the U.S. Almost half of the respondents from Old Europe are either 
―atheists‖ or ―not a religious person‖, compared to only 17 percent in New Europe and 20 
percent in the United States.  
iv. Table 7.1.4 contains crosstabulation results for the “Church answers social problems” 
dependent variable.  
TABLE 7.1.4:  Church answers social problems 
  
  
Generally speaking, do you think that the churches in your country are 
giving adequate answers to the social problems facing our country today? 
 
No (1) Yes (2) 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
72.0% 28.0% 
63.3% 36.7% 
56.1% 43.9% 
88 
 
Two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are significant differences 
between views of the involvement of churches in social problems in Old Europe compared to 
New Europe (X² (1, N = 12326) = 96.01, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the 
United States (X² (1, N = 6287) = 31.23, p ˂ .001***).  
The analysis confirmed the existence of a religiosity divide between Old Europe and New 
Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Crosstabulation results show that 
larger percentages of respondents from New Europe (37 percent) and United States (44 percent) 
than from Old Europe (28 percent) believe that Churches are giving adequate answers to the 
social problems facing their countries (instead of the secular authorities).   
There is significantly more cultural similarity between the pro-American (and more 
religious) New Europe and the United States, than between United States and Old Europe 
regarding the involvement of organized religions in a country‘s social problems. 
v. Crosstabulation results for the “Religious faith in children” dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 7.1.5. 
TABLE 7.1.5:  Religious faith in children 
  
  
Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. 
Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up 
to five.  
Religious faith. 
 
Not mentioned 
1 
 
Important 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
87.1% 12.9% 
60.1% 39.9% 
48.0% 52.0% 
Results from two chi-square tests of independence revealed that there are significant 
distinctions between views of the importance of  children learning religious doctrines and rites 
in Old Europe compared to New Europe (X² (1, N = 17448) = 1576.30, p ˂ .001***) and in New 
Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, N = 7623) = 95.74, p ˂ .001***).   The analysis 
confirmed the existence of a religiosity divide between Old Europe and New Europe, but also 
between New Europe and the United States.  
Crosstabulation results show that significantly larger percentages of respondents from 
New Europe (40 percent) and United States (52 percent) than from Old Europe (13 percent) 
believe that having a strong religious education is important for children starting at an early age, 
at home with their parents.   There is significantly more cultural similarity between New Europe 
and the United States, than between United States and Old Europe regarding the importance to 
teach children about faith, religious ideas, beliefs and rites.  
vi. Table 7.1.6 presents crosstabulation results for the “Secular politicians” dependent 
variable.  
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TABLE 7.1.6:  Secular politicians 
  
  
Politicians who don´t believe in God are unfit for public office 
 
Agree strongly 
1 
Agree 
2 
Neither agree 
or disagree 
3 
Disagree 
4 
Strongly 
disagree 
5 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
2.2% 6.7% 16.4% 33.9% 40.9% 
14.3% 15.3% 24.5% 28.1% 17.8% 
17.0% 18.6% 13.0% 36.7% 14.8% 
Two independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant differences (t (13573) 
= 38.08, p ≤ .001***) in their opinions on secular politicians between Old Europe (M = 4.05, 
SD = 1.01) and New Europe (M = 3.20, SD = 1.28), but not between United States (M = 3.14, 
SD = 1.34) and New Europe (t (6781) = 1.83, p = .06). New Europe (where anti-Americanism 
levels are comparatively lower than in Old Europe) and the United States share more cultural 
similarities regarding views on secular politicians than Old Europe and the U.S. A larger 
percentage of respondents from more pro-American New Europe (30 percent) and United States 
(35 percent) than from Old Europe (9 percent) ―agree‖ or ―strongly agree‖ that politicians who 
don‘t believe in God are unfit for public office.  
vii. Table 7.1.7 contains crosstabulation results for the “Separation church and state” 
dependent variable. 
TABLE 7.1.7:  Separation church and state 
  
  
Religious leaders should not influence government 
 
Agree strongly 
1 
Agree 
2 
Neither agree 
or disagree 
3 
Disagree 
4 
Strongly 
disagree 
5 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
37.3% 30.7% 16.6% 11.7% 3.7% 
42.6% 32.8% 14.0% 7.1% 3.6% 
22.1% 28.6% 10.1% 29.1% 10.1% 
Results from two independent-samples t-tests showed that there are significant 
differences (t (13585) = 8.65, p ≤ .001***) between opinions on the separation of Church and 
State in Old Europe (M = 2.14, SD = 1.15) and New Europe (M = 1.96, SD = 1.08), as well as 
between United States (M = 2.77, SD = 1.34) and New Europe (t (6795) = -25.07, p ≤ 
.001***). Old Europe (where anti-American feelings are comparatively stronger than in New 
Europe) and the United States are more culturally similar than New Europe and the United 
States, when cultural similarity is measured by views on the relationship between national 
governments and religious leaders. The mean response from OE is situated between the mean 
responses from NE (lowest on the scale, which means the most inclined to agree that religious 
leaders should not influence the government) and U.S. (highest on the scale). There is also a 
clear distinction on this issue between Europe as a whole and the United States, where the former 
is advocating a stricter separation of Church and States than the latter. Over 75 percent of 
Europeans, compared to 50 percent of Americans ―agree‖ or ―strongly agree‖ that religious 
leaders should not try to influence the government. 
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viii. Conclusions 
Results of the empirical analysis of levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and 
the United States as measured by variables from the World Values Survey are summarized below 
in Table 7.1.8. 
TABLE 7.1.8:  Levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States as 
measured by variables from the World Values Survey (codebook in Appendix 1) 
 Confidence 
in churches 
Religious 
services 
attendance 
Church 
answers social 
problems 
Religious faith 
in children 
Secular 
politicians 
Religious 
person 
Church 
and State 
separation 
Old 
Europe 
2.60*** 
(.91) 
5.88*** 
(2.31) 
X²=96.01*** 
OE-NE 
X²=1576*** 
OE-NE 
4.05*** 
(1.01) 
1.59*** 
(.66) 
2.14*** 
(1.15) 
New 
Europe 
2.07***/ns 
(.98) 
4.24***/ns 
(2.18) 
X²=31.23*** 
NE-US 
X²=95.74*** 
NE-US 
3.20***/ns 
(1.29) 
1.20***/* 
(.48) 
1.96*** 
(1.08) 
United 
States 
2.04 ns 
(.89) 
4.12 ns 
(2.62) 
X²=31.23*** 
NE-US 
X²=95.74*** 
NE-US 
3.14 ns 
(1.34) 
1.23* 
(.46) 
2.77*** 
(1.34) 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE 
relationship, second one to NE-U.S comparison when the two are different. b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ 
.01**, p ≤ .001***, ns = not significant 
New Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are relatively lower than in Old Europe) 
and the United States share similar, high levels of religiosity, while Western Europe is much 
more secular.  Americans and New Europeans are more inclined than Old Europeans to see 
themselves as religious people, trust their churches and ask them for answers to social problems, 
attend religious services fairly often and offer their children a religious education.  It is also 
interesting to notice that although those interviewed in New Europe tend to agree with the 
Americans that politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office, they parallel 
their fellow Western European when it comes to views on the separation between Church and 
State. A significantly larger percentage of European than American respondents agrees that 
religious leaders should not try to influence the national government‘s policies.  
7.2 . VOICE OF THE PEOPLE – MILLENNIUM EDITION 
Four dependent variables from the Voice of the People – Millennium Edition database 
were used to determine levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. 
These variables were based on answers to questions regarding people‘s faith  (importance of God 
in personal life, the existence of one true religion and one true God) and religious behaviors 
(moments of prayers and church attendance). The overall results of the statistical analysis are 
summarized in Table 7.2.5, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core 
theory at the basis of this section argues that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe 
because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it comes to 
their levels of religiosity (more religious) than to a secular Old Europe.  
 These four variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for all of them was 
independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the 
wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main 
independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old 
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Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was 
coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based 
on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United 
States.  Two t-tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference 
in means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An 
alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test 
results for all four dependent variables are presented below, starting with the “Moments of 
prayer” variable. 
i. Crosstabulation results for the “Moments of prayer” dependent variable are presented 
below in Table 7.2.1. 
TABLE 7.2.1:  Moments of prayer 
  
  
Do you take some moments of prayer, meditation or something 
like that? 
 
Yes 
1 
Don’t know 
2 
No 
3 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
55.4% 2.1% 42.5% 
60.4% 3.3% 36.3% 
86.9% .2% 12.9% 
Two independent-samples t-test revealed that there are significant differences (t 
(19725) = -7.72, p ≤ .001***) in how much people pray between Old Europe (M = 1.50, SD = 
.61) and New Europe (M = 1.59, SD = .82), as well as between United States (M = 1.14, SD = 
.37) and New Europe (t (8919) = 29.61, p ≤ .001***). The t-test results showed New Europe and 
the United States to be culturally less similar than Old Europe and the United States (the mean 
value for the OE population is placed between the NE and the US ones). There are also a 
significantly larger percentage of respondents from United States (87 percent) than from Old 
Europe (55 percent) and New Europe (60 percent) take moments during their regular day-to-day 
lives to pray or meditate, which suggest the existence of a ―prayer divide‖ between Europe and 
the United States. 
ii. Crosstabulation results for the “Religious beliefs” dependent variable are presented 
below in Table 7.2.2. 
TABLE 7.2.2:  Religious beliefs 
  
  
Which of these statements comes closest to your beliefs? 
There is a 
personal God 
1 
There is some sort 
of spirit or life 
force 
2 
I don't know 
what to think 
3 
I don't really think there 
is any sort of spirit, God 
or life force 
4 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
34.2% 37.5% 14.2% 14.0% 
41.6% 34.1% 14.7% 9.7% 
64.6% 28.0% 5.4% 2.0% 
Results from two independent-samples t-test confirmed the existence of significant 
differences (t (19036) = 10.64, p ≤ .001***) in religious beliefs between Old Europe (M = 2.08, 
SD = 1.02) and New Europe (M = 1.92, SD = .97), as well as between United States (M = 1.45, 
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SD = .69) and New Europe (t (8557) = 19.37, p ≤ .001***). The t-test results show that New 
Europe and the United States to be culturally more similar than Old Europe and the United 
States. At the same time, over 90 percent of American respondents (compared to a little over 70 
percent of Europeans) believe that there is a personal God or some sort of spirit or life force, 
which suggests an overall closer similarity of religiosity levels between Old Europe and New 
Europe, than between New Europe and the United States.  
iii. Table 7.2.3 contains crosstabulation results for the “One true religion” dependent 
variable. ―Don‘t know‖ answers were re-coded to express an opinion close to the middle 
of the scale. 
TABLE 7.2.3:  One true religion 
  
  
Would you say that there exists one and only one true religion, that 
there is truth in many religions or that there is no essential truth in 
any religion? 
One and only one 
true religion 
1 
Many true 
religions 
2 
Don't know 
3 
No true 
religion 
4 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
17.0% 56.6% 9.1% 17.3% 
36.2% 39.0% 13.4% 11.5% 
21.1% 72.2% 1.6% 5.1% 
Two independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant differences (t (18768) = 
18.43, p ≤ .001***) in opinions about one true religion between respondents in Old Europe (M = 
2.27, SD = .93) and New Europe (M = 2.00, SD = .97), as well as between those in the U.S. (M 
= 1.91, SD = .65) and New Europe (t (8311) = 3.96, p ≤ .001***). There are stronger similarities 
in levels of religiosity between United States and New Europe (where anti-Americanism is 
relatively weak) than between U.S. and Old Europe (where anti-American feelings are 
comparatively more intense).  The picture emerging is more complicated than this though. 
Americans, by a larger percentage (72 percent) than both New Europe (39 percent) and Old 
Europe (57 percent) believe that there is truth in many religions, which is a direct reflection of 
the diversity of religious beliefs in the American society and the religious homogeneity in 
Europe. In 2008, the largest religious denomination in the U.S. was ―Catholic‖ with 25 percent 
of the respondents, followed by ―Baptist‖ with 16 percent and ―Methodist‖ with 5 percent 
(Kosmin and Keysar 2009).  By contrast, the majority of Romanians – 86 percent of the 
population – identified themselves as Eastern Orthodox, followed by Roman Catholicism with 
4.7 percent and Greek Catholicism, with less than one percent (Centrul de Resurse pentru 
Diversitate Etnoculturala 2002). In France, an officially secular country, 51 percent of the 
population identified themselves as Catholics, 4 percent as Muslims, 3 percent as Protestant, and 
31 percent as agnostics or atheists (Tager Djenane 2004).  
It is also interesting to note that almost 10 percent of respondents in Old Europe and 13 
percent in New Europe ―didn‘t know‖ what to think about the existence of a one true religion, or 
of multiple true religions, or no true religion, which could indicate both a lack of knowledge and 
a lack of interest in spiritual matters. 
iv. Crosstabulation results for the “Religious services attendance” dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 7.2.4. 
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TABLE 7.2.4:  Religious services attendance 
  
  
Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you 
attend religious services these days? 
More than 
once a week 
1 
Once a 
week 
2 
Once a 
month 
3 
Only on 
special 
holy days 
4 
Once a 
year 
5 
Less 
often 
6 
Never, 
practically 
never 
7 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
U.S. 
3.3% 15.4% 8.7% 14.0% 8.6% 9.7% 40.3% 
5.1% 17.2% 11.9% 26.2% 6.9% 10.3% 22.3% 
14.5% 36.4% 13.0% 11.0% 6.9% 9.1% 9.1% 
Two independent-samples t-test revealed that there are significant differences (t 
(19414) = 23.21, p ≤ .001) in religious services attendance between Old Europe (M = 4.99, SD = 
2.02) and New Europe (M = 4.33, SD = 1.91), as well as between United States (M = 3.23, SD = 
1.88) and New Europe (t (8635) = 15.93, p ≤ .001***). New Europe and the United States are 
more culturally similar than Old Europe and the United States. These results also show that in 
general Americans attend church services much more frequently than Europeans do. Over 50 
percent of U.S. respondents go church at least once a week, apart from weddings, christenings 
and funerals, while 40 percent of those interviewed in Old Europe and 22 percent in New Europe 
practically never go to church.  
v. Conclusions 
Empirical analysis results measuring levels of religiosity with data from the Voice of the 
People – Millennium Edition survey are summarized below in Table 7.2.5. 
TABLE 7.2.5:  Levels of religiosity as measured by variables from the Voice of the People – 
Millennium Edition (codebook in Appendix 2) 
 Moments of 
prayer 
Religious beliefs One true 
religion 
Religious 
services 
attendance 
 
Old Europe 1.47*** 
(.53) 
2.08*** 
(1.02) 
2.18*** 
(.81) 
4.99*** 
(2.02) 
New Europe 1.43*** 
(.55) 
1.92*** 
(.97) 
2.02*** 
(1.00) 
4.33*** 
(1.91) 
United States 1.13*** 
(.34) 
1.45*** 
(.69) 
1.87*** 
(.55) 
3.23*** 
(1.88) 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE 
relationship, second one to NE-U.S. (when those two are different). b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ 
.001***, ns = not significant 
Results of the empirical analysis of levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe 
and the United States revealed the existence of a “faith Grand Canyon” between Europe 
and America, and of a smaller “religion divide” within Europe itself. Old Europe is by far 
the most secular of the three regions under investigation, with highest percentage of respondents 
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who do not go to church, do not take time in their days to pray and do not believe in the 
existence of one true religion or one personal God. United States is at the opposite end of the 
spectrum as the most devout of the three. Americans pray a lot, attend religious services 
regularly, believe in the existence of a personal God and identify themselves with a large array of 
religious beliefs. New Europe falls somewhere in between these two extremes; this could provide 
an explanation for why its levels of anti-Americanism are lower than those in Old Europe.  
7.3 . PEW 2002 
Four dependent variables from the PEW 2002 survey database were used to determine 
levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were 
based on answers to questions regarding people‘s opinions on the separation between Church 
and State, relationship between religion and morality, God‘s place in their own lives and other 
religious rites and customs. The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 
7.3.5, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core theory at the basis of this 
section argues that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and 
the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it comes to their levels of religiosity 
(more religious) than Old Europe and the United States are.  
 These four variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for three of them was 
independent-samples t-test, while for the fourth one, I used a chi-square test of independence. 
The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each 
case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, 
“Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the 
second one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the 
United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “Region” and 
coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States.  Two t-tests or two chi-
square test were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference in 
means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An 
alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. 
Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test results for all five dependent variables are 
presented below, starting with the “Religion and morality” variable. 
i. Crosstabulation results for the “Religion and morality” dependent variable are presented 
below in Table 7.3.1. 
TABLE 7.3.1:  Religion and morality 
  
  
Which one of these statements about belief in God comes closest 
to your opinion? 
Not necessary to believe in God 
to be moral/have good values 
1 
Necessary to believe in God to be 
moral/have good values 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
73.5% 26.5% 
66.5% 33.5% 
41.2% 58.8% 
Results from two chi-square tests of independence revealed that there are significant 
distinctions between opinions on religion and morality in Old Europe compared to New Europe 
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(X² (1, N = 4429) = 26.07, p ˂ .001***) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X² 
(1, N = 3418) = 217.40, p ˂ .001***). The analysis confirmed the existence of a religiosity 
divide between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United 
States. Crosstabulation results show that larger percentages of respondents from New Europe (34 
percent) and United States (59 percent) than from Old Europe (27 percent) believe that it is 
necessary to believe in God to have good, moral values.   There is significantly more cultural 
similarity between the pro-American (and more religious) New Europe and the United States, 
than between United States and anti-American Old Europe regarding the relationship between 
faith and morality. 
ii. Table 7.3.2 presents crosstabulation results for the “Importance of religion” dependent 
variable. 
TABLE 7.3.2:  Importance of religion 
  
  
How important is religion in your life? 
 
Very important 
1 
Somewhat important 
2 
Not too 
important 
3 
Not at all 
important 
4 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
21.6% 32.3% 25.2% 20.9% 
22.2% 35.9% 22.8% 19.2% 
59.9% 25.8% 8.0% 6.3% 
An independent-samples t-test discovered a significant, but weak, connection between 
the region where the interview was conducted – Old Europe (M = 2.45, SD = 1.04) and New 
Europe (M = 2.39, SD = 1.03) – and the how important religion was in respondent‘s personal life 
(t (4218) = 2.02, p ≤ .05*). A much stronger relationship between these two variables was 
revealed by a t-test comparing United States (M = 1.61, SD = .88) and New Europe (t (3433) = 
23.94, p ≤ .001***). Levels of religiosity in the United States are more similar to New Europe‘s 
than to those in Old Europe. It should also be pointed out that in general, Americans are much 
more inclined to see religion as very important in their lives (60 percent) as compared to their 
European counterparts (22 percent in both Old Europe and New Europe).  
iii. Crosstabulation results for the “Separation between Church and State” dependent 
variable are presented below in Table 7.3.3. 
TABLE 7.3.3:  Separation between Church and State 
  
  
Religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from 
government policy 
 
Completely agree 
1 
Mostly agree 
2 
Mostly disagree 
3 
Completely disagree 
4 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
69.6% 22.8% 4.9% 2.7% 
67.8% 25.9% 4.1% 2.3% 
57.0% 25.3% 9.7% 7.9% 
Findings from two independent-samples t-test showed no significant differences (t 
(4442) = .08, p = .99 ns) between Old Europe (M = 1.41, SD = .70) and New Europe (M = 1.41, 
SD = .67) regarding people‘s opinion on keeping religion and governmental policies separated. 
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There is however a much stronger divide on this matter between United States (M = 1.69, SD = 
.94) and New Europe (t (3408) = -9.61, p ≤ .001***). Old Europe and New Europe are 
practically indistinguishable from each other on this issue. 70 percent of respondents from 
Old Europe and 68 percent of those from New Europe (compared to 57 percent of Americans) 
completely agree that religion is a matter of personal faith and as such it should be kept separate 
from governmental policies.   
iv. Crosstabulation results for the ―Influence of religious leaders” dependent variable are 
summarized below in Table 7.3.4. 
TABLE 7.3.4:  Influence of religious leaders 
  
  
Is the influence of religious leaders very good, somewhat good, somewhat 
bad or very bad in our country? 
 
Very good 
1 
Somewhat good 
2 
Somewhat bad 
3 
Very bad 
4 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
6.8% 42.3% 39.2% 11.6% 
7.5% 42.4% 37.0% 13.0% 
12.8% 52.8% 25.9% 8.4% 
Results from two independent-samples t-test showed no significant differences (t (4009) 
= .07, p = .94 ns) between Old Europe (M = 2.56, SD = .78) and New Europe (M = 2.55, SD = 
.81) regarding people‘s opinion on what kind of influence religious leaders play in their 
countries. There is however a much stronger distinction on this topic between United States (M = 
2.30, SD = .79) and New Europe (t (3054) = 8.74, p ≤ .001***). Old Europe and New Europe are 
practically impossible to differentiate from each other on this issue. Over 50 percent of 
Europeans (compared to 33 percent of Americans) believe that religious leaders have a negative 
or a very negative influence in their countries.  
v. Conclusions 
Table 7.3.5 summarizes the results of the analysis comparing levels of religiosity in Old 
Europe, New Europe and the United States using variables from the PEW 2002 survey database. 
TABLE 7.3.5:  Levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States as 
measured by variables from the PEW 2002 survey database (codebook in Appendix 3) 
 Religion and 
morality 
Importance of 
religion in life 
Church and State 
separation 
Religious leaders 
influence 
Old Europe X²=26.07*** 
OE-NE 
2.45* 
(1.04) 
1.41 ns 
(.70) 
2.56 ns 
(.78) 
New Europe X²=217.40*** 
NE-US 
2.39*/*** 
(1.03) 
1.41 ns/*** 
(.67) 
2.55 ns/*** 
(.81) 
United States X²=217.40*** 
NE-US 
1.61*** 
(.88) 
1.69*** 
(.94) 
2.30*** 
(.79) 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE 
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relationship, second one to NE-U.S. (when those two are different). b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ 
.001***, ns = not significant 
Overall, findings from the analysis measuring levels of religiosity in Old Europe, 
New Europe and the United States using variables from the PEW 2002 survey have shown 
that Old Europe and New Europe have almost identical levels of religiosity, even if the 
intensity of anti-American feelings in those two regions is very different.  Europe is more 
secular, and would like to keep religion out of the political and governmental realm as much as 
possible, while for Americans faith plays a major role in their personal lives, and they feel it 
should do the same in their public lives.  
7.4 . U.S. 2006 CITIZENSHIP, INVOLVEMENT AND DEMOCRACY 
Three dependent variables from the U.S. 2006 Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy 
database were used to determine levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United 
States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding religious homogeneity, 
church attendance and the importance of religion in a person‘s life. The overall results of the 
statistical analysis are summarized in Table 7.4.4, which is preceded by a detailed description of 
each test. The core theory at the basis of this section argues that New Europe is less anti-
American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each 
other when it comes to their levels of religiosity (more religious) than the secular Old Europe and 
the United States. 
 These three variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for all of them was 
independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the 
wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main 
independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old 
Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was 
coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based 
on variable named “Region” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United 
States.  Two t-tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference 
in means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An 
alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test 
results for all three dependent variables are presented below, starting with the “Personal levels 
of religiosity” variable. 
i. Crosstabulation results for the “Personal level of religiosity” dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 7.4.1. 
TABLE 7.4.1:  Personal levels of religiosity 
  
  
How religious are you? 
 
Not at all religious 
1 
Moderately religious 
5 
Very religious 
10 
 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
11.5% 17.3% 6.1% 
12.8% 19.6% 7.9% 
3.9% 17.4% 9.9% 
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A first independent-samples t-test showed that there are no significant differences (t 
(46065) = .17, p = 86 ns) between how religious people are in Old Europe (M = 4.95, SD = 2.93) 
and New Europe (M = 4.94, SD = 3.04). A second t-test revealed the existence of significant 
distinctions (t (7578) = -12.59, p ≤ .001***) in levels of individual religiosity between United 
States (M = 6.09, SD = 2.59) and New Europe. These results showed that Old Europe and 
New Europe have almost identical (low) levels of religiosity, compared to the United States. 
On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is ―not religious at all‖ and 10 is ―extremely religious‖, there is 
an almost 2 points difference between the more secular Europeans and the more faith-oriented 
Americans.  
ii. Crosstabulation results for the ―Religious services attendance” dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 7.4.2. 
 TABLE 7.4.2:  Religious services attendance 
  
  
How often do you attend religious services, apart from special occasions? 
 
Every 
day 
1 
More than 
once a 
week 
2 
Once a 
week 
3 
At least 
once a 
month 
4 
 
Only on 
special 
holy days 
5 
Less 
often 
6 
 
Never 
7 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
.9% 3.0% 12.1% 10.9% 18.7% 21.5% 32.9% 
.5% 3.5% 22.7% 11.2% 21.3% 12.9% 27.8% 
.5% 8.6% 25.6% 15.5% 15.2% 20.0% 14.7% 
Two independent-samples t-tests revealed that there are significant differences in 
religious services attendance (t (42179) = 17.81, p ≤ .001***) between Old Europe (M = 5.38, 
SD = 1.55) and New Europe (M = 4.99, SD = 1.63), as well as between United States (M = 4.55, 
SD = 1.61) and New Europe (t (7642) = 8.13, p ≤ .001***).  
Comparatively, respondents from New Europe and the United States share more similar 
church attendance habits than those from Old Europe and the U.S. While almost half of 
Americans and New Europeans go to church at least once a month, less than 25 percent of Old 
Europeans do so. 
iii. Table 7.4.3 contains crosstabulation results for the “Religious homogeneity” dependent 
variable.   
TABLE 7.4.3:  Religious homogeneity 
  
  
Better for a country if a variety of different religions 
 
Agree strongly 
1 
Agree 
2 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
3 
Disagree 
4 
Disagree 
strongly 
5 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
6.0% 33.2% 28.4% 25.2% 7.2% 
4.9% 24.1% 31.7% 31.3% 7.9% 
8.4% 67.5% 10.1% 12.2% 1.7% 
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Results from two independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant 
distinctions (t (40913) = -13.19, p ≤ .001***) between people‘s views on religious homogeneity 
in Old Europe (M = 2.95, SD = 1.06) and New Europe (M = 3.13, SD = 1.02), and between 
United States (M = 2.31, SD = .85) and New Europe (t (7275) = 27.27, p ≤ .001***). The mean 
answer from Old Europe is positioned between that from New Europe (highest on the scale and 
the most negative towards religious diversity) and the United States (the lowest on the scale and 
the most negative towards religious homogeneity). The overall numbers also show that United 
States is much more in favor of accepting a multitude of religious beliefs in their society (75 
percent of respondents ―agree‖ or ―strongly agree‖ with this idea) than Europe (less than 40 
percent).  
iv. Conclusions 
Results of the analysis of levels of religiosity as measured by variables from the 2006 
U.S. CID database are summarized below in Table 7.4.4. 
TABLE 7.4.4:  Analysis results for levels of religiosity as measured by variables from the 
2006 U.S. CID database (codebook in Appendix 4) 
 Personal religiosity Religious services 
attendance 
Religious 
homogeneity 
Old Europe 4.95 ns 
(2.93) 
5.38*** 
(1.55) 
2.95*** 
(1.06) 
New Europe 4.94 ns/*** 
(3.04) 
4.99*** 
(1.63) 
3.13*** 
(1.02) 
United States 6.09*** 
(2.59) 
4.55*** 
(1.61) 
2.31*** 
(.85) 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE 
relationship, second one to NE-U.S. (when those two are different). b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ 
.001***, ns = not significant 
Statistical analysis results measuring levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and 
the United States using variables from the 2006 U.S. New Europe is more similar to United 
States than Old Europe is on only one of the three dimensions investigated in this section - 
religious service attendance. On the other two – attitudes towards religious homogeneity and 
self-reported levels of religiosity, data does not back up the core theory of this research. 
Europeans see themselves as more secular, independent of which region of the continent they 
inhabit, than the Americans. Respondents from Old Europe are closer than those in New Europe, 
in their views of religious homogeneity, to the Americans.    
7.5 . PEW 2007 
Five dependent variables from the PEW 2007 survey database were used to measure 
levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were 
based on answers to questions regarding morality and religion, separation between Church and 
State, and matters of personal faith. The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized 
in Table 7.5.6, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core theory at the 
basis of this section argues that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New 
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Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it comes to their attitudes 
towards faith-related issues than Old Europe and the United States are.  
 These five variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for four of them was the 
independent-samples t-test, while for the fifth one I used a chi-square test of independence. 
Results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each 
case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, 
“Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the 
second one, “New Europe vs. United States”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the 
United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “Region” and 
coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States.  Two t-tests were conducted 
for each independent variable, measuring first the difference in means between Old and New 
Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all 
statistical analyses. 
Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test and chi-square results for all five dependent 
variables are presented below, starting with the “Religious leaders influence” variable. 
i. Crosstabulation results for the ―Religious leaders influence‖ dependent variable are 
presented below in Table 7.5.1. 
 TABLE 7.5.1:  Religious leaders influence 
  Is the influence of religious leaders very good, somewhat good, 
somewhat bad or very bad for our country? 
 
  Very good 
1 
Somewhat good 
2 
Somewhat bad 
3 
 
Very bad 
4 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
6.0% 37.9% 39.0% 17.1% 
5.8% 35.5% 40.3% 18.4% 
12.4% 52.2% 23.5% 11.9% 
A first independent-samples t-test showed that there are no significant distinctions (t 
(4359) = -1.57, p =.11 ns) between Old Europe (M = 2.67, SD = .82) and New Europe (M = 
2.71, SD = .83) regarding views on the influence played by religious leaders in these societies. A 
second t-test revealed that on the same issue there were important differences (t (2546) = 10.55, 
p ≤ .001***) between New Europe and the United States (M = 2.35, SD = .84). 
 Dissimilar levels of anti-Americanism in Old Europe and New Europe are not mirrored 
in their religiosity, as expressed in attitudes toward the impact spiritual leaders have on their 
societies. While almost 60 percent of Europeans believe that the influence of religious leaders 
has been ―bad‖ or ―very bad‖ for their countries, only 35 percent of Americans agree with this 
point of view.  
ii. Crosstabulation results for the “Religion kept separate from government policy” 
dependent variable are presented below in Table 7.5.2. 
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 TABLE 7.5.2:  Religion kept separate from government policy 
  
  
Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly 
disagree or completely disagree with it.  Religion is a matter of personal 
faith and should be kept separate from government policy. 
 
Completely 
agree 
1 
Mostly agree 
2 
Neither 
agree, nor 
disagree 
3 
Mostly 
disagree 
4 
Completely 
disagree 
5 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
64.1% 25.3% 1.9% 5.7% 3.0% 
67% 23.9% 3.1% 4.1% 1.9% 
55% 24.9% 1.6% 9.2% 9.3% 
An initial independent-samples t-test showed that there is a moderately strong 
relationship (t (4895) = 2.99, p ≤ .01**) between the region where the interview was conducted – 
Old Europe (M = 1.58, SD = .99) and New Europe (M = 1.50, SD = .88) – and the respondent‘s 
view on keeping religion out of governmental affairs. Region, as independent variable, gains 
more explanatory power (t (2899) = -9.18, p ≤ .001***) when the interviews are conducted in 
New Europe and the United States (M = 1.93, SD = 1.32). Old Europe and United States are 
closer in their views on the separation between Church/religious beliefs and State/governmental 
business. However, these differences are very small, with almost 90 percent of Europeans and 80 
percent of Americans ―completely‖ or ―mostly‖ agreeing that religion is a matter of personal 
faith and as such it should be kept separate from governmental policies. 
iii. Crosstabulation results for the “Religion and morality” dependent variable are presented 
below in Table 7.5.3. 
TABLE 7.5.3:  Religion and morality 
  
  
Which one of these comes closest to your opinion, number 1 or number 2? 
 
Number 1 – It is not necessary to believe 
in God in order to be moral and have 
good values 
1 
Number 2 – It is necessary to 
believe in God in order to be 
moral and have good values 
2 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
76.5% 23.5% 
73.5% 26.5% 
41.8% 58.2% 
Results from two chi-square tests of independence revealed that there are significant 
distinctions between opinions on religion and morality in Old Europe compared to New Europe 
(X² (1, N = 4759) = 5.47, p ≤ .05*) and in New Europe compared to the United States (X² (1, N 
= 2847) = 278.92, p ≤ .001***).   The analysis confirmed the existence of a fairly weak 
religiosity divide between Old Europe and New Europe, and of a stronger one between New 
Europe and the United States. Crosstabulation results show that larger percentages of 
respondents from New Europe (27 percent) and United States (58 percent) than from Old Europe 
(24 percent) believe that it is necessary to believe in God to have good, moral values.   There is 
more cultural similarity between New Europe and the United States, than between United States 
and Old Europe regarding the relationship between faith and morality. It is also interesting to 
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notice that compared to the PEW 2002 data, New Europe actually moved closer to Old Europe 
than to the United States on this issue, with more respondents supporting the view that morality 
can exist independent of religiosity. 
iv. Table 7.5.4 contains crosstabulation results for the “Prayer times” dependent variable. 
TABLE 7.5.4:  Prayer times 
  
  
People practice their religion in different ways.  Outside of attending 
religious services, do you pray several times a day, once a day, a few times 
a week, once a week or less, or never? 
 
Several times a 
day 
1 
Once a day 
2 
A few times a 
week 
3 
Once a week 
or less 
4 
Never 
5 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
6.1% 11.4% 9.1% 23.7% 49.8% 
8.7% 15.3% 7.5% 25.0% 43.6% 
36.6% 21.2% 15.1% 15.7% 11.4% 
Two independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant differences (t (7589) 
= 6.26, p ≤ .001***) in how often people pray in Old Europe (M = 3.99, SD = 1.26) and New 
Europe (M = 3.79, SD = 1.36), as well as between United States (M = 2.44, SD = 1.40) and New 
Europe (t (4648) = 32.84, p ≤ .001***). United States and New Europe are closer in their praying 
habits than Old Europe and the U.S. are. However, it should also be noted that outside religious 
services, Europeans pray a lot less than the Americans. 50 percent of respondents from Old 
Europe and 47 percent from New Europe, compared to only 11 percent from United States, never 
pray outside religious services.  
v. Crosstabulation results for the “Importance of religion” dependent variable are 
presented below on Table 7.5.5.  
 TABLE 7.5.5:  Importance of religion 
  
  
How important is religion in your life – very important, somewhat 
important, not too important, or not at all important? 
Very important 
1 
Somewhat 
important 
2 
Not too important 
3 
Not at all 
important 
4 
Old Europe 
New Europe 
United States 
16.8% 26.9% 24.0% 32.4% 
20.9% 28.8% 25.1% 25.2% 
56.4% 26.2% 9.0% 8.3% 
Two independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant differences (t (7725) 
= 6.69, p ≤ .001***) in the importance of religion for people in Old Europe (M = 2.72, SD = 
1.08) and New Europe (M = 2.55, SD = 1.08), as well as between United States (M = 1.69, SD = 
.94) and New Europe (t (4770) = 28.95, p ≤ .001***). New Europe and United States are closer 
to each other in the how important religion is in people‘s lives than Old Europe and the U.S. are. 
However, just like in the previous cases, Europeans in general are more secular than the 
Americans. For example, over 50 percent of respondents from both Old and New Europe believe 
that religion is ―not really important‖ or ―not important at all‖ in their lives, compared to less 
than 20 percent of those from the United States.   
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vi. Conclusions 
Analysis results measuring levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the 
United States using variables from the PEW 2007 survey database are summarized below in 
Table 7.5.6. 
TABLE 7.5.6:  Levels of religiosity measured by variables from the PEW 2007 survey 
database (codebook in Appendix 5) 
 Religious 
leaders 
influence 
Religion and 
government 
kept separate 
Religion and 
morality 
Prayer times Importance 
of religion 
Old Europe 2.67 ns 
(.82) 
1.58** 
(.99) 
X²=5.47* 
OE-NE 
3.99*** 
(1.26) 
2.72*** 
(1.08) 
New Europe 2.71 ns/*** 
(.83) 
1.50**/*** 
(.88) 
X²=278.92*** 
NE-US 
3.79*** 
(1.36) 
2.55*** 
(1.08) 
United States 2.35 *** 
(.84) 
1.93*** 
(1.32) 
X²=278.92*** 
NE-US 
2.44*** 
(1.40) 
1.69*** 
(.94) 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE 
relationship, second one to NE-U.S. (when those two are different). b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ 
.001***, ns = not significant 
In general, Europeans are more secular than the Americans. New Europe and the United 
States have closer levels of religiosity than Old Europe and the U.S. do when we measure the 
importance of religion in people‘s lives, the number of times individuals pray outside religious 
service and the relationship between morality and religion (although the differences between Old 
and New Europe in the latter case are not extremely significant from a statistical point of view). 
For 80 percent of Americans and less than 50 percent of Europeans religion is very important in 
their lives. 37 percent of Americans compared to 6 percent of respondents from Old Europe and 
9 percent from New Europe pray several times a day. 24 percent of those interviewed in Old 
Europe, 27 from New Europe and 58 percent from the U.S. believe that it is necessary to believe 
in God in order to be moral and have good values.   
There are no significant distinctions between Old Europe and New Europe regarding 
people‘s views on the influence of religious leaders in their societies, and in the case of the 
separation between religion as a matter of personal faith and governmental policies, Old Europe 
is actually closer to the U.S. than New Europe is. Less than 45 percent of Europeans compared to 
65 percent of Americans see the influence of religious leaders in their societies as very good or 
somewhat good. 67 percent of respondents from New Europe, 64 percent from Old Europe and 
55 percent from the United States believe that religion is a matter of personal faith, and as such, 
it should be kept separate from governmental policies.   
7.6 . CONCLUSIONS 
Findings from several statistical tests comparing means of religiosity levels in Old 
Europe, New Europe and the United States are summarized below in Tables 7.6.1 to 7.6.5.  
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TABLE 7.6.1:  Levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States as 
measured by variables from the World Values Survey (codebook in Appendix 1) 
 Confidence 
in churches 
Religious 
services 
attendance 
Church 
answers social 
problems 
Religious faith 
in children 
Secular 
politicians 
Religious 
person 
Church 
and State 
separation 
Old 
Europe 
2.60*** 
(.91) 
5.88*** 
(2.31) 
X²=96.01*** 
OE-NE 
X²=1576*** 
OE-NE 
4.05*** 
(1.01) 
1.59*** 
(.66) 
2.14*** 
(1.15) 
New 
Europe 
2.07***/ns 
(.98) 
4.24***/ns 
(2.18) 
X²=31.23*** 
NE-US 
X²=95.74*** 
NE-US 
3.20***/ns 
(1.29) 
1.20***/* 
(.48) 
1.96*** 
(1.08) 
United 
States 
2.04 ns 
(.89) 
4.12 ns 
(2.62) 
X²=31.23*** 
NE-US 
X²=95.74*** 
NE-US 
3.14 ns 
(1.34) 
1.23* 
(.46) 
2.77*** 
(1.34) 
 
TABLE 7.6.2:  Levels of religiosity as measured by variables from the Voice of the People – 
Millennium Edition (codebook in Appendix 2) 
 Moments of 
prayer 
Religious beliefs One true 
religion 
Religious 
services 
attendance 
Old Europe 1.47*** 
(.53) 
2.08*** 
(1.02) 
2.18*** 
(.81) 
4.99*** 
(2.02) 
New Europe 1.43*** 
(.55) 
1.92*** 
(.97) 
2.02*** 
(1.00) 
4.33*** 
(1.91) 
United States 1.13*** 
(.34) 
1.45*** 
(.69) 
1.87*** 
(.55) 
3.23*** 
(1.88) 
 
TABLE 7.6.3:  Levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States as 
measured by variables from the PEW 2002 survey database (codebook in Appendix 3) 
 Religion and 
morality 
Importance of 
religion in life 
Church and State 
separation 
Religious leaders 
influence 
Old Europe X²=26.07*** 
OE-NE 
2.45* 
(1.04) 
1.41 ns 
(.70) 
2.56 ns 
(.78) 
New Europe X²=217.40*** 
NE-US 
2.39*/*** 
(1.03) 
1.41 ns/*** 
(.67) 
2.55 ns/*** 
(.81) 
United States X²=217.40*** 
NE-US 
1.61*** 
(.88) 
1.69*** 
(.94) 
2.30*** 
(.79) 
 
TABLE 7.6.4:  Analysis results for levels of religiosity as measured by variables from the  
2006 U.S. CID database (codebook in Appendix 4) 
 Personal religiosity Religious services 
attendance 
Religious 
homogeneity 
Old Europe 4.95 ns 
(2.93) 
5.38*** 
(1.55) 
2.95*** 
(1.06) 
New Europe 4.94 ns/*** 
(3.04) 
4.99*** 
(1.63) 
3.13*** 
(1.02) 
United States 6.09*** 
(2.59) 
4.55*** 
(1.61) 
2.31*** 
(.85) 
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TABLE 7.6.5:  Levels of religiosity measured by variables from the PEW 2007 survey 
database (codebook in Appendix 5) 
 Religious 
leaders 
influence 
Religion and 
government 
kept separate 
Religion and 
morality 
Prayer times Importance 
of religion 
Old Europe 2.67 ns 
(.82) 
1.58** 
(.99) 
X²=5.47* 
OE-NE 
3.99*** 
(1.26) 
2.72*** 
(1.08) 
New Europe 2.71 ns/*** 
(.83) 
1.50**/*** 
(.88) 
X²=278.92*** 
NE-US 
3.79*** 
(1.36) 
2.55*** 
(1.08) 
United States 2.35 *** 
(.84) 
1.93*** 
(1.32) 
X²=278.92*** 
NE-US 
2.44*** 
(1.40) 
1.69*** 
(.94) 
Notes: a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are 
significant at p ≤ .05. For ―New Europe‖ entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE 
relationship, second one to NE-U.S. (when those two are different). b) p ≤ .05 *, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ 
.001***, ns = not significant 
Overall, Europeans are more secular than the Americans, and Old Europe is less devout 
than New Europe. New Europe and the United States share several characteristics in matters of 
faith and spirituality, especially when it comes to the importance of religion in people‘s lives, 
how many times a person prays and/or attends church services and the role of religion and 
religious leaders in governmental/political affairs. 
At the beginning of the 21
st
 century, New Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are 
relatively lower than in Old Europe) and the United States share similar, high levels of 
religiosity, while Western Europe is much more secular.  Americans and New Europeans are 
more inclined than Old Europeans to see themselves as religious people, trust their churches and 
ask them for answers to social problems, attend religious services fairly often and offer their 
children a religious education. Respondents from New Europe tend to agree with the Americans 
that politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office, but they also parallel their 
Western European counterparts when it comes to views on the separation between Church and 
State. A significantly larger percentage of European than American respondents agree that 
religious leaders should not try to influence the national government‘s policies.  
In 2000, a ―Voice of the People‖ survey finds Old Europe to be the most secular of the 
three regions under investigation, with the highest percentage of respondents who do not go to 
church, do not take time in their days to pray and do not believe in the existence of one true 
religion or one personal God. United States is at the opposite end of the spectrum as the most 
devout of the three. Americans pray a lot, attend religious services regularly, believe in the 
existence of a personal God and identify themselves with a large array of religious beliefs. New 
Europe falls somewhere in between these two extremes; this could provide an explanation for 
why its levels of anti-Americanism are lower than those in Old Europe. Two years later, the 
PEW survey discovers that Old Europe and New Europe have almost identical levels of 
religiosity, even if the intensity of anti-American feelings in those two regions is very different.  
Europe is more secular, and would like to keep religion out of the political and governmental 
realm as much as possible, while for Americans faith plays a major role in their personal lives, 
and they feel it should do the same in their public lives.  
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In the second half of the first decade of the 21
st
 century, statistical analysis results 
measuring levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States show that New 
Europe is more similar to United States than Old Europe is terms of religious service attendance. 
In other aspects of religiosity Europeans see themselves as more secular, independent of which 
region of the continent they inhabit, than the Americans. Respondents from Old Europe are 
closer than those in New Europe, in their positive views of religious homogeneity, to the 
Americans. In 2007, another PEW surveys finds Europeans to be still more secular than the 
Americans. New Europe and the United States have closer levels of religiosity than Old Europe 
and the U.S. do regarding importance of religion in people‘s lives, the number of times 
individuals pray outside religious service and the relationship between morality and religion. 
There are however no significant distinctions between Old Europe and New Europe on the 
subject of the influence of religious leaders in their societies, and in the case of the separation 
between religion as a matter of personal faith and governmental policies, Old Europe is actually 
closer to the U.S. than New Europe is.  
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CHAPTER 8 – TRADE, TRAVEL, THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT: ALTERNATIVE THEORIES AND A MULTIVARIATE 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
This chapter covers the empirical analysis of the relationship between several variables 
other than tolerance and religiosity variables, and anti-Americanism. My tenth hypothesis states 
that besides cultural values, there are several other factors that might play a role in levels of anti-
Americanism: the strength of economic ties between country X and the United States, an 
individual‘s support for the Palestinians, the frequency of his/her travels to the U.S., interest in 
environmental issues as well as a desire to see American troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan as 
soon as possible. 
Hypothesis 10 (alternative economic explanation): There is a positive correlation 
between high levels of anti-Americanism and weak trade ties, low number of travels to the U.S., 
positive support for the Palestinians, interest in environmentally-friendly policies and desire to 
see American troops leaving Iraq as soon as possible.    
8.1 . MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: DATA AND METHODS 
PEW 2002 and PEW 2007 are the two databases used for the multivariate regression 
analysis, as they contain almost all the elements used in this empirical analysis: trade, travel, 
U.S. foreign policies towards Israel and towards the environment, cultural similarity (tolerance 
towards women, immigrants/foreign workers and homosexuals), religiosity and anti-
Americanism. The 2002 survey was conducted in 44 countries, 8 of which are part of the final 
database used here: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovak Republic 
and Great Britain.  
The 2007 survey was conducted in over 50 countries, including several from Old and 
New Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, 
Spain and Sweden. In Britain, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Slovakia, and Sweden, the 
questionnaire was split into two forms, each of which was administered to approximately one-
half of the sample. In these countries, most questions were assigned to one form or another. Two 
separate databases were created for each of these two forms, to minimize the risk of having 
information lost during the regression analysis.  
According to Hypothesis 10, the more a respondent believes U.S. foreign policies in the 
Middle East favor the state of Israel, the higher his/her levels of anti-Americanism. Variables 
from the PEW 2002 database used to measure Europe‘s views of America‘s involvement in the 
Palestinian problem were re-coded so they would reflect a scale of pro-Palestinian feelings. For 
example, one of the questions asked: ―What's your opinion of U.S. policies in the Middle East – 
would you say they are fair or do they favor Israel too much or do they favor the Palestinians too 
much?‖ Initially, the answers were coded: 1 (Fair), 2 (Favor Israel) and 3 (Favor Palestinians). I 
re-coded them as follows: 1 (Favor Israel), 2 (Fair) and 3 (Favor Palestinians), so they would 
reflect an incremental positive attitude towards the Palestinians.  
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8.2 . CULTURAL SIMILARITY, RELIGION, TRADE, TRAVEL, THE MIDDLE 
EAST, THE ENVIRONMENT AND ANTI-AMERICANISM: A MULTIVARIATE 
ANALYSIS RESULTS 
8.2.1. PEW 2002 
Two standard linear regression analyses were conducted using ―Opinion of United 
States‖ and ―Opinion of Americans‖ as dependent variables. Table 8.2.1.1 presents the wording 
and the coding of each of the 13 independent variables from the PEW 2002 database used in 
these two regression analyses, as well as the two dependent variables. 
TABLE 8.2.1.1: PEW 2002 variables – wording and measurement scales 
 Scale Scale Scale Scale Scale 
 
Variable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Immigration problem Very big 
problem 
Moderately big 
problem 
Small 
problem 
Not a 
problem at 
all 
 
 
Most people are 
better off in a free 
market economy, 
even though some 
people are rich and 
some are poor. 
 
Completely 
agree 
Mostly agree Mostly 
disagree 
Completely 
disagree 
 
Religious leaders 
influence 
Very good Somewhat 
good 
Somewhat 
bad 
 
Very bad  
Immigrants influence Very good Somewhat 
good 
Somewhat 
bad 
 
Very bad  
Religion is a matter 
of personal faith and 
should be kept 
separate from 
government policy? 
 
Completely 
agree 
Mostly agree Mostly 
disagree 
Completely 
disagree 
 
We should restrict 
and control entry of 
people into our 
country more than we 
do now. 
 
 
Completely 
agree 
Mostly agree Mostly 
disagree 
Completely 
disagree 
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Table continued. 
 Scale Scale Scale Scale Scale 
 
Variable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
What kind of 
marriage do you 
think is the more 
satisfying way of life? 
Husband 
provides for 
family, wife 
cares for house 
and kids 
 
Both have jobs 
& take care of 
house and 
children 
   
Which one of these 
statements about 
belief in God comes 
closest to your 
opinion? 
Not necessary 
to believe in 
God to be 
moral/have 
good values 
Necessary to 
believe in God 
to be 
moral/have 
good values 
 
   
Which one of these 
statements about 
homosexuality comes 
closer to your 
opinion? 
 
Homosexuality-
way of life 
society should 
accept 
 
Homosexuality-
way of life 
society should 
not accept 
   
What is your opinion 
of the United States? 
Very favorable Somewhat 
favorable 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
Very 
unfavorable 
 
 
What is your opinion 
of Americans? 
Very favorable Somewhat 
favorable 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
Very 
unfavorable 
 
 
Have you ever 
traveled to the U.S.? 
 
Yes No    
Outside of attending 
religious services, do 
you pray several 
times a day, once a 
day, a few times a 
week, once a week or 
less, or never? 
 
Several times a 
day 
Once a day A few 
times a 
week 
Once a 
week or 
less 
 
Never 
How important is 
religion in your life? 
Very important Somewhat 
important 
Not too 
important 
Not at all 
important 
 
 
Region Old Europe New Europe    
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Table 8.2.1.2 shows the results of the linear regression analyzing the relationship between 
anti-Americanism, as expressed in opinions of the United States, and cultural similarity, trade, 
travel, and support for free market. Anti-Americanism is measured by looking at opinions of the 
United States, a variable coded on a scale from 1 (very favorable) to 4 (very unfavorable). 
TABLE 8.2.1.2: PEW 2002 database regression results with “Opinion of United States” as 
dependent variable (F (14, 2834 = 8.45, R² = .040) 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Old Europe vs. New Europe -.185 .061 -.109 -3.007 .003** 
Immigration problem -.010 .019 -.012 -.552 .581 ns 
Stricter immigration laws .008 .018 .010 .467 .641 ns 
Immigrants influence .030 .021 .029 1.393 .164 ns 
Religious leaders influence .049 .020 .051 2.435 .015* 
Religion separate from state .019 .019 .018 .960 .337 ns 
God and Morality .005 .038 .003 .134 .894 ns 
Times of prayer -.053 .016 -.094 -3.414 .001*** 
Religion importance in life .115 .022 .148 5.127 .000*** 
Marriage .013 .038 .007 .350 .726 ns 
Homosexuality .026 .038 .014 .677 .498 ns 
Trade -.009 .024 -.014 -.397 .692 ns 
Travel .143 .045 .063 3.172 .002** 
Free Market .079 .017 .087 4.665 .000*** 
Note: p ≤ .05*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, p ˃ .05 not significant (ns). 
Regression analysis revealed that the overall model significantly predicted levels of anti-
Americanism in Europe, F (14, 2834) = 8.45, p ≤ .001***. R² for the model was .040 and 
adjusted R² was .036. Table 8.2.1.2 displays the un-standardized regression coefficients (B) and 
111 
 
standard error (Std. Error), the standardized coefficient Beta, as well as the t value and the level 
of significance p. In terms of individual relationships between the independent variables and 
anti-Americanism, influence of religious leaders (t = 2.43, p ≤ .05*), times of prayer (t = -3.41, p 
≤ .001***), importance of religion (t = 5.12, p ≤ .001***) are the only three variables pertaining 
to cultural similarity that have significantly predicted levels of anti-Americanism. Two additional 
control variables –travel (t = 3.17, p ≤ .01**) and attitudes towards free markets (t = 4.66, p ≤ 
.001***) are also significantly related to anti-American attitudes, while no significant 
relationship was discovered between attitudes towards immigrants, women and homosexuals and 
feelings towards the United States.  The Old Europe – New Europe regional divide maintains its 
significant impact on levels of anti-Americanism (t = -3.00, p ≤ .01**). 
“Opinion of Americans” is used as a dependent variable in a second multiple regression, 
with the same 13 variable presented above selected as independent variables. Analysis results are 
presented in Table 8.2.1.3. 
TABLE 8.2.1.3: PEW 2002 database regression results with “Opinion of Americans” as 
dependent variable (F (14, 2810) = 7.32, R² = .035) 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Old Europe vs. New Europe -.203 .057 -.129 -3.539 .000*** 
Immigration problem -.013 .018 -.016 -.722 .470 ns 
Stricter immigration laws -.006 .017 -.008 -.354 .723 ns 
Immigrants influence .015 .020 .016 .760 .447 ns 
Religious leaders influence .076 .019 .085 4.072 .000*** 
Religion separate from state .012 .018 .013 .659 .510 ns 
God and Morality -.021 .036 -.013 -.594 .553 ns 
Times of prayer -.059 .015 -.111 -3.988 .000*** 
Religion importance in life .101 .021 .141 4.819 .000*** 
Marriage .029 .035 .016 .818 .413 ns 
Homosexuality .067 .035 .040 1.902 .057 ns 
Table continued. 
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 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Trade -.054 .022 -.089 -2.454 .014* 
Travel .111 .042 .052 2.620 .009** 
Free Market .050 .016 .059 3.128 .002** 
Note: a) p ≤ .05*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, p ˃ .05 not significant (ns). 
          b) An ordered probit analysis was also conducted using the same independent and 
dependent variables and its results supported the findings in the table above. 
This second regression analysis revealed that the overall model significantly predicted 
levels of anti-Americanism in Europe, F (14, 2810) = 7.32, p ≤ .001***. R² for the model was 
.035 and adjusted R² was .031 (smaller values that in the previous case). Table 8.2.1.3 displays 
the un-standardized regression coefficients (B) and standard error (Std. Error), the standardized 
coefficient Beta, as well as the t value and the level of significance p. In terms of individual 
relationships between the independent variables and anti-Americanism, influence of religious 
leaders is still statistically significant (t = 4.07, p ≤ .001***). Frequency of prayer times (t = -
3.98 p ≤ .001***) and the importance of religion (t = 4.81, p ≤ .001***) also maintain their 
strong explanatory power. Three of the additional control variables – trade (t = -2.45, p ≤ .05*), 
travel (t = 2.62, p ≤ .01**) and attitudes towards free markets (t = 3.12, p ≤ .01**) have been 
found to be significantly related to anti-American attitudes, while no significant relationship was 
discovered between attitudes towards immigrants, women and homosexuals and feelings towards 
the American people.  The Old Europe – New Europe regional divide is also shown to have a 
significant impact on levels of anti-Americanism (t = 3.53, p ≤ .001***). 
To summarize these findings, there is a slight difference in the factors influencing 
Europe‘s views on the United States and the American government, compared to feelings 
towards the American people, although in both cases stronger anti-Americans are correlated with 
lower levels of religiosity, support for free markets and not having travelled to the United States. 
The main difference comes from the ―religious leaders influence‖ independent variable. 
Europeans who believe that religious leaders have too much influence in their countries (an issue 
related to the separation between Church and State) are more likely to dislike the United States 
government, but not the American people in general. This suggests that these respondents, while 
unhappy with how the U.S. government responds to pressures from the faith-based community, 
believe that this intermingling of secular and religious affairs does not negatively reflect upon the 
majority of the American people. These results have also shown that there is a strong 
correlation between the regions where the interview was conducted (Old Europe vs. New 
Europe) and opinions of the United States and of Americans, with Old Europe having 
higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe. 
8.2.2. PEW 2007 – FORM A 
Two standard multiple regression analyses were conducted using ―Opinion of United 
States‖ and ―Opinion of Americans‖ as dependent variables for the PEW 2007 Form A. Table 
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8.2.2.1 presents the wording and the coding of each of the independent variables from the PEW 
2007 database used in these regression analyses, as well as the two dependent variables. A and B 
next to the variable tell the reader in which of the two PEW 2007 questionnaires that information 
can be found.  
TABLE 8.2.2.1: PEW 2007 (Form A) variables – wording and measurement scales 
 Scale Scale Scale Scale Scale 
 
Variable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Religious leaders 
influence 
Very good Somewhat 
good 
Somewhat 
bad 
 
Very bad  
Which one of these 
statements about 
belief in God comes 
closest to your 
opinion? 
Not necessary 
to believe in 
God to be 
moral/have 
good values 
Necessary to 
believe in God 
to be 
moral/have 
good values 
 
   
How often do you 
pray outside religious 
services? 
 
Several times a 
day 
Once a day A few 
times a 
week 
Once a 
week or 
less 
 
Never 
How important is 
religion in your life? 
Very important Somewhat 
important 
Not too 
important 
Not at all 
important 
 
 
Immigrants influence Very good Somewhat 
good 
Somewhat 
bad 
 
Very bad  
Opinion on women as 
political leaders 
Men generally 
make better 
political leaders 
than women 
In general, 
women and 
men make 
equally good 
political leaders 
Women 
generally 
make better 
political 
leaders 
than men 
 
  
Which one of these 
statements about 
homosexuality comes 
closer to your 
opinion? 
 
Homosexuality-
way of life 
society should 
accept 
 
Homosexuality-
way of life 
society should 
not accept 
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Table continued. 
 Scale Scale Scale Scale Scale 
 
Variable 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Do you think the U.S. 
should keep military 
troops in Iraq until 
the situation has 
stabilized, or do you 
think the U.S. should 
remove its troops as 
soon as possible? 
 
Keep troops in 
Iraq 
Remove its 
troops 
   
What's your opinion 
of U.S. policies in the 
Middle East? 
 
Favor Israel Fair Favor 
Palestinians 
  
What is your opinion 
of the United States? 
Very favorable Somewhat 
favorable 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
Very 
unfavorable 
 
 
What is your opinion 
of Americans? 
Very favorable Somewhat 
favorable 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
Very 
unfavorable 
 
 
Have you ever 
traveled to the U.S.? 
 
Yes No    
Region 
 
Old Europe New Europe    
The first regression analysis for the PEW 2007 – Form A database revealed that the 
overall model significantly predicted levels of anti-Americanism in Europe, F (12, 2507) = 
30.56, p ≤ .001***. R² for the model was .128 and adjusted R² was .124. Table 8.2.2.1 presents 
the un-standardized regression coefficients (B) and standard error (Std. Error), the standardized 
coefficient Beta, as well as the t value and the alpha level of significance. 
TABLE 8.2.2.2: PEW 2007 Form A database regression results with “Opinion of United 
States” as dependent variable (F (12, 2507) = 30.56, R² = .128) 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Old Europe vs. New Europe -.139 .040 -.076 -3.510 .000*** 
Religious leaders influence .142 .021 .140 6.839 .000*** 
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Table continued. 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
God and Morality -.054 .042 -.027 -1.287 .198 ns 
Prayer  -.019 .017 -.029 -1.113 .266 ns 
Importance of religion .047 .021 .061 2.216 .027* 
Immigrants influence -.020 .021 -.018 -.950 .342 ns 
Women as political leaders .102 .034 .057 3.022 .003** 
Homosexuality -.077 .040 -.038 -1.919 .055 ns 
U.S. troops in Iraq .395 .034 .222 11.722 .000*** 
U.S. Middle East policies -.127 .027 -.092 -4.789 .000*** 
Travel .284 .042 .137 6.827 .000** 
Trade .027 .019 .031 1.402 .161 ns 
Note: a) p ≤ .05*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, p ˃ .05 not significant (ns). 
          b) An ordered probit analysis was also conducted using the same independent and 
dependent variables and its results supported the findings in the table above. 
In terms of individual relationships between the independent variables and anti-
Americanism, the only variables pertaining to the cultural similarity theory (as described in the 
previous chapters) that have significantly predicted levels of anti-Americanism are: 1) influence 
of religious leaders (t = 6.83, p ≤ .001***), 2) importance of religion (t = 2.21, p ≤ .05*), and 3) 
opinions on women as political leaders (t = 3.02, p ≤ .01**). The three additional control 
variables - travel (t = 6.82, p ≤ .01**) and attitudes towards U.S. policies in the Middle East - 
both on the topics of Iraq (t = 11.72, p ≤ .001***) and Israel (t = -4.78, p ≤ .001***) - are also 
related to anti-American attitudes, while no significant relationship was discovered between 
attitudes towards homosexuals and immigrants, beliefs regarding the relationship between faith 
and morality, frequency of prayers, and feelings towards the United States. The Old Europe – 
New Europe geographical divide is, in this model, significantly related to levels of anti-
Americanism (t = -3.51, p ≤ .001***).  
A second multiple regression was conducted to analyze the relationship between the same 
independent variables mentioned above, and anti-Americanism as measured by opinions on 
Americans.  Results have shown that this model also holds significant overall explanatory 
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strength (F (12, 2458) = 15.76, p ≤ .001***), with an R² value of .072 and adjusted R² of .067. 
The coefficients for the individual relationships between the dependent variable – opinion of 
Americans – and each of the 11 independent variables is presented below in Table 8.2.2.3. 
TABLE 8.2.2.3: PEW 2007 Form A database regression results with “Opinion of 
Americans” as dependent variable (F (12, 2458) = 15.76, R² = .070) 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Old Europe vs. New Europe -.081 .037 -.049 -2.161 .031* 
Religious leaders influence .098 .020 .107 5.008 .000** 
God and Morality .033 .039 .018 .831 .406 ns 
Prayer  -.007 .016 -.012 -.449 .653 ns 
Importance of religion .039 .020 .056 1.978 .048* 
Immigrants influence .067 .020 .069 3.396 .001*** 
Women as political leaders .005 .032 .003 .145 .885 ns 
Homosexuality -.022 .038 -.012 -.585 .559 ns 
U.S. troops in Iraq .232 .032 .144 7.326 .000*** 
U.S. Middle East policies -.036 .025 -.029 -1.447 .148 ns 
Travel .228 .039 .121 5.808 .000*** 
Trade -.058 .018 -.074 -3.190 .001*** 
Note: a) p ≤ .05*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, p ˃ .05 not significant (ns). 
          b) An ordered probit analysis was also conducted using the same independent and 
dependent variables and its results supported the findings in the table above. 
These results revealed that, unlike the previous model, there is no significant correlation 
between levels of anti-Americanism as measured by opinions of the American people, and views 
on women in a position of political leadership, homosexuals and the U.S. involvement in the 
Palestinian problem. There is also no noticeable relationship between anti-Americanism, the 
frequency of prayer times and the belief that faith and morality. This model uncovered an 
interesting difference in the strength of the correlation between attitudes towards immigrants and 
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anti-Americanism when the targets of this anti-Americanism are the U.S. government and the 
American people. If in the former case, there is no correlation, while in the latter, we can notice a 
statistically significant relationship (t = 3.39, p ≤ .001***). Two other elements of the cultural 
similarity theory, the influence of religious leaders (t = 5.00, p ≤ .001***) and the importance of 
religion in a person‘s life (t = 1.97, p ≤ .05*) are both predicting levels of anti-Americanism, as 
do three of the control variables: trade (t = -3.19, p≤.001***), travel to the U.S. (t = 5.80, p ≤ 
.001***) and views on the war in Iraq (t = 7.32, p ≤ .001***). The Old Europe – New Europe 
distinction also maintained its explanatory power, although the correlation between this 
variable and opinions of Americans is weaker than in the case of feelings towards the United 
States (t = -2.16, p ≤ .05*).  
8.2.3. PEW 2007 – FORM B 
―Opinion of the United States‖ and ―opinion of Americans‖ were used as dependent 
variables for two sets of multiple regressions analyzing the correlation between anti-
Americanism in Europe and seven independent variables that were not captured by Form A of 
the PEW 2007 questionnaire: aspects of cultural similarity (tolerance towards women and 
immigrants, and the separation between Church and States), as well as opinions on American 
President George W. Bush, the necessity of protecting the environment and the benefits of free 
market.  Table 8.2.3.1 presents the wording and the coding for each of these nine variables. 
TABLE 8.2.3.1: PEW 2007 (Form B) variables – wording and measurement scales 
 Scale Scale Scale Scale 
 
Variable 
 
1 2 3 4 
Most people are better 
off in a free market 
economy, even though 
some people are rich 
and some are poor. 
 
Completely agree Mostly agree Mostly 
disagree 
Completely 
disagree 
Protecting the 
environment should be 
given priority, even if it 
causes slower economic 
growth and some loss of 
jobs. 
 
Completely agree Mostly agree Mostly 
disagree 
Completely 
disagree 
Religion is a matter of 
personal faith and 
should be kept separate 
from government 
policy? 
 
Completely agree Mostly agree Mostly 
disagree 
Completely 
disagree 
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Table continued. 
 Scale Scale Scale Scale 
 
Variable 
 
1 2 3 4 
We should restrict and 
control entry of people 
into our country more 
than we do now. 
 
Completely agree Mostly agree Mostly 
disagree 
Completely 
disagree 
Which one of the 
following statements 
comes closest to your 
opinion about educating 
children? 
 
It is more 
important for 
boys than for 
girls  
It is equally 
important for 
girls and boys 
It is more 
important for 
girls than for 
boys 
 
How much confidence 
you have in U.S. 
President George W. 
Bush to do the right 
thing regarding world 
affairs? 
 
A lot of 
confidence 
Some confidence  Not too 
much 
confidence 
No 
confidence at 
all 
In your view, is global 
warming a very serious 
problem, somewhat 
serious, not too serious, 
or not a problem? 
 
Very serious  Somewhat 
serious 
Not too 
serious 
Not a 
problem 
What is your opinion of 
the United States? 
Very favorable Somewhat 
favorable 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
Very 
unfavorable 
 
What is your opinion of 
Americans? 
Very favorable Somewhat 
favorable 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
Very 
unfavorable 
 
Region 
 
Old Europe New Europe   
Overall, these eight predictors from Form B of the PEW 2007 survey questionnaires 
explain a sizable proportion of variance (R² = .261, F (8, 4030) = 177.50, p ≤ .001***) in levels 
of anti-Americanism as measured by attitudes towards the United States. Table 8.2.3.2 
displays the standardized and unstandardized coefficients for the individual relationships 
between each of the independent variables and the dependent variable.  
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TABLE 8.2.3.2: PEW 2007 Form B database regression results with “Opinion of United 
States” as dependent variable (F (8, 4030 = 177.50, R² = .261) 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Old Europe vs. New Europe -.001 .024 -.001 -.049 .961 ns 
Free market .075 .013 .080 5.743 .000*** 
Protecting the environment -.006 .014 -.007 -.466 .641 ns 
Religion as a personal matter -.006 .016 -.005 -.347 .729 ns 
Stricter immigration laws -.002 .012 -.002 -.169 .866 ns 
Education for boys and girls .037 .071 .007 .527 .598 ns 
Opinions on George W. Bush .464 .013 .488 34.592 .000*** 
Global warming - problem -.039 .017 -.032 -2.255 .024* 
Note: a) p ≤ .05*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, p ˃ .05 not significant (ns). 
          b) An ordered probit analysis was also conducted using the same independent and 
dependent variables and its results supported the findings in the table above. 
The only three independent variables having a significant predictor strength are views on 
the benefits of free market (t = 5.74, p ≤ .001***), on George W. Bush‘s capacity to handle 
world affairs (t = 34.59, p ≤ .001***) and on the seriousness of the global warming problem (t = 
-2.25, p ≤ .05*). More negative views of the United States are correlated with negative views of 
former President George W. Bush, negative views of the benefits of free markets and belief in 
the seriousness of the global warming problem. The other factors, including beliefs about the 
separation between State and Church and the importance of education for boys and girls, or the 
Old Europe – New Europe divide, do not appear to have a strong relationship with a 
respondent‘s opinions on the United States.  
The results from a second regression using “opinions on Americans” as the dependent 
variable are presented below in Table 8.2.3.3. 
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TABLE 8.2.3.3: PEW 2007 Form B database regression results with “Opinion of 
Americans” as dependent variable (F (8, 3962) = 64.57, R² = .116) 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Old Europe vs. New Europe .147 .024 .092 5.999 .000*** 
Free market .039 .013 .045 2.895 .004** 
Protecting the environment .035 .014 .038 2.443 .015* 
Religion as a personal matter .035 .016 .033 2.169 .030* 
Stricter immigration laws -.056 .012 -.071 -4.696 .000*** 
Education for boys and girls -.031 .072 -.006 -.427 .670 ns 
Opinions on George W. Bush .291 .014 .330 21.145 .000*** 
Global warming - problem -.008 .018 -.007 -.457 .647 ns 
Note: p ≤ .05*, p ≤ .01**, p ≤ .001***, p ˃ .05 not significant (ns). 
The explanatory strength of this second regression model is slightly weaker than the one 
using opinions of the United States as dependent variable (R² = .116, and the adjusted R² = .114). 
It would seem that Europeans interviewed using Form B of the PEW 2007 questionnaire saw a 
clearer relationship between these eight independent variables and the American people, than in 
the previous example. Trust in the benefits of free market (t = 2.89, p ≤ .01**) and opinions on 
American President George W. Bush‘s ability to handle international affairs (t = 21.14, p ≤ 
.001***) maintained their strong explanatory power, when the focus of anti-Americanism 
changes from the U.S. government to the American people. The two variables looking at 
environmental attitudes are changing places compared to the previous model: views on the 
seriousness of global warming problems are not significantly related to attitudes towards the 
Americans, while those on protecting the environment even if it means job loss are (t = 2.44, p ≤ 
.05*). Two aspect of cultural similarity, tolerance towards immigrants (t = -4.69, p ≤ .001***) 
and the separation between Church and State (t = 2.16, p ≤ .05*) are significantly related to 
opinions on Americans even if they do not appear to have a relevant impact on anti-Americanism 
as measured by views of the United States. The Old Europe – New Europe divide also shows a 
strong effect on opinions of the Americans, although not in the direction previously observed (t = 
5.99, p ≤ .001***). A second regression analysis showed that once we remove the ―George W. 
Bush‖ variable, the European divide in anti-Americanism returns to its original characteristic, 
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with Old Europe exhibiting higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe (see Appendix 9 
for complete results). This suggests that when they focus their anti-Americanism on just one 
person (George W. Bush), Old Europeans might be more inclined to see the rest of the 
Americans in a positive light.  
8.3 . CONCLUSIONS 
Multiple regression results from the PEW 2002 and PEW 2007 have offered moderate 
support for the cultural similarity theory which argues that there is a relationship between 
cultural similarity (tolerance and religiosity levels) and anti-Americanism, even when we control 
for additional factors such as direct contact with the American society through trade and travel, 
views on American President George W. Bush and his government‘s policies towards Israel, Iraq 
and the environment. In general, factors significantly correlated with anti-Americanism 
maintained their explanatory strength for both its facets: opinions on the United States (the 
government) and opinions on the American people.  
Each of the databases containing the trade per GDP ratio showed a significant correlation 
between trade dependence and anti-Americanism. In each case, an increase in the strength of a 
respondent‘s trade ties with the United States was matched by an increase in levels of anti-
Americanism, which contradicts the modernization theory assumption that increased economic 
contact between society breeds friendship. On the other hand, more direct contact with the 
American society through travel to the United States is negatively correlated with anti-
Americanism: respondents who have traveled to the U.S. are less anti-American than those who 
haven‘t.   
Results have also shown that America‘s image in Europe is positively correlated with 
support for a free market economy. In both 2002 and 2007 databases, those respondents who 
believe that most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are 
poor and some are rich are also more like to exhibit friendlier attitudes towards the U.S. 
government and the American people. Positive views on how capable American President 
George W. Bush is to handle international affairs, as well as his policies towards Israel and the 
deployment of troops in Iraq are all correlated with negative feelings towards the U.S. 
government. Europeans who have a lot of confidence in George W. Bush to do the right thing 
regarding world affair and who also think that the U.S. should keep military troops in Iraq until 
the situation has stabilized are more likely to have favorable views of the United States 
government, as well as of the American people. Those respondents who perceive U.S. policies in 
the Middle East conflict to favor Israel are more inclined to have negative opinions only of the 
United States and not the American people.  
One of the two PEW 2007 questionnaires also asked several questions about 
environmental issues. The two selected for this analysis are about the benefits of environmental 
protection even when it hurts the economy, and the seriousness of global warming problems. The 
results of the two multiple regression analyses are somewhat puzzling: Europeans who believe 
that global warming is a serious problem are slightly more likely to harbor negative feelings 
towards the U.S. government, but not the American people, which would suggest that they do 
not agree with the way the Bush government was dealing at the time with the issues of global 
warming. On the other hand, the variable measuring a respondent‘s willingness to support 
environmental protective measures even if they negatively affect their economies is positively 
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correlated with just opinions of the Americans, and not with opinions of the U.S. More support 
for the environment, in this case, translates into more favorable views of the American people, 
which would suggest that although Europeans disagree with the U.S. government‘s handling of 
environmental affairs, they also believe in the pro-environment propensities of the general public 
in America.  
Returning to the cultural similarity theory, we notice a strong correlation between two of 
the independent variables measuring various aspects of religiosity and levels of anti-
Americanism. In both PEW 2002 and PEW 2002 surveys, respondents who see the influence of 
religious leaders in their societies as a positive one and for whom religions is very important in 
their lives are more likely to have favorable opinions of the U.S. government and the American 
people.  Views on the relationship between faith and morality are not a significant predictor of 
anti-Americanism in any of the databases used in this chapter, while the frequency of prayer 
times is significantly correlated with anti-Americanism only in the 2002 survey (the more you 
pray the more pro-American you are). The belief that religion is a matter of personal faith and 
should be kept separate from government policy has a strong influence on opinions of the 
American people only in the PEW 2007 which would suggest that five years prior, Europeans 
did not see the Americans as trying to bring faith into politics as much as in 2007. 
Tolerance towards immigrants and views on women as political leaders are correlated 
with anti-Americanism only in the 2007 survey, which comes as no surprise if we think about the 
heightened tensions regarding these issues in the United States towards the end of George W. 
Bush‘s second term in office. While at the beginning of his Presidency Americans were mostly 
concerned about the response to the 9/11 attacks, the debates regarding illegal immigration, gay 
marriage, abortion and a woman‘s place in the political realm (topic made visible by Hillary 
Clinton‘s much publicized Presidential campaign) became much more heated the closer we got 
to the 2008 general elections. In general, Europeans who believe that men and women make 
equally good political leaders are slightly more likely to have negative opinions of the United 
States government, but not of the American people. The opposite is true for tolerance towards 
immigrants: respondents who argued that the influence of immigrants in their societies is either 
very good or somewhat good were more likely to have favorable and somewhat favorable 
opinions of the American people (without any significant impact on levels of anti-Americanism 
as measured by attitudes towards the American government), which would again suggest that in 
certain cases Europeans dislike for certain policies of the Bush administration did not extend to 
the Americans in general.   
The Old Europe – New Europe geographical divide maintained its explanatory strength 
even when we control for all the factors mentioned above. New Europe has more positive views 
on the United States and on the American people than does Old Europe. Chapter IX looks at two 
countries, one from Old Europe – France, and one from New Europe – Romania, and the reasons 
behind their very different levels of anti-Americanism. This concludes the general empirical 
analysis of various aspects of Europe‘s attitudes towards America, including elements of cultural 
similarity, policy-driven feelings directed at the U.S., as well as direct economic and personal 
contact with the United States and with the American people.  
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CHAPTER 9 – FRANCE AND ROMANIA: A TALE OF TWO ANTI-
AMERICANISMS 
9.1. FRANCE AND ROMANIA – A SIX-HUNDRED YEARS OLD FRIENDSHIP 
Romania was recognized in 2006 by France as one of the most francophone countries in 
the world, when it became the first ―New European‖ country to host the 11th Francophone 
World Summit. There is a special department in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
dedicated to the country‘s francophone connections. France was Romania‘s strongest supporter 
in its bid for EU membership. During Romania‘s Communist years, the two foreign languages 
taught in Romanian schools were Russian and French. Taking all these things into account, one 
might expect Romania to follow France‘s lead in European anti-Americanism. And one would be 
wrong. Romania is one of the most pro-American countries in Europe, while France is one of the 
most anti-American. This chapter explores the reasons behind these different levels of anti-
Americanism, using information from the World Values Survey, as well as the 2005 
Eurobarometer. This data paints a picture that reflects the general Old Europe – New Europe 
findings from the previous chapters:  Romania is more culturally similar to the U.S. than France 
is in terms of their levels of religiosity and tolerance towards women, homosexuals and 
immigrant/foreign workers. This section will present a short historical background of the 
relationship between France and its francophone little sister, Romania. 
Romanian children have learned for at least the last twenty years that one of the first 
interactions between France and Romania dates back to 1300s, when Burgundy knights under the 
command of Jean de Nevers came and fought against the Turks alongside famous Romanian 
prince Mircea cel Batran. A century later, the French-Romanian anti-Ottoman alliance was 
renewed by Moldavian princes from the Movilesti family (Berindei 1967). For the next three 
hundred years, these interactions intensified, as the French kings had begun to see Romania‘s 
geostrategic value as a first defense bastion for Christian Europe in the face of the increased 
power of the Ottoman Empire. French emissaries were sent to all three Romanian princely 
courts, and young Romanian boyars started to journey to Paris, in what turns out to be the 
beginning of a long cultural friendship between the two countries. In the 19
th
 century, as well as 
after World War I, the cream of the Romanian intelligentsia traveled to Paris and was heavily 
influenced by French culture.  Mihai Eminescu (Romania‘s national poet), Brancusi (one of the 
world‘s most illustrious sculptors), philosophers Eliade and Cioran, as well as one of the most 
influential play writers of the Theatre of the Absurd and Member of the French Academy Eugen 
Ionescu, are just a few of those who have strengthened Romania‘s francophone character (Eliade 
1982). Romania‘s penal code was fashioned from the French Napoleonic code, and there are 
currently French cultural centers all across Romania run by the French embassy to support of 
their francophone ties. The Francophone International Organization has an office in Bucharest 
that supervises francophone activities in all Eastern and Central European countries. The 
Francophone Office of Higher Education has been operating in a similar fashion since 1994 and 
there are over 25 Romanian universities that have dual-degrees programs with French colleges ( 
(Ambassade de France en Roumanie n.d.).  
It is also true that in the 21
st
 century, the relationships between these two countries have 
experienced several tense moments. After President Jacques Chirac‘s strong support for 
Romania‘s EU membership and the opening of Europe‘s borders to Romanians in search for 
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better economic opportunities, tensions arose when a massive influx of Roma settled in France. 
Perceived as criminal elements in some circles of French politics, Roma became the target of a 
government-supported deportation campaign initiated in 2010 by then French President Nicholas 
Sarkozy. Although this attempt to send the Roma back to Romanian (and Bulgaria) has so far 
been fairly unsuccessful, it has temporarily strained the otherwise amicable relationship between 
the two countries.   
But Roma are not the only source of tension in this six-hundred years old friendship. 
Romania‘s support for the war in Iraq has caused former French President Jacques Chirac 
(quoted here by Graff (2003)) to call it ―not very well behaved and rather reckless.‖ He 
continued by telling Romanians that they ―missed a good opportunity to keep quiet‖ and that ―if 
they wanted to reduce their chances of joining Europe, they could not have found a better way‖ 
(Graff 2003). Romania‘s pro-Americanism has been over the years a constant source of irritation 
for the French government, and the next section presents a short overview on France‘s own 
complicated relationship with the United States over the last two hundred years. 
9.2. FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES – “ARE AMERICAN DOGS REALLY 
BARKING?” 
France and the United States have never been at war with each other, at least not 
officially. Which is part of the reason why, on a trip to Paris in 1999 (during the American 
bombing of Belgrade), I was very surprised to engage in a rather animated conversation with one 
of the guides at the War Museum - Musée de l'Armée – about French-American military 
relations. The reason this conversation started was because at the time I was translating from 
French to English to one my American friends. Our guide took exception to that, and asked me 
first if my friend was American. He then decided to stop the tour, to ask me if I was not ashamed 
to be friends with one of these ―imperialists keeling innocent people.‖ I blame the rest of the 
incident on my temper: I retorted that he, of all people, should be grateful for America‘s help 
during World War II, or he would be speaking German now. It turns out that was not the right 
thing to say, as I was told in English by this guide at the French National Military Museum that 
France was doing just fine during WW II, and that it didn‘t really need any help from a country 
that ―never won a war in its history.‖  Instead of just dropping the conversation (and to my 
friend‘s despair) I proceeded to point out that at least the Americans didn‘t build a 50 kilometer 
long wall to protect a 500 kilometer long border. At which point we were not so politely asked to 
leave the museum: ―You and your American friend can leave this museum now!‖ On our way 
out, I asked my friend why he wasn‘t upset about how people talked about the United States, 
right in front of him. His answer was ―Oh, this was not that bad. I‘ve seen worse. You should 
have just told them I‘m from Canada.‖ 
Coming from a country with strong pro-American inclinations, I was shocked by the 
French hostility towards the United States. Having lived in Louisiana for the last eight years, I 
am even more surprised, because of the strong ties this southern American state has with France. 
So some of the questions I have been asking myself since the 1999 visit to the ―Musée de 
l'Armée‖ are: how did it all start?  Were the French always anti-Americans? If not, when did this 
change occur and why?  
Franco-American relations have not always been as tense as they have been over the last 
ten years. The French played a significant supporting role in the birth of the United States as an 
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independent nation, providing military, economic and diplomatic backing for the New Republic, 
even if it was not exactly for selfless reasons. In the second half of the 18
th
 century, France and 
Great Britain were trying to tilt the European balance of power in their favor, and the French saw 
the American Revolution as an opportunity to reach this goal. The French monarchy however did 
not expect for the American political model to become a shining example for the intellectuals in 
Paris of how the ―ancien régime‖ could be reformed. Benjamin Franklin‘s visits to Paris were 
touted as proof that democracy, science and culture can coexist, and that ―the Americans were 
important contributing members of an international community of enlightened citizens‖ (Strauss 
1978, 17). 
This marks the beginning of a trend in French anti-Americanism. It seems that any time 
the French perceive the Americans as truly being in their debt, or as being weaker and non-
threatening, levels of anti-Americanism are low. When America prospers, does not act according 
to French plans, or seems to replace France as the leading force in international politics, 
economics or culture, however, anti-American feelings catch fire again. Anti-Americanism in 
France is inseparable from French insecurities and self-doubt about their country‘s place in the 
world.  
No sooner had the United States started to emerge from the ashes of the American 
Revolution, then had anti-American rhetoric started to spread in France.  It was initially directed 
not at the American government, nor the American people, but at the weather, flora, and fauna of 
the New Republic.  This rhetoric came primarily from two ―scientific‖ sources: Georges Louis 
Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (Oeuvres Completes 1859) and Cornelius De Paw (De Pauw 1806). 
The portrait they painted of North America was a grim one, characterized by a degeneration of 
plants, animals and ultimately humans, all of whom were not only smaller and weaker than the 
European ones, but also without any prospects of bettering themselves in the future. Chickens 
did not lay eggs, American pigs were smaller than European cats, men were cowards and not 
interested in women and the women were manly and driven by lust for European-born males. 
Crops were anemic, the weather was harsh, the land was covered in salt, and the dogs did not 
bark. There were political reasons behind these and other similar attacks against the United 
States. Europeans monarchs, while supporting the American anti-colonial struggles as a way to 
weaken the British Empire, wanted to ensure that the European citizens did not become so 
enamored with the New Republic that they would decide either to immigrate there (therefore 
putting a strain on Europe‘s economics), or worse, to emulate the American political model and 
replace hereditary monarchies with democratic systems. 
Franklin, the American representative in Paris, and later Jefferson, tried to improve this 
image in the eyes of the Europeans as they feared that it would translate into political 
isolationism at a time when America needed all the support it could gather in Europe‘s capitals. 
Unfortunately, the seeds of anti-Americanism were planted, and there was little the Americans 
could do to change the views of people who have never traveled to the New Continent or met an 
American dog. With the onset of the French Revolution, diplomatic relations between France 
and the United States took a turn for the worse. Fearing that the instability and violence in Paris 
might spread across the ocean, U.S. signed a secret treaty with Great Britain, which further 
angered the French. Roger (2005) writes: 
French privateers started attacking American ships. Twenty years after the ―trade, 
friendship, and alliance‖ treaty, France and the United States were in a state of 
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belligerence [which] makes for a strange epilogue to a century of Enlightenment in 
which, even before the birth of the American nation had taken place, the French anti-
American image war had begun (25). 
19
th
 century Franco-American relations did little to silence the anti-American voices in 
France. The first half of the century saw the naturalist criticism of the United States replaced by a 
cultural one. French travelers to the New Republic, as well as literary giants like Balzac or 
Baudelaire have nothing good to say about America‘s cultural endeavors. This period sees the 
birth of another long lasting anti-American stereotype: the U.S. as the land where civilization is 
trumped by mercantilism and where people are more interested in making money than intelligent 
conversation. Tocqueville‘s ―Democracy in America‖ (De Tocqueville 1966) does nothing to 
change the negative views of French intelligentsia of America and Americans. Au contraire! 
Being perceived as unapologetically pro-American, Tocqueville and his travel companions are 
met with a wave of criticism for their views on American democracy, and we see another 
stereotype being born: Americans are not as democratic as they like to pretend, because they 
have only two parties, they killed the Native Americans and they had slaves (Roger 2005).  
The second half of the 19
th
 century witnesses a change in French anti-Americanism, and 
it was exemplified by the whole ―Statue of Liberty‖ debacle. Following the 1870 defeat of the 
French armies at the hands of the Prussian Empire, and the birth of the French Republic, the 
American model became popular again in a small circle of conservative republicans led by 
Laboulaye. It was his desire to rekindle the friendly relationship France and the United States 
shared a hundred years ago around the ideals of the French Revolution – Liberté, Egalité, 
Fraternité! However, the results of his endeavors were completely opposite: it took a long time 
for the statue‘s pedestal to be built, and in France, this was publicized as just another sign of 
America‘s lack of civilization and gratitude towards France. Philippe Roger places the ―official‖ 
birth date of French anti-Americanism as the end of the 19
th
 century. Upset about the lack of 
respect shown by the Americans to their larger-than-life present, worried about the economic and 
military progresses made by the United States (including the successful 1898 Spanish War) and 
in internal turmoil following the Dreyfuss Affair, the French turned to the one topic on which 
could all agree - anti-Americanism: ―At the high point of civil discord in a divided France, anti-
Americanism was the only ‗French passion‘ that calmed the other passions, curbed antagonisms, 
and reconciled the staunchest adversaries‖ (Roger 2005, 141).  For the first time, a new element 
of anti-Americanism emerges, an element that has resurfaced at various times including the 
recent American interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan – the United States as an imperialist 
power. American dogs were maybe mute, but American cannons were not, and the echoes of the 
Spanish War were heard all over the Old Continent. 
By the beginning of the 20
th
 century, Europe in general, and France in particular, were 
forced to begrudgingly acknowledge that the nation of rude, violent and profit-oriented 
Americans they ridiculed for more than a century has risen to challenge Europe for world 
domination. WWI made it even clearer that the French were losing this contest, so it is no 
surprise that the interwar years are marked by new developments in anti-Americanism, the 
effects of which can be seen in contemporary polls not only in France, but all over Europe. First, 
we can see the seeds of the pan-European project emerging as an alternative to the inexorable 
American take-over. Second, it became fashionable to condemn American cultural values – 
movies, music, and literature – as poisonous to Europe‘s civilization. But more important, the 
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first half of the 20
th
 century witnessed the United States coming to the rescue of the French 
nation not once, but twice. Instead of gratitude, the Americans were met with disdain and 
condescension in Paris. De Gaulle‘s decision to pull out of the NATO military command, 
although remaining a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, as well as France‘s pursuit 
of nuclear weapons, were a reflection of a general feeling among the French people that they did 
not really owe anything to the Americans, that they did not need the Americanism to protect 
them from the Soviets, and that they were on the verge of winning WWII even without 
America‘s help.  
During the Cold War, Franco-American relations remained friendly, yet strained at 
governmental levels. Opposition to the war in Vietnam, France‘s pursuit of secularism and 
comparative economic and military weakness, and the strength of the political Left all 
contributed to the survival of French anti-Americanism over the last sixty years. Americans are 
still seen as rude, greedy, uncivilized, and as too religious and selfishly imperialistic. Given that 
French views of the United States and its people still have the power to unite a divided country, 
and given that these enmities help France to forget its own faults and weaknesses, this may 
continue to be a key component of the French ethos for the foreseeable future. It seems unlikely 
that the Americans could do anything to make the French like them more. Two hundred years 
after Buffon, dogs in America are definitely barking, but there is nobody in France interested in 
hearing them.  
The next section of this chapter describes a very different relationship between a 
European country and the United States – Romania‘s pro-Americanism.   
9.3. ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES – “GOD SMILES UPON US!” 
In 2002, massive crowds enthusiastically welcomed President George W. Bush in his first 
visit to Romania, and the feelings were apparently mutual. During his speech, held in a steady, 
cold November rain, a rainbow appeared in the sky, prompting President Bush to exclaim ―God 
is smiling on us!‖ For the rest of his presidency, George W. Bush would mention this ―magical‖ 
moment every time he would meet Romanian artists, athletes, or politicians. At the time, he was 
not as enthusiastic about the French who mounted, alongside the Germans, the strongest 
opposition to the war in Iraq: 
There is a sense of frustration and disappointment amongst the American people toward 
the French decision [because] they didn't understand the decisions by the French 
leadership to thwart the American desire, and the desire of others, to work on security 
and freedom — security for our countries and freedom in Iraq (Associated Press 2003). 
This section offers a short overview of Romanian pro-Americanism, and its somewhat 
paradoxical character. To understand better the paradox of Romanian pro-Americanism, I start 
with a brief personal story. Growing up, I heard numerous stories about World War II from my 
maternal grandmother, who lived as a child in the Ploesti region, where Romania‘s oil fields are 
located. Her war memories were notably marked by the terror they felt any time American planes 
were dropping bombs not only on the oil fields and refineries (supplying fuel for the Nazi army) 
but also on the town where she lived. She and her family eventually escaped the bombings by 
taking refuge in the countryside, but she never forgot the stars and stripes on the planes bombing 
her house and her school. Apparently, the American planes were flying extremely closely to the 
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ground to avoid the air defenses around Ploiesti and I found confirmation of her war 
recollections on the U.S Air Force‘s website (U.S. Air Force n.d.). 
So, imagine my surprise when, upon receiving my acceptance letter from Indiana State 
University‘s Political Science Department, I saw tears in my grandmother‘s eyes. I thought she 
was upset, but it turns out there were tears of joy. She told me that her dream was always to get 
to see the White House, because she wanted to thank President Reagan for helping us get rid of 
Communism (being accustomed to Ceausescu‘s lifelong hold on Romania, it was hard for her to 
understand that American Presidents leave power after 4 or 8 years, so she assumed Reagan was 
still living in the White House in 1999). 
No matter what the historical reality about the end of the Cold War might be, her feelings 
for the United States were not uncommon among older Romanians –―Yes, the U.S. bombed us 
during WW II. And yes, Roosevelt sold us to the Soviets at Malta, but Reagan came and saved 
us from Communism.‖ And with that, the previous fifty years of tepid Romanian-American 
relations are put behind us, and we start the friendship anew. The remainder of this section will 
present a brief historical overview of this friendship, using as main sources the United States 
Department of State (US Department of State 2011) and media reports.  
In 1968, U.S.–Romanian relations warmed following President Ceausescu‘s show of 
distancing himself from the Soviets during the invasion of Czechoslovakia.  In 1969, as part of 
his ―détente‖ policy, Nixon visits Romania, and ten years later, the Romanian dictator and his 
wife are received at the White House by President Carter. Prior to this visit, a trade agreement 
signed in April 1975 granted most favored nation (MFN) status to Romania under Section 402 of 
the Trade Reform Act of 1974 (US Department of State 2011). This status was renewed yearly 
by Congress following a Presidential evaluation of Romania‘s progress toward freedom of 
emigration, and it was put to good use by the Communist propaganda machine in Romania. 
Every year, after the renewal of the MNF status, the state-owned TV station showed a proud 
Ceausescu talking, usually for about two hours, about the American support for his regime. 
Year after year, Romanians were left to wonder which one was the real America: the one 
backing the dictator, or the one we heard about on our radios through the ―Voice of America‖ 
and ―Radio Free Europe‖ stations.  Those two news agencies, funded by the U.S. Congress 
through the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), a bipartisan federal agency overseeing all 
U.S international broadcasting services, were the only sources of reasonably independent news in 
Romania before 1989, and I remember being taught very early on, as soon as I learn how to 
speak, not to tell anyone about our illegal ―radio sessions.‖ Despite the Ceausescu regime‘s 
attempts to jam their signal, these stations succeeded in spreading the word all over the country 
about the brutal 1989 crackdown in Timisoara, and thus played a key role in ending the 
Communist control over Romania and the rest of the Eastern European countries (Puddington 
2000).  
After the 1989 regime change in Romania, relations between Bucharest and Washington 
did not evolve as fast as the majority of the Romanians would have liked. After the 1990 visit to 
Romania by then Secretary of State James Baker, and the anti-democratic events of early 1990s 
that culminated with the ―Mineriada‖—attacks by coal miners on peaceful protesters in the 
capital city of Bucharest—relations between U.S. and Romania became warmer.  A strong 
catalyst for this was that, following the 1992 elections, Romania demonstrated a decisive turn 
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away from Russia in their foreign and domestic policies. Five years later, with Romanians 
actively pushing for EU and NATO membership, President Clinton visited Romania and was 
received with open arms by a large crowd. Despite the fact that in that very year Romania‘s bid 
for NATO membership had been put on hold due to American reservations about Romania‘s 
political and economic reforms, tens of thousands of Romanians still warmly welcomed the first 
American President to visit post-Communist Romania (CNN Time 1997).  
The 9/11 terrorist attacks and Romania‘s full support for the American-led wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan marked a new stage in U.S.–Romanian relations. A NATO member since 2004, 
Romanian troops have fought in Iraq and are still currently deployed in Afghanistan. American 
President George W. Bush has visited Romania twice, in 2002 and 2007. With Turkey denying 
Americans military access to their national airspace, Romania became an attractive alternative 
option for the geostrategic access to the Black Sea, and from there, to Iraq, Afghanistan and, if 
necessary, Iran. In 2005, Romanian President Basescu made his first official visit to Washington, 
and a year later, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Bucharest and signed an 
agreement that allowed for the use of the Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base by U.S. troops.  These 
moves toward military cooperation drew sharp criticism from Romania‘s longtime foe Russia, 
which saw this as an attempt to diminish Russia‘s influence in Eastern Europe. 
The tensions between Russia and Romania escalated in 2010, when following a visit to 
Bucharest by Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen 
Tauscher, Romania agreed to host elements of the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach to European 
missile defense within the 2015 timeframe (Agenţia Naţională de Presă 2011). An article in the 
Russian newspaper Prava makes it very clear that the government in Moscow was less than 
pleased with the heightened level of military cooperation between Romania and the United 
States:  
Contrary to the statements of the President of Romania, the missile defense deployment is 
directed precisely against Russia. We could take retaliatory measures such as deploying 
Iskander and transferring fighter bombers in the area. In this case, the United States and 
Romania, as they say, found each other. Russia will have to respond not only to the 
Americans but also to the Romanians. There is no guarantee that it will be one and the 
same response. For example, the deployment of Iskander in Transnistria is unlikely to 
impress Washington, but would be a different story for Bucharest (Trukhachev 2011). 
And here lies one of the key components of U.S.–Romanian relations, and of Romania‘s 
pro-Americanism, especially when compared to French anti-Americanism. Yes, Romanians are 
more culturally similar to the Americans than the French are (see next section - public opinion 
data on cultural similarity). Yes, they did not like being scolded by French President Chirac 
when they decided to support the war in Iraq. Yes, Romanian immigrants to the United States are 
treated better and with more respect than are those who either travel to, or look for a better 
economic future in France. But above all, Romania has always needed protection against 
Russia.  There is a saying, based on some historical facts, that every time Romanians have 
signed a peace agreement with the Russians, they lost a part of their territory. 
As of this writing in 2011, just as was the case six decades prior, the U.S. is seen as by 
the government in Bucharest as the primary alternative to Russian influence, but unlike the post-
WWII world, the U.S. needs Romania too due to its geostrategic location. Under these 
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circumstances, maybe it is not that paradoxical after all that despite being bombed by U.S. planes 
during WWII, sold to the Soviets at Malta, abandoned to Ceausescu for fifty years, criticized for 
slow democratic reforms after 1989, and all but ignored until 2002 in their attempts to join 
NATO, Romanians still are, and will for the foreseeable future be, pro-American. 
9.4. FRANCE, ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES: CULTURAL SIMILARITY 
AND ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE 21
ST
 CENTURY 
This section looks at elements of cultural similarity that have been found to have a 
significant relationship with attitudes towards the U.S. in Old and New Europe.  Besides 
economic factors, geostrategic considerations, and domestic politics games (which were the foci 
of the previous three sections of this chapter), I argue here that cultural similarity is an 
additional, major influence on a country‘s levels of anti-Americanism. In the case of Romania 
and France, we are interested to see if their six-hundred years old friendship and francophone ties 
have created strong cultural similarities in the 21
st
 century, or if their different levels of anti-
Americans are actually reflected in different cultural characteristics regarding tolerance and 
religiosity. 
The 2005 and 2006 waves of the World Values Survey provided the empirical data for an 
in-depth look at cultural similarity between a country from Old Europe – France, one from New 
Europe – Romania, and the United States. Discussions of levels of anti-Americanism in France 
and Romania were based on information from the 2005 Eurobarometer 63.4. 
9.4.1. ANTI-AMERICANISM 
While Romania‘s support for the 2003 war in Iraq has drawn sharp criticism from Paris, 
this was just one of many manifestations of different levels of anti-Americanism in Old and New 
Europe. In 2005, several questions from the Eurobarometer surveys measured feelings towards 
the United States in the 27 EU member states, and the differences between France and Romania 
are clear. The Charts visually presenting this data can be found in Appendix 1, after the 
bibliographic information. 
Almost 59 percent of Romanians, compared to only 16 percent of French respondents, 
believe that the United States plays a positive role in supporting world peace. 57 percent of 
Romanians and 29 percent of the French see America‘s impact on economic growth worldwide 
as a positive one, while over 70 percent of those interviewed in France (compared to only 13 
percent in Romania) think that USA plays a negative role in fighting poverty worldwide as well 
as in protecting the environment. Both the French (85 percent) and the Romanians (65 percent) 
support an EU foreign policy more independent of the United States.  This finding suggests that 
pro-Americanism in Romania does not necessarily co-occur with negative attitudes towards the 
European Union. However, when asked to compare the two on several dimensions, only a little 
over 20 percent of Romanians compared to more than half of the French believe that the overall 
quality of life in Europe is much better or somewhat better than in the United States, and that 
Europe is ahead of the U.S. when it comes to fighting discrimination.   
Two years after the Romanian government‘s support for the war in Iraq, this confirms the 
existence of a fairly clear divide in levels of anti-Americanism in France and Romania. It would 
seem that former Romanian President Ion Iliescu‘s decision to join the American-led ―coalition 
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of the willing‖ was a reflection of a generalized pro-American feeling in an otherwise 
francophone society. As Chapters 3-8 have previously shown, there is a strong relationship 
between cultural similarity and anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe – the more anti-
American Old Europe is less culturally similar to the United States than New Europe is. This 
chapter brings into focus another question: are France and Romania so culturally ―dissimilar‖ to 
make one of them look more like the United States than its European ―cousin‖? The next section 
looks at two elements of cultural similarity, tolerance and religiosity, and how they are reflected 
in the cases of France, Romania and the United States. Charts presenting this data can be found 
in Appendix 9.      
9.4.2. TOLERANCE 
Before talking specifically about tolerance towards women, homosexuals and 
immigrants/foreign workers, let‘s first take a look at what are considered important qualities in 
French, American and Romanian children. In the last place we can find ―imagination‖, with only 
31 percent of Americans, 25 percent of the French and a little over 18 percent of the Romanians 
viewing this trait as important in their children.  The most significant child quality for the French 
and the American is to be tolerant and respect other people in their societies (87 percent of 
respondents in France and 79 percent in the U.S. – compared to 60 percent in Romania), while 
for the Romanians is work ethic – 85 percent of Romanians (compared to 62 percent in both 
France and the United States) believe it is important for children to be taught to work hard in life. 
Over 50 percent of Americans and Romanians think that religious faith is a central child quality, 
while only 9 percent of the French agree with that point of view. Based on these answers, one 
would expect that levels of tolerance in France to parallel those in the U.S. than in the Romania – 
U.S. pairing, while in the case of religiosity, the U.S. and Romania should look more alike than 
the U.S. and France.  
We begin our inquiry by looking at tolerance towards homosexuals and 
immigrants/foreign workers. When asked about what groups of individuals they would not want 
as neighbors, both France and Romania had higher percentage of respondents than the United 
States mentioning people of a different race, or who speak a different language, practice a 
different religion, and have AIDS, as well homosexuals and immigrants/foreign workers among 
the ―undesirables.‖ For all three countries the most objectionable group as neighbors are the drug 
addicts, with the heavy drinkers coming in close second. While these answers might simply 
reflect the fact that Europeans are not used to live in as diverse neighborhoods as the Americans 
do, when asked about the justifiability of homosexuality, the U.S. and Romania present a fairly 
similar picture on intolerance. A percentage of French higher than those in Romania and the U.S. 
combined believes that homosexuality is always justifiable. Same scenario repeats itself when 
people are asked if, when jobs are scarce, domestic workers should be given priority over the 
immigrants.   
Regarding tolerance towards women, while over 65 percent of respondents from France 
and the United States that men and women have equal rights in the job market, even when jobs 
are scarce, only 41 percent of Romanians share their views. Sexist/intolerant attitudes towards 
women and gender equality issues are also reflected in the views of those interviewed in 
Romania about women as business executives – more than half of respondents agree or strongly 
agree than men make better business executives and political leaders than women, compared to 
less than 25 percent in France and United States. Romania closes the tolerance towards women 
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gap when it comes to opinions on the importance of college education for boys and girls, 
although it still lags behind France and the United States – 80 percent of Romanians do not 
believe that a university education is more important for boys than for girls (compared to over 95 
percent of the French and Americans). France is more culturally similar to the United States than 
Romania is on these topics related to tolerance towards women. 
While on issues of gender equality there does not seem to be a positive relationship 
between cultural similarity and anti-Americanism, things change when we look at topics, such as 
abortion, divorce or single-parent household, in which gender and religious beliefs are closer 
intertwined. 62 percent of French respondents (compared to 52 percent of Americans and 48 
percent of Romanians) approve of women as single parents, while over 25 percent believe that 
abortion and divorce are always justifiable. Only 7 percent of Americans and 4 percent of 
Romanians agree with this view on abortion, with only slightly higher percentages in the case of 
divorce. This latter observation brings to attention the importance of religiosity as an element of 
cultural similarity, supporting the results from the previous chapters which showed that faith was 
a remarkably strong predictor for levels of anti-Americanism: the more religious, the more pro-
American. The next section looks at cultural similarity between Old Europe, New Europe and the 
United States in terms of their levels of religiosity. 
9.4.3. RELIGIOSITY 
While officially an atheistic society for more than 50 years during Communism, Romania 
has been exhibiting for the last two decades something similar to a spiritual revival that makes 
this country from New Europe look more like the United States than secular France. For more 
than three in four respondents from Romania and the U.S. religion and God are very important or 
rather important in their lives, compared to less than half of the French. 93 percent of 
Romanians, 72 percent of the Americans and only 47 percent of the French consider themselves 
a religious person. It is also interesting to notice that while 17 percent of the French are 
convinced atheists, less than 5 percent of the Americans and less than one in a hundred 
Romanians has atheistic beliefs. This translates into higher trust in organized religions as well as 
more frequent church attendance in Romania and the United States, compared to France where 
over half of the people never attend religious services outside funerals and weddings. There is a 
clear faith-divide between France and Romania, and their different levels of religiosity match 
their different attitudes towards the United States: the more religious and more similar to the 
U.S., the more pro-American. 
9.5. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has shown that not only are Romanians much more pro-American than the 
French, but Romania and France are also more culturally dissimilar than their francophone ties 
and six hundred years of shared history would have suggested. Table 9.5.1 summarizes the 
finding presented in the previous section regarding different levels of anti-Americanism in 
France and Romania. 
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TABLE 9.5.1:  ANTI-AMERICANISM IN FRANCE AND ROMANIA IN THE 21
ST
 
CENTURY 
 FRANCE 
 
ROMANIA 
USA positive role in world peace 15.6% 58.7% 
USA positive role in world 
economy 
29.2% 57.4% 
USA positive role in fighting 
world poverty 
10.7% 52.6% 
USA positive role in 
environment protection 
8.2% 56% 
EU foreign policy should be 
more independent of the USA 
84.9% 64.9% 
Europe is ahead of the USA on 
fighting discrimination 
52.1% 22.5% 
Quality of life in Europe is better 
than in the USA 
56.3% 25.5% 
Two years after the onset of the Iraq war, the wave of anti-American feelings flowing 
from France failed to reach the Romanians for whom the United States is still very much a 
political, economic and social model worth emulating and an overall positive influence 
worldwide. In France, things are very different, and there are no signs of a renewed friendship 
between the two countries. Talking about French anti-Americanism, Pascal Bruckner explains 
that it will never truly disappear because it has become:  
―[…] a life's work for a number of sociologists, novelists, philosophers, and artists. There 
is a stock of prejudices endlessly renewed and which emerge unchanged out of every 
crisis. The hatred for America as a nation derives from a mixture of ignorance, jealousy, 
and pettiness. It is usually accompanied by a pro-found nostalgia for French grandeur 
from the time of the Empire or Charles de Gaulle, and from resentment and worship of 
the past‖ (Bruckner and Golsan 2005, 18). 
Romania and France are different on more than just their anti-Americanism levels. Those 
cultural ties bonding these two countries so tightly in the Interwar years were significantly 
weakened by fifty years of Communist rule in Romania, followed by twenty years of pro-
Americanism. Table 9.5.2 summarizes the cultural similarities between Romania, France and the 
United States.  
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TABLE 9.5.2: CULTURAL SIMILARITY – FRANCE, UNITED STATES AND 
ROMANIA IN THE 21
ST
 CENTURY 
 FRANCE UNITED STATES ROMANIA 
Religious faith important for children 8.7% 50.8% 64% 
Tolerance and respect for other people are 
important children qualities 
86.8% 78.7% 59.7% 
Religion very important in life 13.0% 47.4% 58.0% 
God very important in life 11.2% 57.8% 66.3% 
I am a religious person 46.9% 72.1% 93.4% 
I never attend church services 60.1% 25.6% 4.5% 
I have confidence in national churches 46% 66.3% 88% 
Homosexuality is never justifiable 14.8% 32.5% 73.0% 
Prostitution is never justifiable 41.2% 43.2% 69.2% 
Abortion is never justifiable 13.8% 25.5% 48.4% 
Divorce is never justifiable 8.7% 5.8% 34.7% 
University education is more important for 
a boy than for a girl 
6.8% 7.9% 19.3% 
Disapprove of women as single parents 26.4% 47.8% 38.2% 
Men make better political leaders than 
women do 
21.2% 24.7% 55% 
Men make better business executives than 
women do 
14.4% 16.5% 51.1% 
Employers should hire men instead of 
women when jobs are scarce 
18.1% 6.8% 35.2% 
Employers should hire domestic workers 
instead of immigrants when jobs are scarce 
42.1% 55.4% 65.1% 
For as much as they dislike the United States, the French are more similar to the 
Americans in their views on gender equality than the Romanians are, with the exception of single 
motherhood issues. On other topics, such as homosexuality, abortion or the right of immigrants 
to jobs even in bad economies, Romania and the United States share slightly more intolerant 
attitudes than the French. But the issue that stands out as the single most striking difference 
between France on one side, and Romania and the U.S. on the other is religion. Secularism, so 
predominant in the French society, has failed to take roots in 21
st
 century Romania, which could 
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be at least in part as a reaction to the forced atheism imposed by the Communist regime. 
Romania and the United States are religious, traditional societies, with conservative beliefs and 
mores. This particular aspect of cultural similarity has been found to be strongly correlated with 
levels of anti-Americanism, but the picture painted in this chapter is more complex than that. 
Romanians have come to see the U.S. as their strongest defense against possible trouble brewing 
in Moscow, while the French will never forget that ―Pax Americanna‖ took over and effectively 
ended ―La Belle Époque‖: 
France is a proud nation which regards itself as superior to all other nations in many 
important ways: it is usually just as negative toward other nations as it is toward the 
United States now. In this sense France is very much like the United States, which also 
regards itself as superior and a nation to which other peoples should want to come, rather 
than as a nation from which some of its citizens leave as emigrants (Rose 1952, 469). 
The last chapter of this dissertation presents a summary of all the findings in this 
dissertation and opens the door for future research on anti-Americanism and cultural similarity in 
a divided European Union. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
136 
 
CHAPTER 10 – CONCLUSIONS 
Donald Rumsfeld may have been wrong about many things during his time as the 
Secretary of Defense for George W. Bush, but on one issue he was right. Old Europe, including 
countries like France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Belgium, is significantly more 
anti-American than New Europe, which includes countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Poland 
and Hungary. In this project, however, I have made a number of observations that go beyond 
than this simple conclusion. I examined factors that could be behind these different levels of anti-
Americanism in Old Europe and New Europe, and one key answer that emerged was ―cultural 
similarity.‖ There are, of course, other factors that impact attitudes towards the United States and 
Americans, such as the frequent travels to and from the U.S., a country‘s trade ties with the 
American government, and people‘s views on U.S. policies in the Middle East and towards the 
environment. But even when we take all these elements into account, cultural similarity still 
plays a significant role in why Old Europe is more anti-American than is New Europe. The 
United States and New Europe resemble each other more culturally than Old Europe and the 
U.S. do, particularly in their levels of religiosity. Secularism never took root in New Europe and 
the United States with the force that it has in Old Europe. Romanians and Americans go to 
church more often, pray more frequently, and place more importance on religion in their lives 
than do the French.  
The second element of cultural similarity investigated in this dissertation is tolerance. 
There is a significant relationship between levels of anti-Americanism and tolerance towards 
women, immigrants/foreign workers and immigrants in Old Europe versus New Europe. New 
Europe and the United States are, in general, more intolerant than Old Europe.  There is an 
exception here, however, in terms of gender equality issues. French and Americans are more 
likely than are Romanians to support equal rights to a job for men and women even when jobs 
are scarce.  French and Americans are also more likely than are Romanians to view female 
politicians as equally qualified with their male counterparts for leadership positions. On other 
topics where religion tends to influence public opinion, however—such as in the cases of 
abortion or prostitution—Old Europeans have a more open-minded and tolerant attitude than do 
New Europeans and Americans. To draw a simplistic caricature outlining these findings—if you 
are from New Europe then you are relatively sexist, xenophobic, homophobic, religious, and pro-
American relative to your Old European counterparts. 
There are, of course, several avenues for advancement of this research program.  For 
example, future work could take additional factors into account as potentially impacting levels of 
anti-Americanism, in terms of both cultural and non-cultural influences. Further, focusing on 
additional Old and New European countries, and viewing the relationship between cultural issues 
and public support of non-U.S. countries world would help to identify the degree to which these 
findings are generalizable to other cases. But even without taking these additional steps, I believe 
that the results presented in this dissertation provide a better understanding of European anti-
Americanism than was previously the case in the already extensive literature on this topic. There 
is a clear cultural divide in the European Union between Old Europe and New Europe that 
parallels their respective attitudes towards the United States and the American people. 
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APPENDIX 1 
WORLD VALUES SURVEY DATABASE – CODEBOOK 
QUESTION 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Important in life: 
Religion 
 Very 
important 
Rather 
important 
Not very 
important 
Not at all 
important 
 
Important child 
qualities: tolerance 
and respect for other 
people 
Not 
mentioned 
Important     
Important child 
qualities: religious 
faith 
Not 
mentioned 
Important     
Which of the 
following groups 
you would not want 
as neighbors: 
Immigrants/foreign 
workers 
 
Not 
mentioned 
Mentioned     
Which of the 
following groups 
you would not want 
as neighbors: 
Homosexuals 
Not 
mentioned 
Mentioned     
Jobs scarce: Men 
should have more 
right to a job than 
women 
 Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree   
Jobs scarce: 
Employers should 
give priority to 
(nation) people than 
immigrants 
 Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree   
A woman has to 
have children to be 
fulfilled 
Not 
necessary 
Needs 
children 
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Table continued. 
QUESTION 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Marriage is an out-
dated institution 
Disagree  Agree     
Woman as a single 
parent 
 
Disapprove Approve     
Men make better 
political leaders than 
women do 
 Agree 
strongly 
Agree Disagree Disagree 
strongly 
 
University is more 
important for a boy 
than for a girl 
 Agree 
strongly 
Agree Disagree Disagree 
strongly 
 
How much 
confidence do you 
have in Churches? 
 A great 
deal 
Quite a 
lot 
Not very 
much 
None at 
all 
 
Immigrant policy  Let anyone 
come 
As long 
as jobs 
are 
available 
Strict 
limits 
Prohibit 
people 
from 
coming 
 
How often do you 
attend religious 
services 
(6 = Once a year, 
7=Less often, 
8=never, practically 
never) 
 
 More than 
once a 
week 
Once a 
week 
Once a 
month 
Only on 
special 
holy days/ 
Christmas/ 
Easter 
Other 
specific 
holy 
days 
Do you consider 
yourself a religious 
person? 
 A religious 
person 
Not a 
religious 
person 
A 
convinced 
atheist 
  
Churches give 
answers to social 
problems 
 
No Yes     
How important is 
God in your life? 
(10 = very 
important) 
 Not at all 
important 
2 3 4 5 
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Table continued. 
QUESTION 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Politicians who 
don´t believe in God 
are unfit for public 
office 
 Agree 
strongly 
Agree Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Better if more 
people with strong 
religious beliefs in 
public office 
 Agree 
strongly 
Agree Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Religious leaders 
should not influence 
government 
 
 Agree 
strongly 
Agree Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Justifiable: 
homosexuality 
(10 = always 
justifiable) 
 Never 
justifiable 
2 3 4 5 
Justifiable: 
prostitution 
(10 = always 
justifiable) 
 Never 
justifiable 
2 3 4 5 
Justifiable: abortion 
(10 = always 
justifiable) 
 Never 
justifiable 
2 3 4 5 
Justifiable: divorce 
(10 = always 
justifiable) 
 Never 
justifiable 
2 3 4 5 
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APPENDIX 2 
VOICE OF THE PEOPLE – MILLENIUM EDITION DATABASE CODEBOOK 
QUESTION 1 2 3 4 
How often do you attend religious 
services these days? 
(5 = once a year, 6 = less often, 7 = 
never, practically never) 
More than 
once a week 
Once a 
week 
Once a 
month 
Only on 
special 
holy days 
Would you say that there exists one and 
only one true religion, that there is truth 
in many religions or that there is no 
essential truth in any religion? 
One and 
only one 
true religion 
Many true 
religions 
No true 
religion 
 
How important is God in your life? (10 
= very important) 
Not at all 
important 
2 3 4 
Do you take some moments of prayer, 
meditation or something like that? 
Yes No   
Which of these statements comes closest 
to your beliefs? 
There is a 
personal 
God 
There is 
some sort of 
spirit or life 
force 
I don‘t 
know 
what to 
think 
I don‘t 
really think 
there is any 
sort of 
spirit, God 
or life force 
Education is more important for boys 
than for girls. 
Agree Disagree   
Both the husband and the wife should 
contribute to the household income? 
Agree Disagree   
On the whole, men make better political 
leaders than women do. 
Agree Disagree   
When jobs are scarce, men should have 
more rights to a job than women? 
Agree Disagree   
A woman needs to have children in 
order to be really fulfilled. 
Agree Disagree   
Sometimes when a woman says no to 
sex, she doesn't always mean it. 
Agree Disagree   
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APPENDIX 3 
PEW 2002 DATABASE CODEBOOK 
QUESTION 1 2 3 4 5 
Is the influence of 
religious leaders very 
good, somewhat good, 
somewhat bad or very 
bad in our country? 
Very good Somewhat 
good 
Somewhat 
bad 
Very bad  
Is the influence of 
immigrants very good, 
somewhat good, 
somewhat bad or very 
bad in our country? 
Very good Somewhat 
good 
Somewhat 
bad 
Very bad  
Religion is a matter of 
personal faith and should 
be kept separate from 
government policy 
Completely 
agree 
Mostly agree Mostly 
disagree 
Completely 
disagree 
 
Our people are not 
perfect, but our culture is 
superior to others. 
 
Completely 
agree 
Mostly agree Mostly 
disagree 
Completely 
disagree 
 
Our way of life needs to 
be protected against 
foreign influence? 
Completely 
agree 
Mostly agree Mostly 
disagree 
Completely 
disagree 
 
We should restrict and 
control entry of people 
into our country more 
than we do now. 
Completely 
agree 
Mostly agree Mostly 
disagree 
Completely 
disagree 
 
What kind of marriage 
do you think is the more 
satisfying way of life? 
Husband 
provides for 
family, wife 
cares for house 
and kids 
Both have jobs 
and take care 
of house and 
children 
   
Which one of these 
statements about belief 
in God comes closest to 
your opinion? 
Not necessary 
to believe in 
God to have 
moral/good 
values 
Necessary to 
believe in God 
to have 
moral/good 
values 
   
Which one of these 
statements about 
homosexuality comes 
closer to your opinion? 
Homosexuality 
is a way of life 
society should 
accept 
Homosexuality 
is a way of life 
society should 
not accept 
 
   
What is your opinion of 
the United States? 
Very favorable Somewhat 
favorable 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
Very 
unfavorable 
 
149 
 
Table continued. 
QUESTION 1 2 3 4 5 
What is your opinion of 
Americans? 
Very favorable Somewhat 
favorable 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
Very 
unfavorable 
 
In making international 
policy decisions, to what 
extent do you think the 
United States takes into 
account the interests of 
countries like our 
country? 
Great deal Fair amount Not too 
much 
Not at all  
In your opinion, do 
United States' policies 
increase the gap between 
rich and poor countries, 
lessen the gap between 
rich and poor countries, 
or do United States 
policies have no effect 
on the gap between rich 
and poor countries? 
 
Increase gap 
between rich 
and poor 
No effect Lessen gap 
between 
rich and 
poor 
  
In terms of solving world 
problems, does the 
United States do too 
much, too little, or the 
right amount in helping 
solve world problems? 
United States 
does too much 
United States 
does the right 
amount 
United 
States does 
too little 
United 
States does 
nothing 
 
It's good that American 
ideas and customs are 
spreading here, OR it's 
bad that American ideas 
and customs are 
spreading here. 
It's good that 
American 
ideas and 
customs are 
spreading here 
It‘s bad that 
American 
ideas and 
customs are 
spreading here 
   
Outside of attending 
religious services, do 
you pray several times a 
day, once a day, a few 
times a week, once a 
week or less, or never? 
Several times a 
day 
Once a day A few 
times a 
week 
Once a 
week or 
less 
Never 
How important is 
religion in your life? 
Very 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Not too 
important 
Not at all 
important 
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APPENDIX 4 
2006 UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP, INVOLVEMENT AND DEMOCRACY SURVEY 
AND 2002 EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY DATABASE CODEBOOK 
QUESTION 0 1 2 3 4 
Gays and lesbians free to live life as 
they whish 
(5 = disagree strongly) 
 Agree 
strongly 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree 
How religious are you? 
(10 = very religious) 
Not at all 
religious 
1 2 3 4 
How often do you attend religious 
services apart from special occasions? 
(5 = only on special holy days, 6 = 
less often, 7=never) 
 Every 
day 
More 
than 
once a 
week 
Once a 
week 
At least 
once a 
month 
Qualification for immigration: good 
educational qualifications 
(10 = extremely important) 
Extremely 
unimportant 
1 2 3 4 
Qualification for immigration: close 
family living here 
(10 = extremely important) 
Extremely 
unimportant 
1 2 3 4 
Qualification for immigration: speak 
country‘s official language 
Extremely 
unimportant 
1 2 3 4 
Qualification for immigration: 
Christian background 
(10 = extremely important) 
Extremely 
unimportant 
1 2 3 4 
Qualification for immigration: be 
white 
(10 = extremely important) 
Extremely 
unimportant 
1 2 3 4 
Taxes and services: immigrants take 
out more than they put in or less 
(10 = generally put in more) 
Generally 
take out 
more 
1 2 3 4 
Country's cultural life undermined or 
enriched by immigrants 
(10 = cultural life enriched) 
Cultural life 
undermined 
1 2 3 4 
Immigrants make country's crime 
problems worse or better 
(10 = crime problems made better) 
Crime 
problems 
made worse 
1 2 3 4 
Better for a country if almost 
everyone share customs and traditions 
(5 = disagree strongly) 
 Agree 
strongly 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree 
Better for a country if a variety of 
different religions 
(5 = disagree strongly) 
 Agree 
strongly 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree 
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APPENDIX 5 
PEW 2007 DATABASE CODEBOOK 
QUESTION       1 2 3 4 
Is immigration a problem in our 
country? 
Very big 
problem 
A moderately 
big problem 
A small 
problem 
Not a 
problem at 
all 
 
What is your opinion of the 
United States? 
Very 
favorable 
Somewhat 
favorable 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
Very 
unfavorable 
 
What is your opinion of the 
Americans? 
Very 
favorable 
Somewhat 
favorable 
Somewhat 
unfavorable 
Very 
unfavorable 
 
The influence of religious leaders 
in our country is __ 
Very good Somewhat 
good 
Somewhat 
bad 
 
Very bad 
The influence of immigrants in 
our country is ____ 
Very good Somewhat 
good 
Somewhat 
bad 
 
Very bad 
Religion is a matter of personal 
faith and should be kept separate 
from government policy. 
 
Completely 
agree 
Mostly agree Mostly 
disagree 
Completely 
disagree 
In making international policy 
decisions, do you think the U.S/ 
takes into account the interests of 
countries like our country? 
 
Great deal Fair amount Not too 
much 
Not at all 
In making international policy 
decisions, do you think the 
United States take into account 
the interests of other countries 
around the world? 
 
Great deal Fair amount Not too 
much 
Not at all 
What effect do U.S. policies 
have on the gap between rich and 
poor countries? 
Increase gap 
between rich 
and poor 
No effect Lessen gap 
between 
rich and 
poor 
 
 
Which of the following phrases 
comes closer to your view? 
It's good that 
American 
ideas and 
customs are 
spreading 
here 
It's bad that 
American 
ideas and 
customs are 
spreading 
here 
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Table continued. 
QUESTION       1 2 3 4 
Which one of the following 
statements comes closest to your 
opinion about men and women 
as political leaders? 
Men 
generally 
make better 
political 
leaders than 
women 
In general, 
women and 
men make 
equally good 
political 
leaders 
Women 
generally 
make better 
political 
leaders than 
men 
 
 
Which one of these comes 
closest to your opinion, number 
1 or number 2? 
Number 1 – 
It is not 
necessary to 
believe in 
God in order 
to be moral 
and have 
good values 
 
Number 2 – It 
is necessary 
to believe in 
God in order 
to be moral 
and have 
good values 
  
And which one of these comes 
closer to your opinion, number 1 
or number 2? 
 
 
 
 
 
Number 1 – 
Homosexuali
ty is a way of 
life that 
should be 
accepted by 
society 
Number 2 – 
Homosexualit
y is a way of 
life that 
should not be 
accepted by 
society 
  
Outside of attending religious 
services, how often do you pray? 
(5 = never) 
 
Several times 
a day 
Once a day A few times 
a week 
Once a week 
or less 
How important is religion in 
your life? 
 
Very 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Not too 
important 
Not at all 
important 
And which comes closer to 
describing your view?   
The United 
States 
promotes 
democracy 
wherever it 
can 
The United 
States 
promotes 
democracy 
mostly where 
it serves its 
interests 
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APPENDIX 6 
EUROBAROMETER 62 – 2004 DATABASE CODEBOOK 
QUESTION 1 2 3 
Should the EU foreign policy be 
more independent of the USA? 
 
Tend to agree Tend to disagree  
USA role in peace in the world 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
USA role in fighting terrorism 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
USA role in economic growth 
worldwide 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
USA role in fighting poverty 
worldwide 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
USA role in environment protection 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
EU role in peace in the world 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
EU role in fighting terrorism 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
EU role in economic growth 
worldwide 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
EU role in fighting poverty 
worldwide 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
EU role in environment protection Positive Neither nor Negative 
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APPENDIX 7 
EUROBAROMETER 63 – 2005 DATABASE CODEBOOK 
QUESTION 
 
1 2 3 
EU foreign policy more 
independent of the United States 
 
Tend to agree Don‘t know Tend to disagree 
USA role in peace in the world 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
USA role in fighting terrorism 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
USA role in economic growth 
worldwide 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
USA role in fighting poverty 
worldwide 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
USA role in environment protection 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
EU role in peace in the world 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
EU role in fighting terrorism 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
EU role in economic growth 
worldwide 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
EU role in fighting poverty 
worldwide 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
EU role in environment protection 
 
 
Positive Neither nor Negative 
EU compared to the U.S. – life 
quality 
(4 = definitely less good) 
 
Much better Somewhat better Somewhat less 
good 
Europe compared to the U.S. – 
scientific research 
Europe ahead of the 
United States 
At the same 
level 
Europe behind 
the United 
States 
 
Europe compared to the U.S. – 
medical research 
Europe ahead of the 
United States 
At the same 
level 
Europe behind 
the United 
States 
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Table continued. 
QUESTION 
 
1 2 3 
Europe compared to the U.S. – 
environment protection 
Europe ahead of the 
United States 
At the same 
level 
Europe behind 
the United 
States 
 
Europe compared to the U.S. – 
innovation technology 
Europe ahead of the 
United States 
At the same 
level 
Europe behind 
the United 
States 
 
Europe compared to the U.S. – 
healthcare system 
Europe ahead of the 
United States 
At the same 
level 
Europe behind 
the United 
States 
 
Europe compared to the U.S. – 
education 
 
 
Europe ahead of the 
United States 
At the same 
level 
Europe behind 
the United 
States 
Europe compared to the U.S. – 
fighting social disparities 
Europe ahead of the 
United States 
At the same 
level 
Europe behind 
the United 
States 
 
Europe compared to the U.S. – 
fighting unemployment 
Europe ahead of the 
United States 
At the same 
level 
Europe behind 
the United 
States 
 
Europe compared to the U.S. – 
fighting discrimination 
Europe ahead of the 
United States 
At the same 
level 
Europe behind 
the United 
States 
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APPENDIX 8 
TABLE SHOWING REGRESSION RESULTS FOR PEW 2007 – FORM B DATABASE, 
WITHOUT THE “OPINIONS OF GEORGE W. BUSH” INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Dependent Variable: Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, 
somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States? 
  t Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 2.351 .171   13.772 .000 
Free market .148 .015 .157 10.133 .000 
Protecting the environment. -.023 .016 -.024 -1.490 .136 
Church and State  -.048 .018 -.041 -2.655 .008 
Stricter immigration .030 .013 .035 2.279 .023 
Children education .071 .080 .014 .888 .375 
Global warming -.080 .019 -.066 -4.156 .000 
Old Europe vs. New Europe -.170 .026 -.100 -6.501 .000 
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APPENDIX 9 
CHARTS SHOWING LEVELS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN FRANCE AND 
ROMANIA  
(Chapter 9, section 9.4) 
Chart 1 – USA role in world peace 
 
Chart 2 – USA role in economic growth worldwide 
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Chart 3: USA role in fighting poverty worldwide 
 
 
Chart 4: USA role in protecting the environment 
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Chart 5: Support for an EU foreign policy more independent of the USA 
 
 
 
Chart 6: Europe compared to the USA on fighting discrimination 
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Chart 7: Europe compared to the USA on overall quality of life 
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APPENDIX 10 
CHARTS SHOWING LEVELS OF TOLRANCE AND RELIGIOSITY IN FRANCE, 
ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES  
(Chapter 9, section 9.4) 
Chart1: Important child qualities 
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Chart 2: People that you wouldn‘t want as neighbors 
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Chart 3: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women 
 
 
Chart 4: When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to (nation) people than immigrants 
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Chart 5: Men make better business executives than women do 
 
 
Chart 6: Men make better political leaders than women do 
 
 
 
 
2.5% 
11.9% 
30.9% 
54.8% 
2.3% 
14.2% 
53.6% 
29.9% 
14.0% 
34.7% 
27.8% 
23.5% 
Agree strongly Agree Disagree Strongly disagree
Men make better business executives than women do 
France
United States
Romania
3.8% 
17.4% 
33.7% 
45.1% 
4.4% 
20.3% 
57.0% 
18.3% 
15.0% 
40.0% 
26.2% 
18.8% 
Agree strongly Agree Disagree Strongly disagree
Men make better political leaders than women do 
France
United
States
Romania
165 
 
Chart 7: Women as single parents 
 
 
Chart 8: Education for boys and girls 
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Chart 9: Homosexuality – justifiable? 
 
 
Chart 10: Prostitution – justifiable? 
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Chart 11: Abortion – justifiable? 
 
 
Chart 12: Divorce – justifiable? 
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Chart 13: How important is religion in your life? 
 
 
 
Chart 14: How important in God in your life? 
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Chart 15: Do you consider yourself a religious person? 
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Chart 16: How often do you attend religious services? 
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Chart 17: How much confidence do you have in churches? 
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APPENDIX 11 
TABLE SHOWING CHANGES IN “FAVORABLE” AND “SOMEWHAT 
FAVORABLE” OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AS MEASURED BY THE PEW 
2002 AND PEW 2007 SURVEYS 
Question: Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat 
unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States? 
Country 2002 2007 
Bulgaria 73.8% 55.8% 
Czech Republic 70.2% 47.3% 
Poland 77.4% 67% 
Slovak Republic 65.8% 43.2% 
France 70.6% 39.1% 
Germany 70.6% 31.5% 
Italy 73.8% 58.4% 
Great Britain 81.8% 82% 
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APPENDIX 12 
 
CHART SHOWING CHANGES IN “FAVORABLE” AND “SOMEWHAT 
FAVORABLE” OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AS MEASURED BY THE PEW 
2002 AND PEW 2007 SURVEYS 
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